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Preface 
Universally, becoming a parent is seen as one of the main goals in life. Raising a helpless 
little human to an autonomous adult brings, among many other things, joy, happiness, 
fear, worries, frustration, pride, busy days and sleepless nights. Becoming a parent can 
without a doubt be seen as one of the most life-changing events in a person’s life. For 
some people, the path to parenthood is a challenge. Fertility problems block their child 
wish to come through. Luckily, many solutions are available to overcome involuntary 
childlessness. Using donated gametes is one of them. For those families, several 
dynamics occur that are absent in other families. They need to deal with questions that 
other families are not confronted with. In this dissertation, I will go in to some 
normative and psychological issues concerning family building via gamete donation. For 
four years I had the opportunity to delve into the topic of parenthood after assisted 
reproduction with gamete donation. I was able to read and think about ethical issues 
and I had the chance to study the views, experiences and opinions of the people 
involved in the practice. This dissertation is the result of four years of work. It 
represents my own process of thinking about parenthood via gamete donation. This 
dissertation discusses by no means in detail every ethically relevant aspect of this topic. 
However, I attempt to discuss what I believe are some of the main issues surrounding 
this field. 
 
In a sense, writing a doctoral dissertation is similar to climbing a mountain. Of course, 
the views from my office didn’t come near to the views in the mountains, and yes, 
writing a dissertation requires nothing but a chair (or something similar) and a 
computer. Nonetheless, on one point the similarities are striking. From the moment a 
climber leaves basecamp, he knows difficulties might cross his path. The snow 
conditions might not be as expected, the weather might change drastically during the 
ascent, the route might be more difficult than expected, fear might suddenly overwhelm 
the climber or the friendly roommate in the mountain refuge might turn out to be a 
snorer. Difficulties also like to appear whilst writing a doctoral dissertation. I can 
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honestly say that Murphy probably had a laugh almost every time I submitted a 
manuscript to a journal. Also at my first encounter with an ESHRE talk, he was there 
enjoying himself, leading to a personal aversion of everything that looks like presenting 
in front of a reasonable audience. However, with persistence, many of these hitches can 
be overcome and the mountain can be conquered, and so can be reaching the end of 
writing a doctoral dissertation. Writing this doctoral dissertation was sometimes 
demotivating, difficult, boring, lonely, and at some points, a lot more difficult than 
climbing. But at other times it was equally fun, enriching, challenging and enormously 
freeing. Either way, the last four years have transformed me, for the better and the 
worse. 
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Introduction and background 
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The child wish: when ART comes in 
Universally, parenthood is undeniably regarded as one of the most important goals in 
life. For most people in most societies, parenthood is included in their life plan and is 
considered to be central to their identity (Boivin et al., 2007). In many cultures, having 
children is a confirmation of one’s masculinity and femininity and it is seen as an 
expression of the couple’s unity. There are many possible motivations for choosing the 
path of parenthood. Having children is said to bring happiness and being a parent is 
seen as a valuable act in life. The fulfilment of one’s identity and continuity (passing on 
one’s genes) are also seen as reasons for opting into parenthood (Bos et al., 2003). 
However, not all couples who intend to have children will also achieve this goal 
spontaneously. Some will need medical help to resolve underlying fertility problems. 
The World Health Organization recognizes infertility as a public health issue worldwide 
(Boivin et al., 2007). Infertility is clinically defined as ‘a disease of the reproductive system 
defined by the failure to achieve a clinical pregnancy after 12 months or more of regular 
unprotected sexual intercourse’ (Zegers-Hochschild et al. for the World Health 
Organization and the International Committee for Monitoring Assisted Reproductive 
Technology, 2009). As age is a determining factor for a successful conception and 
pregnancy, a woman aged 35 or older is considered infertile after six months of 
unsuccessfully attempting a pregnancy. According to this definition, infertility is a 
broad concept. In practice, a distinction can be made between infertility and 
subfertility. Many couples who fail to conceive after 12 months are sub fertile: they may 
still achieve a pregnancy without medical assistance in the future. Another distinction 
can be made between primary infertility, which is the inability to conceive, and 
secondary infertility, which is defined as a failure to conceive after a previous 
conception (Keye, 2006). In this dissertation, infertility is used in the broad sense: 
everyone who experiences difficulties in having children and needs to appeal to assisted 
reproduction is infertile. 
When having a baby does not go smoothly 
An estimated 10-15 % of couples is affected by infertility, which makes this one of the 
most common diseases for people at their reproductive age (between 20 and 45 years 
old) (ASRM Fact Sheet, 2014). Physiological causes in either the man or the woman are 
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responsible for 20-35% of the infertility cases. For 25-40% of cases, the problem lies with 
both partners and in 10-20% the infertility remains unexplained (ESHRE ART Fact Sheet, 
2014). Next to physiological causes, lifestyle factors such as smoking, obesity and stress 
are associated with increased risk of infertility (ESHRE ART Fact Sheet, 2014). Several 
techniques and medical treatments have been developed to help infertile couples. Non-
invasive methods include advice about the timing of intercourse or drug therapy to 
promote ovulation or prevent miscarriages (Harvard Medical School, 2009). Other 
couples need to appeal to more advanced medical techniques such as in vitro 
fertilization (IVF) or intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) where a woman’s oocytes 
are removed from her ovaries and combined with sperm in a laboratory. When embryos 
develop, these are transferred to the woman’s womb (HFEA, 2012). Since the birth of the 
first IVF baby Louis Browne in 1978, it is estimated that more than 5 million IVF babies 
followed since then worldwide (Adamson et al., 2013). Each year, an estimated 1.5 
million Artificial Reproduction Techniques (ART) cycles are performed worldwide, 
which result annually in the birth of an estimated 350,000 babies (ESHRE, 2014). In 
Belgium, more than 3 % of all babies born are conceived by ARTs. In the USA, this is 
estimated to be slightly more than 1% of total births (ESHRE, 2014). 
A considerable part of the infertile couples cannot use their own genetic material. In 
such cases, material of a third party can be used. Sperm, oocyte or embryo donation can 
help a couple to conceive a child that is partly genetically or biologically related to 
them. In the United States, it is estimated that 40.000 children are born annually via 
donor insemination (Thorn, 2006). In Belgium, in 2011, an estimated 13.000 women were 
inseminated with donor sperm and an estimated 300 women received a donor egg 
(Belrap, 2014). 
Given the value that is attached to parenthood, it is not surprising that infertility has 
a massive impact on the individual’s and couple’s psychological wellbeing and stability. 
Both men and women report on the psychological burdens of infertility in the form of 
anger, grief and depression, guilt, stress, isolation, loss and a sense of personal failure 
(Dunkel-Schetter & Lobel, 1991; Mason, 1993; Cousineau & Domar, 2007). The most 
difficult emotion for couples to handle is the loss of control over one’s life (Cousineau & 
Domar, 2007). Infertility becomes the centre of daily tasks and discourse, often leading 
to an exclusion of other important aspects of life (Cousineau & Domar, 2007). For men, 
reduced sexual desire and satisfaction, and feelings of personal and sexual inadequacy 
were found after infertility diagnosis (Ramezanzadeh et al., 2006; Irvine, 1996). For 
women, failure talk is often reported with regard to sexual and reproductive functions, 
and a reduction of self-esteem in the sense that their body cannot do what other women 
seem to do without any difficulty (Petok, 2006; Daniluk, 1998). Lengthier treatment 
seems to increase marital distress, which, for women, is accompanied with a negative 
impact on sexual functioning (Petok, 2006, Cousineau & Domar, 2007). Overall, stress 
seems to be a larger problem for women than for men (Petok, 2006; Henning and 
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Strauss, 2002). Data on the impact of infertility on the couple and the impact on the 
marital relationship has not been conclusive (Cousineau & Domar, 2007). On the one 
hand, marital stress seems to increase in couples who do not conceive within the first 
year compared to couples who do (Benazon et al., 1992). On the other hand, studies have 
shown that generally, marital relationships remain stable (Edelmann et al., 1994). For 
most couples, infertility seems to be a temporarily life crisis.  
Alternative families 
Infertility does not only affect heterosexual couples. Lesbian and gay couples and 
singles may not have medical reasons for assisted reproduction, but they cannot achieve 
a pregnancy on their own either. To differentiate this inability to conceive 
spontaneously from medical infertility, sometimes the term social infertility is used. A 
study conducted in 2012 showed that 3.5% of the adults in the US identified as lesbian, 
gay, bisexual or transgender, which comes down to 8.2 million people in the US (Gates & 
Newport, 2012). Of these, an estimated 650.000 same-sex couples are living in the US 
with 19% of them raising children, with 27% for lesbian couples specifically (The 
Williams Institute, 2010). These data include biological children, adopted children and 
foster care children. Unlike heterosexual couples who often only find out about 
infertility after months of trying to conceive naturally, these couples know in advance 
that having children on their own is not possible. When such couples opt for medical aid 
to fulfil their child wish, they know that, in the case of lesbian couples, a gamete donor, 
and for gay couples also a surrogate, will be necessary.  
Zooming in on third party reproduction 
Along with the development of reproductive techniques, ethical questions and 
discussions have been raised from the start. Several examples of such ethical debates 
can be given. For instance, arguments were advanced against the moral acceptability of 
the reproductive techniques. The argument goes that by using such techniques, 
procreation is separated from sexual intercourse, disrupting the ‘natural order’ of 
things. Italy for instance rejects gamete donation based on this motivation. Another 
example of a hugely important moral consideration is the welfare of the child. It is for 
instance argued that with ARTs and the practice of gamete donation, families can be 
formed which cannot guarantee the child’s well-being: frozen sperm that was stored 
from a man who died, can be used to inseminate the widow. In the ethical debate, it is 
argued that the right to procreate should always be balanced with the well-being of the 
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future child, meaning that the resulting child should have a reasonably happy life 
(Pennings, 1999). Another example of a moral objection raised against ARTs, is the fear 
for designer babies and eugenics. To what extend should would-be parents be able to 
choose their donor and accompanying characteristics? Should would-be parents be able 
to create embryos and pick only the boys or girls, or choose the blond or brown haired 
child? A recent debate in this regard discusses the moral acceptability of the so-called 
‘three parent babies’, where DNA of three persons is used during an IVF treatment in 
order to prevent mitochondrial diseases (HFEA, 2014; Human Genetics Alert, 2013). 
Other ethical debates include for instance the status of the embryo, the importance of 
genetic ties, the acceptability of surrogacy, access to infertility treatment, fertility 
preservation, and surplus embryos and their destiny. 
With this dissertation, I aim to contribute to the ethical and empirical bioethical 
debates that focus on third party reproduction, particularly with regard to heterosexual 
and lesbian families. Third party reproduction is used as a general term incorporating 
sperm and oocyte donation, but leaving out surrogacy arrangements. The term is 
alternated with synonyms such as gamete donation or the gamete donation practice 
throughout this dissertation. In order to situate the topics I touch upon in this 
dissertation in the literature about third party reproduction, three main debates are 
outlined in this introduction.  
 
(1) Third party reproduction challenges the traditional view on parenthood. This raises 
questions about the definition of parenthood and, consequently, about what makes 
someone a parent and gives this person parental rights and responsibilities. Several 
normative accounts of parenthood and their problems are explored. 
(2) For a long time, the use of gamete donation was shrouded in secrecy. An important 
ethical debate nowadays concerns the question whether children should be told 
about their conception method. The debate focusses on the discrepancy between the 
right of the child to be informed and the right of the parents to keep this 
information private.  
(3) Even though a donor transfers his parental rights and obligations to the intending 
parents, he or she contributes to the existence of a child. The question is whether a 
donor, knowing that his or her genetic make-up is partly present in the child, should 
have the responsibility of being available when the child becomes older and has 
questions about his or her genetic roots. This debate centres around the anonymity 
and open-identity systems, with the interests of two parties opposing: the child’s 
right to information about the donor and the donor’s right to privacy. 
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Chapter 1  
Third party reproduction: a challenge to the 
traditional accounts of parenthood and kinship 
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The genetic and biological accounts of parenthood are probably the most intuitive and 
the most prominent throughout history, reflecting the idea that parenthood results 
from creating a child with one’s own genetic material and gestating it. It is not 
surprising that the law still reflects such a conception of parenthood. In most countries, 
the mother who gave birth to the child is automatically the legal mother. In marriage, 
the husband of the legal mother automatically becomes the legal father. The rationale 
behind this legislation is that the woman who gives birth to the child is evidently also 
the genetic mother and the woman’s partner is, presumably, the genetic father. With 
the development of ARTs, this - for a long time self-evident - link between genetics and 
parenthood was severed, hereby challenging the traditional view on what constitutes 
parenthood. Imagine the following case: a couple desperately wants to have a child of 
their own. After trying for 3 years and several medical examinations later, it turns out 
both spouses are infertile. The man cannot produce sperm and the woman cannot 
produce good quality oocytes both due to a genetic disorder. For the woman, this 
disorder has affected her capacity to carry an embryo to term as well. Adoption is not an 
option for them, so they decide to search for two donors and a surrogate. The donor 
sperm and donor oocytes are successfully united and one embryo is transferred to the 
surrogate’s body. This woman subsequently gives birth to a healthy baby boy. The baby 
is handed over to the couple and they start raising the little boy (Hill, 1991). Who is 
entitled to parenthood in this case? Instead of two, now at least five parties are entitled 
to claim parental rights and duties (not to mention the partners of the donors and 
surrogate). In what follows, an overview of the ethical considerations concerning what 
makes someone a parent is given. 
1.1 Accounts of parenthood 
In the search towards a conclusive definition of parenthood, several views have been 
developed in the literature. There are those who ground parental rights and 
responsibilities in genetics and biology, accounts known as geneticism and 
gestationalism, and those who argue that parenthood arises from non-genetic or social 
grounds, accounts known as voluntarism, intentionalism and causalism. All these 
accounts can be considered as ‘monistic definitions’ of parenthood: they argue that 
there is a single basis for parenthood. Several problems arise from each of these 
accounts. As an answer to these problems, a pluralistic account was proposed. 
Advocates of this account argue that each basis given by the monistic definitions is a 
sufficient basis, rather than a necessary one. By making each basis a sufficient condition 
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for parenthood, several bases can be defended as a ground for parenthood. This account 
of parenthood defends both genetic and social grounds for parenthood. However, also 
this account faces an obvious problem.  
1.1.1 Monistic accounts of parenthood and their problems 
1.1.1.1 Parenthood based on genetic and biological grounds 
Geneticism 
A geneticist account of parenthood states that parental rights and obligations arise 
solely from the genetic relationship between the parents and the child. Several 
arguments were given by advocates, mainly revolving around the property argument 
and the causal geneticism argument. 
Property argument. The first argument in favour of a geneticist account was based on the 
idea that a person ‘owns’ the products, processes, and organs of his or her own body, 
and consequently, has property rights over his or her own genetic material (Hill, 1991; 
Kolers & Bayne, 2001; Hall, 1999). Since a child is a product of one’s genetic material, a 
genetic parent receives the rights over this child. 
Opponents pointed out several problems with this argument. First, since a child is a 
genetic composition of two persons, one would only own half of the child (Hill, 1991). In 
practice, this would be rather inconvenient since one cannot make decisions for only 
half of the child. Second, it is not clear how rights over one’s own gametes can be 
transferred to rights over a child. A new human being comes into existence: claims over 
its components are not the same as claims over the new human being (Kolers & Bayne, 
2001). Thirdly, parental rights and responsibilities are not simply property rights, since 
property rights do not depend on social obligations (Kolers & Bayne, 2001). One can own 
a mobile phone and choose to never look at it or destroy it. This is allowed since you 
bought the phone and you have the private property rights over the phone. Parental 
rights are clearly of a different sort: such rights are directly connected to the well-being 
of the ‘owned’. In addition, in contrast to property rights, the value of ‘the property’ 
(meaning, the child) does not depend on its rarity or importance. Moreover, parental 
rights and responsibilities change over time since the child grows up to become an 
adult. Property rights do not change over time as long as the ownership does not (Kolers 
& Bayne, 2001). 
Causal geneticism. A second argument given by advocates of geneticism claims that 
genetic ties are not a matter of choice. Begetting a child is the same as causing a child to 
exist, and one is morally accountable for the things one causes (Nelson, 2000). Callahan 
(1992) defended the argument by claiming that genetic ties intrinsically lead to 
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obligations. We cannot choose to either acknowledge or transfer them: causing a child 
means agreeing to parental duties. The genetic account thus leaves aside the intentions 
of people. The rationale behind this position is that children are helpless and dependent 
on others when they are born. Since genetic parents are the direct cause of the 
existence of the child, they bear this responsibility. This does not necessarily rule out 
adoptive parents or stepparents: one can pick up parental duties voluntarily. The 
difference is that a genetic relationship automatically leads to parenthood (Fuscaldo, 
2006). The question is why the genetic parents in these cases, such as adoption, are not 
seen as the moral parents of the child. If parental obligations are inherent to genetics, 
why can they be transferred so easily in the case of adoption or newly constituted 
families? Causal geneticism thus faces several problems. Kolers and Bayne (2001) tackle 
this argument by showing that the idea that pure genetics cause a child to exist is false, 
or at least controversial. The question is when a child is brought into existence. Some 
identity theories argue that one exists from the first moment of consciousness (when 
the relevant part of the brain is formed). They state that it is not entirely clear when 
this moment takes place, but argue that, by the time this part of the brain has 
developed, the gestational mother is as much responsible for the existence as the 
genetic parents (Kolers & Bayne, 2001). Fuscaldo (2006) also argues that a difficulty 
arises from the causal geneticism argument. She questions what can be seen as the cause 
of a child’s existence: is it the donor, the embryologist who fertilizes the woman’s 
oocyte, the clinician who transfers the embryo back into the woman’s body? 
Parenthood defines a unique relationship between a person and a child. She argues that 
a causal account generates too many parents and that it is therefore not plausible. 
Implications for donors. Proponents of the causal geneticism account argue that from their 
account, it follows that donors have parental duties and rights. The fact that a donor has 
no intention of raising the children resulting from his or her gametes, that the receiving 
couple does not want him or her to take up parental rights and responsibilities and that 
society excuses him from any obligations and rights, is not relevant (Callahan, 1992; 
Benatar, 1999). According to them, building new families through gamete donation is 
morally wrong because donors fail to fulfil their parental responsibilities. However, 
Bayne (2003) stated that it does not automatically follow from the account that donors 
have parental responsibilities. Even if geneticism were defendable, donors should still 
not be responsible. He argues that donor families should be regarded as exceptions to 
the standard routine to parenthood. According to him, it is permissible that someone 
transfers his or her parental responsibilities and rights to another individual (or 
institution) as long as he or she has good reasons to believe that this individual will 
carry out these responsibilities adequately. Consequently, by agreeing to the donation 
contract, a donor transfers his parental liability. Of course, one could argue that donors 
cannot know with certainty that his or her recipients will be responsible parents and 
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that therefore, they cannot transfer their rights. However, in practice, recipients of 
donor material always receive counselling. This counselling session should detect 
possible problems with regard to parental responsibilities. It can be assumed that all 
people starting ART treatment via gamete donation will be responsible parents. Donors 
can therefore transfer their rights.  
 Also Fuscaldo (2006) argues that a person cannot be held responsible for 
everything he causes, especially not for unforeseeable actions. To make her point, she 
presents a case report based on an incident that occurred during the civil war.  
According to Dr T.G. Capers of Vicksburg, on 12th May 1863, during a battle, a 
young soldier friend of his was hit in the scrotum by a bullet that carried away his 
left testicle. The same bullet apparently penetrated the left side of the abdomen of 
a young woman nursing the injured nearby. To her surprise, 278 days later, the 
woman gave birth to a healthy baby boy. The infant was shortly after operated on 
to remove a malformed bullet. Dr Capers concluded that this was the same bullet 
that carried away the testicle of his young friend and, with some spermatozoa on 
it, penetrated the ovary of the young woman. (Fuscaldo, 2006, p. 67) 
She believes that, although the two persons can be seen as the cause of the existence 
of the child, they cannot be forced to carry parental obligations. Indeed, conception 
happened out of their control. 
Gestationalism 
The gestational account of parenthood argues that parental rights and responsibilities 
arise solely from gestating and giving birth to the child. This does not mean that fathers 
cannot be parents in a moral sense. Their moral status as a parent arises indirectly from 
the relationship the father has with the mother, instead of the relationship with the 
child (Rothman, 1989). Three arguments are discussed.  
Maternal bonding argument. The first argument is based on the idea that during the pre- 
and postnatal relationship between the mother and the child, a deep bond is developed. 
From this bond, a parental claim arises (Hill, 1991). One can wonder what exactly the 
implications of such a bond are for parental rights. A first problem is that it is unclear 
how this bond differs qualitatively from the bonding process developed by others (e.g. 
the father). Secondly, it is not certain that such an intrinsic bond even exists. We know 
that parents, whether they are the natural parents or the adoptive parents, love their 
child. This so-called ‘intrinsic bond’ seems to be present in the case of adoption as well 
(Hill, 1991).  
The relinquishment argument. The second argument concerns the effects on the mother 
when she has to relinquish her child. Evidence shows that when new mothers are 
separated from their child (even for only a short period of time), feelings of anxiety 
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develop (Hock et al., 1989). Again, it is not clear how this influences granting parental 
rights and why psychological harm in case of relinquishment would not be equally 
harmful for others (e.g. the father), meaning that the mother has no exclusive right to 
parental responsibility.  
The physical involvement argument. The physical contribution of a birth mother to the 
existence of a child cannot be overlooked. It is argued that this involvement should be 
the basis for granting parental rights to the birth mother. The physical involvement 
generates property rights to the child (Hill, 1991). First of all, this argument faces the 
same problems as already mentioned above: parental rights differ from property rights. 
Secondly, one could argue that a genetic contribution would also count as physical 
involvement. In that case, not only gestation would lead to parental rights, such rights 
would also follow from a genetic link. 
Implications for surrogacy. From the gestational account it follows that the gestational 
host has moral priority to the parental status (Hill, 1991). This means that in case of 
surrogacy, the primary parental status goes to the surrogate mother. Opponents argue 
that this account does not necessarily imply a moral priority for the surrogate mother. 
As in the case of the geneticist account and the implication for donors, it can be argued 
that surrogacy should be regarded as an exception to the standard practice. By agreeing 
to a contract in which the surrogate declares to carry the child to term in order to hand 
the child over to the intending couple, she gives up her priority as a parent. A 
counterargument can be developed to each of the above arguments (Hill, 1991). With 
regard to the maternal bonding argument, a surrogate mother knows in advance that 
she will not be recognized as the mother of the child. The maternal bonding should be 
given less weight since attachment to the child can be precluded. With regard to the 
relinquishment argument, one should evaluate possible regrets in the light of 
contractual agreement made between the surrogate and the couple. In addition, the 
possible harm done to the surrogate when relinquishing the child should be weighed up 
against the possible harm done to the intending couple when not receiving the child. 
With regard to the physical involvement argument: the physical involvement of the 
surrogate gives her property rights over the child, and as these property rights would 
be considered the same as parental rights, it follows from there that she transferred her 
property rights – and, parental rights - to the new owners by contractual agreement. 
1.1.1.2 Parenthood based on social grounds  
Voluntarism 
Several people voluntarily take up a parental role with accompanying rights and 
responsibilities. Adoptive parents are a clear example. The promise to take up parental 
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obligations, implies that one is willing to fulfil this promise. Therefore, a voluntary 
commitment to parenthood implies the acceptance of parental responsibilities 
(Weinberg, 2008). However, the obvious problem here is the voluntariness of parental 
obligations. One can choose freely to fulfil parenthood or not. Such an account implies 
an arbitrary basis for parenthood: many children will be left without or with too many 
parents when this is regarded as the basis. 
Intentionalism 
As an answer to the problems posed by the traditional views on parenthood for third 
party reproduction and surrogacy, a new account was introduced (Van Zyl, 2002). The 
intentional account of parenthood defends the position that the parents of the child are 
those people who intended to create the child, regardless of any biological connection. 
In this case, parental obligations and rights arise from the mental states of persons and 
the contracts between individuals rather than from genetic or biological ties (Hill, 1991). 
This account gives expression to the procreative liberty that was made possible by the 
ARTs and gamete donation: procreation became a conscious choice without the need of 
biogenetic ties. Schultz (1990) argued that, to include the new families created by ARTs, 
the law should refrain from the traditional accounts of parenthood and should purely 
accept intention as the basis for determining parenthood. Hill (1991) also argued that 
the moral parent should be determined by intentions. He argued that intentional 
parents are the first cause of the existence of a child; their desire and intention to rear a 
child starts the chain of creating a child for instance by searching for a donor. Without 
the intention of the parents, the child would not exist. This creates a unique causal 
relationship, from which parental rights and obligations rise. Moreover, while a 
combination of genetic progenitors and a gestational host are necessary to bring the 
child into existence, no specific progenitor is necessary. Any biological progenitor 
would do to create the child, but if it were not for the particular intentional parents, the 
child would not exist (Hill, 1991).  
Although this account offers a solution for non-traditional families, several problems 
still remain. First, this account can be used to exclude people from parental duties and 
rights (Van Zyl, 2002). In cases where ARTs are used to conceive a child, conscious 
thought has indeed taken place before conception. Nevertheless, many pregnancies are 
still unplanned and unintended. With intention as the single basis for parenthood, 
parents of unintended children could not be held responsible for them. This account 
allows people to procreate without intending to be a parent and thus, be free of any 
parental duties and rights. At the same time, parents who unintentionally created a 
child, cannot claim parental rights and responsibilities. A child could be left with no 
parents (Fuscaldo, 2006). Second, anyone can claim parental responsibility by showing 
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intent, hereby including people who intuitively should not be the parents of a particular 
child (Roberts, 1983).  
Bayne and Kolers (2003) refute Hill’s arguments. First, they reject the intentional 
parents as prime movers, because other people such as eager grandparents might be the 
prime movers in orchestrating a pregnancy. Second, they agree that but for the 
orchestration of the intended parents, the child would not exist. However, they reject 
the position that the intended parents are the only necessary cause of a particular 
child’s existence since particular biological progenitors are also necessary: each 
person’s genetic material is essential to that person. Particular gametes will create a 
particular child. Hill’s but for-argument is not limited to intentional parents, it also 
includes the genetic and gestational parents as having parental rights and 
responsibilities. Nonetheless, Bayne and Kolers argument fails to counter intentionalism 
because the providers of gametes may not have the intention the create a child. 
Causalism 
Another ground for parenthood was given by causalists who defend that parenthood 
results from being the cause of the existence of the child. A first interpretation was 
given by Munson (1988) who made a distinction between multiple agents who were part 
of the causal chain that lead to the existence of the child, and the initial causal agents, 
who started the chain that lead to the existence of the child. He argues that one cannot 
be held morally responsible for every consequence one contributes to. Therefore donors 
and medical doctors for instance are not morally responsible for the child and 
consequently do not have parental rights and responsibilities. The problem with this 
account is that it is often unclear who or what exactly is the initial cause: grandparents, 
parents, the bottle of wine or the electricity breakdown? Although Munson’s 
interpretation offers an account that is closely related to our intuitions with regard to 
the donor and other actors who contribute to the existence of the child, it remains too 
vague to pin down who exactly should be held responsible for the child.  
Another interpretation was given by Fuscaldo (2006), calling her account ‘candidate 
parenthood’. Like Munson, Fuscaldo argued that merely being part of the causal chain 
that leads to the existence of the child is not enough to generate parental rights and 
responsibilities: however, instead of narrowing the causal account down to the initial 
cause, her account requires the notions of freedom and foreseeability. She argued that 
parenthood follows when the creation of a child was a foreseeable consequence of a free 
action. This also implies that donors are responsible for the child, since it is foreseeable 
that from freely donating gametes, a child will be created. However, she adds that not 
everyone is equally responsible for the existence of a child, meaning that degrees of 
responsibility exist. Nonetheless, the problem with this account remains that it creates 
too many parents. The foreseeable consequence of a child can be incurred by genetics, 
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gestation and intention. This account does not offer a solution when a conflict arises 
between all parties who freely contributed to the foreseeable existence of the child. 
1.1.2 A pluralistic account of parenthood 
Clearly, every monistic account of parenthood faces problems due to their monistic 
nature. A monistic definition based on genetics fails to include the social intentional 
parents. The gestational account fails to include intentional families using a surrogate 
and fails to ground fatherhood and accompanying rights and responsibilities in the 
relationship the father has with the child. The intentionalist account fails to include 
those couples who conceive an unintended child and causalists create too many parents. 
To solve this, a more inclusive account of parenthood in which one or more criteria are 
regarded as sufficient rather than necessary for parenthood was suggested by Bayne 
and Kolers (2003). They argue that handling a sufficiency view leaves open the 
possibility that all accounts constitute a part of the puzzle, implying that genetic, 
gestational and intentional parents are all parents and therefore, all have rights and 
responsibilities towards the child (Bayne & Kolers, 2003). They argue that the 
underlying assumption in all these accounts seems to be a correct basis for parenthood: 
being the cause of a child is the key basis for parenthood. A causal account of 
parenthood is necessarily pluralistic, since several activities make significant causal 
contributions. By taking such a pluralistic account, they recognize the implication that a 
child can have a number of parents.  
 Although such an account has the advantage of including several types of parents, 
the obvious problem is that no priority is given to a basis of parenthood and that when a 
conflict arises, no solution can come from this account. When we recall the example of 
the little boy brought into existence by the help of his donors, his gestational mother 
and his intentional parents, custody could be claimed by all these parties. In practice, 
this would not be possible, nor would it be in the best interest of the child. This could 
result in either too many parents or in every responsible party pointing at each other, 
leaving the child with no parent (Weinberg, 2008). 
1.2 Conflicting values 
The institutionalization of gamete donation has changed the focus of what constitutes 
parenthood. Also the development of adoption and foster care programs shows that an 
evolution in the view on parenthood has taken place. By evaluating such practices as 
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morally acceptable, Western societies have accepted that parental relationships need 
not be grounded in genetic ties. By offering such treatments and programs, the 
importance of genetic ties is downgraded and social parenthood is promoted. 
Remarkably, during the course of treatment with gamete donation, a conflict seems to 
rise between on the one hand, downgrading genetic ties, and on the other hand, 
underlining the importance of the genetic ties. First of all, third party reproduction is 
often only offered after a long series of unsuccessful treatment with own gametes. Long, 
expensive and, for the woman, physically burdensome treatments with own gametes 
are preferred in order to have a genetically own child, while donor insemination is a 
relatively easy way to conceive. Already in the first stage of assisted reproduction, 
society underlines the value attached to genetic ties. When own material cannot be used 
(and only then), a choice must be made when the couple still wants to have children. 
The two most common options are adoption and third party reproduction. Many 
couples choose third party reproduction because then at least one of the two parents 
can still have a genetic link with the child (van den Akker, 2001a, 2001b, 2006). This 
shows that genetic relatedness is still seen as important. In a way, the use of donor 
gametes and its motivation reflect opposite values. When the decision is taken to use 
gamete donation to have a child, very often, physical characteristics of the future social 
parent (for instance eye and hair colour, height and weight, blood type) are ‘matched’ 
with the donor. The idea is that by doing that, the child will look like a combination of 
the two parents. By offering to match the social parent with the donor, the assumption 
seems to be that physical resemblances – which are a symbol of genetic relatedness – 
are actually important, and that a genetic relationship should be pretended, or 
simulated. The social parent may not have genetic ties with the child, but at least he or 
she looks like a genetic parent. Another motivation for donor matching is that it 
facilitates secrecy. 
One explanation for this conflict between these two values can be found in the 
societal view on kinship and relatedness. For a long time, a couple could only become 
parents by virtue of biological processes, therefore, the social recognition as parents 
could only result from the biological link (for fathers, the assumed biological link in 
marriage) between parents and their children (Strathern, 1999). Although 
anthropological analyses often argue that kinship is a symbolic cultural system, the 
normative idea of kinship in society attaches great significance to ‘blood ties’ (Nelkin & 
Lindee, 1995). The transference of biogenetic ties between parents and child is culturally 
perceived to constitute a bond of relatedness (Carsten, 2004). Nelkin (2006) argued that 
genetics are increasingly seen as providing the essence of true personhood. The blood 
bond between parents and a child is ‘proved’ by visual characteristics (Becker, 2000). 
Similarities between the parents and the child, either physical, psychological or social, 
are sought and underlined by both the parents and the social environment in order to 
confirm kin ties and relatedness. This sort of dialogue is called “resemblance talk” and is 
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an important expression of the cultural norm about kinship (Becker et al., 2005). 
Matching the donor can be seen as a way to invoke social recognition for the social 
parent, and as a way to take over the role of the genetic link: kinship is actively created 
as if it would be based on a genetic link (Becker et al., 2005; Burr, 2009; Scheib et al., 
2000). Instead of developing an alternative view on kinship and family ties, the 
importance of the presence of a genetic link is reinforced, while couples opting for 
donor gametes have shown their acceptance of an alternative model to adapt the 
societal normative model of kinship (Becker et al., 2005). Studies show that such couples 
de-emphasize the importance of genetic links and tend to focus more on social 
relationships and the child in itself instead of comparing it as ‘familiar’ to the parents 
(Becker et al., 2005). Third party reproduction challenges the societal normative view on 
kinship and family ties, but it seems that the societal view is not adapting. Rather, 
couples using third party reproduction have to deal with their deviation from the norm. 
In conclusion, it is clear that third party reproduction has a major impact on the 
moral norms surrounding parenthood. The separation of the genetic link from 
parenthood raises questions about what makes someone a parent and on what basis 
parental obligations and rights should be allocated. Moreover, this separation seems to 
conflict with our intuitive account of kinship and family ties. Even though third party 
reproduction is morally accepted by most people in Western society, the importance of 
genetics for kinship is not entirely put aside. On the contrary, while promoting a 
practice which detaches parenthood from genetics, exactly the importance of genetic 
ties seems to be underlined. 
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Chapter 2  
The involvement of four parties: sharing 
information 
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Fulfilling one’s child wish through gamete donation means the involvement of two 
extra parties (apart from the couple): the medical team and the donor. When a child is 
born, a fourth party is added. When the couple is not seen as a unit but as two separate 
persons, five parties are involved with all their own specific interests. In natural 
conception, no one but the couple is involved in the process: all decisions before and 
after pregnancy are made by the couple itself. They do not need to consider the possible 
interests of someone else but themselves (and their future child). When two external 
parties are involved, the question rises about who needs to be informed about what. 
Several ethical debates exist, ranging from what information the recipient couple 
should receive before conception about the donor, to what information a hospital 
should obtain from the donor, and who needs to be informed about the conception 
method. In this introduction, I focus on the last question and discuss two closely related 
debates. The first debate concerns the disclosure of the conception method to the child. 
The second debate concerns the kind of information about the donor that should be 
available to the child. Both debates are closely related since the question about secrecy 
precedes the flow of information from the donor to the child: if the child is not 
informed about the conception method, information about the donor is not relevant. 
Often, both debates are mixed up and it is assumed that anonymity precedes secrecy 
and identifiability invokes openness. However, both debates should be clearly 
distinguished: using an anonymous or identifiable donor does not determine secrecy or 
disclosure. A couple can perfectly use an identifiable donor but choose never to disclose 
the conception method or a couple can use an anonymous donor and choose to tell the 
child about his or her origins. 
In both debates, each party has his or her own rights, obligations and interests, which 
often results in opposite outcomes. Deontological and consequentialist approaches 
present two different ways of thinking about the rights of the parties involved. The 
consequentialist approach holds that choices, which include actions or certain 
behaviour, need to be morally assessed on the grounds of their effects. More precisely, 
this means taking into account the benefits and harms done to all parties involved. 
Deontologists evaluate actions by their conformity to the moral norm. If an action 
affecting a party’s interests is in itself morally bad, regardless of the consequences, it is 
argued that this action should not be taken. In the following, arguments presented by 
both approaches are discussed. 
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2.1 Sharing the conception method: secrecy and disclosure 
The first application in clinical practice of sperm donation was around the 1930s. For 
many years, the use of donor material was shrouded in secrecy. Medical doctors advised 
their patients to never disclose details about the deviant conception method to either 
the environment or the child (Allan, 2012). The use of sperm donation was linked with 
masturbation and intrusion of the marital vowels. The practice was heavily morally 
charged: sperm donation was a taboo and the child and environment should not be 
informed about the conception method (Frith, 2001a; Cook et al., 1995a). Over the years, 
the demand for gamete donation grew and the practice became more and more 
accepted. From the 1980s, the disclosure debate was stimulated by this increased 
acceptance of the practice. The veil of secrecy became questioned and voices were 
raised in favour of more openness about the conception method. Two important factors 
determining this shift were the openness in the adoption practice, where this was found 
to be in the best interest of the child, and the greater emphasis on children’s rights 
(Haimes, 1988; UN Conventions on the Rights of the Child, 1989). Nowadays, openness 
towards the child, preferably at an early age, about the use of gamete donation is more 
and more being advised to patients (Klock, 2013). Nonetheless, in the end the parents 
can still decide whether or not they will disclose the information.  
2.1.1 Parents 
Notwithstanding the trend towards openness over the years, studies show that most 
heterosexual couples choose to keep the conception method secret, with study 
outcomes ranging from 54% to 81% (Nachtigall et al. 1998; Golombok et al. 2002; Owen & 
Golombok 2009). Although more and more couples express their intention to disclose 
when questioned before conception, final outcomes prove otherwise. The actual 
disclosure tends to be postponed and eventually abandoned because barriers such as 
discomfort and anxiety developed (Gottlieb et al., 2000; Nordqvist & Smart 2014; Klock 
2013; Cook et al. 1995b; Daniels et al., 2009). Many heterosexual couples who intended to 
disclose, do not do so (Gottlieb et al., 2000; Lindblad et al., 2000; Lalos et al., 2007). These 
data contrast with data from lesbian and single mothers, where secrecy is more difficult 
to maintain due to the absence of a father (Landau & Weissenberg, 2010; Murray & 
Golombok, 2005; MacCallum & Golombok, 2004; Stevens et al., 2003). The nature of 
gamete donation allows for the option of secrecy: a pregnancy and birth occur so it is 
possible to ‘disguise’ the donor conception, pass the child off as biologically and 
genetically related to the parents and to appear as a ‘normal’ family (Frith, 2001a). This 
is exactly one of the reasons that is often given by parents in support of their choice for 
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secrecy: the wish not to stand out in the crowd and to blend in as a normal family, 
particularly in relation to the child. Secrecy is chosen so that the child would feel 
‘normal’ and have a normal childhood (Readings et al., 2011). In relation to this, secrecy 
is often preferred out of fear that the child would be rejected by the environment, or to 
protect the father or mother against deteriorating relationships if the child would no 
longer accept the social parent as a parent (Rowland, 1985; Nachtigall, 1993; Daniels & 
Taylor, 1993). Other reasons given by parents are that there is no need to tell, that the 
information is seen as a personal matter, or that disclosure is pointless when no further 
information about the donor can be given (Readings, 2011; Brewaeys et al., 1997). 
Additionally, protection of the child is often mentioned: protection against frustration 
or a sense of loss that might be experienced when no information is available about the 
donor, or protection against possibly upsetting information (Readings, 2011; Brewaeys 
et al., 1997).  
Nonetheless, a group of parents does indeed disclose the conception method to their 
child at a relatively young age (before adolescence). Data differ from 8.6% in a European 
study by Golombok et al. (2002) to approximately 30% (New Zealand) or 50% (UK) in 
more recent studies (Daniels et al., 2009; Readings et al., 2011). This might indicate a 
shift towards more openness within families. One of the arguments given against 
secrecy is that there is always the possibility of unexpected disclosure. Parents need to 
keep the secret and this can weigh on them psychologically. It has also been argued that 
secrecy may jeopardize family communication which might result in the distancing of 
family members (Papp, 1993; Imber-Black, 1998). A gap might develop between those 
who know and those who do not know (Clamar, 1989). Parents who disclose the 
information give similar reasons for their decision. An important consideration given by 
these parents is that they want to be open and honest with the child (Blyth et al., 2001; 
Readings et al., 2011). Children ought to know about ‘their’ story, and this is proof of 
how wanted the child was. Keeping the information a secret would be morally wrong. 
Other reasons that are given are that the child has the right to know, that there is no 
reason not to do so, and to protect the child from an unexpected disclosure (Lycett et 
al., 2005; Readings, 2011). It is often argued that if the child finds out at a later time, this 
will destroy the child’s trust in the parents.  
In conclusion, parents can decide whether to disclose or not for a number of morally 
relevant reasons. In the ethical debate about what should be done, several arguments 
are given. In the following, two arguments are discussed.  
Right to privacy 
Studies of the opinions of the parents themselves show that the privacy of the parents 
should not be treated lightly. Information about the use of ART and the specific 
conception method can be regarded as highly personal and intimate information about 
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the couple. Such information contains sensitive knowledge about one’s health and about 
the lack of genetic contribution of one parent. Disclosing such information means 
exposing one’s personal life. Because of the sensitive nature of the information, it can be 
argued that the couple has the right to keep it private and not disclose it to the child or 
environment. Privacy can be defined as “the condition of not having undocumented personal 
knowledge possessed by others” (Parent, 1983) or as “the right of individuals to limit access by 
others to some part of their persons” (Gostin, 1995). Privacy means protecting information 
from others. Several arguments are given in support of the right to privacy of the 
parents. Infertility can have a devastating effect on the well-being and self-image of a 
person. Disclosing such information could be detrimental for the person’s well-being 
(Pennings, 2001a). Also, the information can be embarrassing for either the mother or 
the father. Keeping the information private would also protect the man or woman from 
social stigma (Nachtigall, 1993). 
Right to autonomy 
The arguments based on the autonomy of the parents are closely related to the 
arguments based on the right to privacy. Parents are autonomous actors and their 
decisions regarding reproduction should be respected. It is argued that, as long as the 
child will have a reasonable quality of life, an intervention on their decisions should not 
be allowed (Pennings, 2001b). The argument against full parental autonomy is that the 
disclosure decision will affect the well-being of the child. In the early days, disclosure 
was thought to have a detrimental effect on the well-being of the child and the family. 
Nowadays, it is argued that telling the child is in his or her best interest and that secrecy 
is harmful for the child. However, in most decisions concerning their child, full parental 
autonomy is respected even though these decisions might have a serious impact on the 
child’s well-being: parents are free to decide to move, change school or spend a lot of 
time working (Pennings, 2001b). An intervention in the disclosure decision is even 
harder to justify when compared to the context of genetic counselling where the risks of 
having an affected child are communicated to the parents, but the decision is left to the 
parents. The consequences in such cases are far more severe than the consequences of 
disclosure or non-disclosure (a thorough analysis of this argument will be given in 
chapter 6). If we respect the parents’ autonomy in these cases, their autonomy should 
also be respected in the case of the disclosure decision. Parents should either be free to 
choose or they should be guided towards a decision in all situations where the child’s 
welfare is at stake. 
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2.1.2 Children 
At this moment, not much is known yet about the impact of disclosure on the child and 
family relationships in general (Golombok et al., 2011). This is due to the secrecy that 
has surrounded gamete donation for decades and the high secrecy rates up until now in 
heterosexual couples. It is impossible to investigate the opinion of children who are not 
informed about the donor conception without revealing the secret. Nevertheless, 
studies have been conducted on the wellbeing of these children with results showing 
that children who are not informed have positive relationships with their parents and 
develop normally, which shows that this specific family secret does not always have an 
impact on the child’s life (Golombok et al. 2002; MacCallum et al., 2007). Of children who 
are aware of their donor conception, it appears that age and the manner of disclosure 
have an impact on the reaction of the children, with people finding out at a later age, 
particularly if the disclosure happened by accident or under adverse circumstances, 
reporting more negative reactions such as anger and feelings of betrayal (Jadva et. al., 
2009; Turner & Coyle, 2000). In chapter 6, a thorough analysis is made of the empirical 
data available at this moment regarding the impact of disclosure and secrecy on the 
child. In the ethical debate, the arguments supporting the interests of the child centre 
around the child’s rights.  
Right to privacy 
Most definitions of privacy are formulated in a negative sense: a right to limit access to 
certain information about oneself. The right of parents not to disclose as discussed 
previously is an example of this interpretation. Privacy can also be defined in a positive 
sense (Pennings, 2001a). This interpretation starts from the right not to know: privacy 
not only means the right to limit access to information of an individual to others, but 
also to limit access to information from others to the individual (Council of Europe, 
1996; Laurie, 1999). This means that a person has the right not to know certain facts 
about him- or herself which might lead to an adaptation of the picture of him- or herself 
in a troublesome way. This right is often discussed with regard to medical information 
or information concerning one’s genetic make-up: no one is obliged to take a genetic 
test and everyone has the right to decline the offer of information about one’s health. It 
is argued that if a person has the right not to know such information, that person also 
has the right to obtain information that might result in a more correct image of the self 
(Pennings, 2001a). Information about one’s conception method offers insight into one’s 
genetic origins and the relationships with one’s parents. This information is highly 
valued in society: the family and one’s place in the family is regarded as crucial 
information for one’s identity. Most often, the ideal family is defined as a mother and a 
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father with genetically related children. When the family composition is deviant from 
this norm, a child should be informed to correct his or her self-image.  
From this, two arguments can be developed depending on the ethical theory that is 
chosen (deontological or consequentialist). Consequentialist argue that although 
information about the conception method indeed contributes to a more complete self-
image, it does not necessarily increase a person’s psychological wellbeing (Pennings, 
2001a). Correct information about one’s genetic make-up is not necessary to live a 
happy live. This is clear from misattributed paternity cases: a number of people (both 
children and fathers) are not aware of the misattribution of paternity, but they are 
nevertheless happy and live normal lives. In contrast, according to the deontological 
approach, the moral norm is that a person ought to have access to information that 
might complete his identity. To conform to the norm, a donor conceived child should 
receive identifying information about the donor, whatever the consequences.  
Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The positive interpretation of privacy is also covered by the human right to respect for 
identity and private life. This right prescribes that everyone should have access to 
details about their identity as individual human beings (European Court of Human 
Rights, 1989). The Human Rights and the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child are 
often quoted in the larger debate concerning disclosure and information exchange in 
the context of gamete donation. Especially in the debate about the right of the child to 
receive information about the donor, these rights are used in support of the child. 
Nonetheless, three rights apply to the disclosure debate as well: article 13 which 
generally prescribes a person’s right to information, article 2 which provides protection 
against discrimination, and article 7 which gives the child the right ‘[…] as far as possible 
[…] to know […] his parents’. It is easy to see why article 13 supports the claim that children 
have the right to be informed about their conception method. According to article 2, 
withholding information about the conception would discriminate donor offspring 
since information about the conception method is routinely provided to all persons who 
are raised by their genetic parents. In the case of donor conception, questions about the 
usefulness of this information for the child are posed and secrecy is maintained. Not 
sharing this particular information is discriminatory towards the donor conceived 
children. Article 7 prescribes the right of the child to know his or her parents. This 
particular right is actually applied to the anonymity debate. However, the right implies 
openness towards the child about his or her conception. If the child has the right to 
know his or her parents, and assuming that this means that a child should have access 
to information about the donor, a child should also have the right to be informed about 
the conception method. Several counterarguments are given to these rights. However, 
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these rights will be discussed more thoroughly in the following part concerning the 
anonymity debate. All counterarguments will be discussed in that part. 
2.2 Exchanging information between the donor and the 
family: anonymity and identifiability 
Next to the information exchange between the parents and the child about the donor 
conception, information can also be exchanged between the donor and the family and 
the other way around. The main ethical debate in this regard focusses on the anonymity 
and identifiability of the donor: should donors remain anonymous or should they 
release information about themselves, and if so, what information should they release? 
The question can also be reversed to whether donors should receive information about 
their donor offspring. In chapter 5, this question is analysed. As in the secrecy and 
disclosure debate, the interests of several parties are involved: the child, the donor and 
the parents, although the focus lies particularly on the first two parties. Opposing rights 
and interests are at stake, with different outcomes depending on which interests are 
prioritized. The current legal situation regarding the information exchange differs 
across countries, which shows that balancing all interests is a difficult exercise and 
several outcomes can be defended.  
2.2.1 Legal situation 
Anonymity 
For a long time, together with keeping secret the use of gamete donation, the donor’s 
identity was safeguarded. This practice of anonymity was chosen because of the stigma 
surrounding infertility (particularly male infertility), the accompanying possible social 
rejection of the practice and the possible consequences this could have for both the 
families and the medical profession (Blyth & Frith, 2008). Nowadays, the global legal 
situation still centres around anonymity. All but 11 countries in which gamete donation 
is permitted endorse anonymity either by allowing it or by imposing it (Janssens et al., 
2011). In an anonymous system, no identifying information about the donor can be 
obtained by the child or parents, or from the child by the donor. In some of these 
countries the law allows that some general non-identifying information is exchanged. In 
Belgium, for instance, very little non-identifying information is released in the form of 
‘matching’ the donor to the social parent. The social parent’s physical characteristics, 
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such as eye and hair colour, are used to select a donor. This means that recipients can 
assume that the donor has for instance brown eyes and brown curly hair. Such 
information is very vague. In Spain, both parents and child have the right to obtain 
general non-identifying information about their donor. Also, in exceptional cases when 
the life of the child is endangered, the identity of the donor may be released on the 
condition that this release averts the danger for the child (Pennings, 2002). 
Open-identity 
In 1984, Sweden was the first country to remove the anonymity of the donor. Several 
countries followed this example during the 1990s such as Austria, Switzerland, New 
Zealand, a number of Australian jurisdictions. Others followed later on such as The 
Netherlands, Finland and the UK (Frith, 2001a; Janssens et al., 2011; Lalos et al., 2007). In 
the United States, no federal legislation exist that either prohibits or allows anonymous 
or identifiable donation. The policies concerning the exchange of (non)-identifying 
information differ from centre to centre. Most centres offer partial access to 
information, which means non-identifying information is available (Pennings, 2002). 
However, data show that open-identity programs are on the rise (Scheib & Cushing, 
2007).  
An open-identity system obliges donors to agree with a release of his or her 
identifying information and it allows the child, when mature, to receive identifying 
information about the donor (Daniels & Lalos, 1995). In some countries, also non-
identifying information is included in the exchange. The age of the children varies, with 
some countries releasing the information when the child turns 16 and other countries 
preferring the age of 18. When the child reaches the prescribed age, the information 
becomes available via registers. This means that children are able to access the 
information if they want to, but they are not forced: children have the right, but not the 
duty to obtain information. This interpretation of the child’s right has as a consequence 
that when the parents decide to keep the conception method secret, the child will never 
be informed about the available information. An open-identity system only has meaning 
when the conception method is shared (Shenfield & Steele, 1997). To forestall this 
problem, a suggestion was made by Warnock in 1987 to place the donor conception on 
the birth certificate. Up until today, only the state Victoria (Australia) has implemented 
this in their regulation (VARTA, 2014).  
While in the majority of such open-identity countries, the information exchange goes 
in one direction (from donor to child), New Zealand and Victoria foresee an information 
exchange in the other direction. Donors are allowed to receive identifying information 
about the offspring born from their donation, but only if the child agrees to this 
exchange (New Zealand Government, 2004; Victorian Registry of Birth Death and 
Marriages, 2008). In the UK, donors are entitled to non-identifying information about 
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their donor conceived children such as the number of children born from their 
donation, their sex and year of birth (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 
2009). 
Other information exchange systems 
 Next to the anonymous and open-identity legislations, other systems exist. In Iceland, 
both the anonymous and open-identity track are offered to both the parents and donor 
(Frith, 2001). This so-called ‘double track’ system incorporates the potential wishes and 
interests of both parents and donor. Such a system recognizes that several morally 
acceptable perspectives exist in this discussion and leaves the decision to the actors in 
the field, in contrast to anonymous or open-identity systems which impose one option 
that is regarded as inherently better than others (Pennings, 1997). This system thus 
allows an information exchange, but only when consent is given by both parties. 
In a couple of countries (for instance, Belgium), yet another system is legally allowed. 
For oocyte donation, known donation is a widespread practice next to the anonymous 
system. This known donor is generally a sister or sometimes a friend of the recipient. 
There are two options. The recipient can choose to use her sister’s or her friend’s 
oocytes herself. This is called known (intra-familial) donation. The second option is that 
the sister’s oocytes are offered to the centre in return for oocytes donated by another 
donor (who is also someone’s known donor). In that case, a known-anonymous donation 
takes place (Laruelle et al., 2011). The reason for allowing this system is the continuous 
shortage of oocyte donors with long waiting lists as a consequence. When a recipient 
brings her own donor, she does not depend on the availability of an anonymous donor. 
In case of known donation, the exchange of information between the recipient, the child 
and the donor is inevitable. However, this system does not necessarily result into 
openness, which means that the child may know the donor in a different capacity than 
as its genetic parent (Greenfeld & Klock, 2004). In case of known-anonymous donation, 
no information is released between the recipient and the anonymous donor. 
Apart from the official paths, commercial companies (sperm banks that sell sperm 
over the Internet) have developed separate rules about the exchange of information. 
The most famous example of such a network of companies is Cryos International. 
Couples can choose their donor from a list and order sperm. The information exchange 
from donor to parents is available already before conception. Donors are presented in a 
catalogue, with a standard profile containing information about their medical and 
physical characteristics. Donors can choose to extend this profile by adding a social and 
educational history, religion, sexual orientation, and skills such as language, music, and 
sports. A donor can also add an audiotape or a written message with his or her 
motivation for donating his or her gametes. In most American clinics such profiles are 
given to the parents before conception as well, meaning that they can make a choice 
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based on the profile of a donor. In such cases, a large amount of non-identifying 
information is exchanged. 
Not only systems to exchange information between parents, children and donors 
exist, also systems to share information between donor siblings – children conceived 
with the same donor – and their families have been developed. The most successful 
worldwide registry is the USA-based Donor Sibling Registry (DSR), founded in 2000 
(Freeman et al., 2009), which at the moment (November 2014) has more than 44000 
registered parents, donor children and donors and some 11700 connected donor half-
siblings and/or donors (Donor Sibling Registry, 2014). Through this registry, not only 
half-siblings and accompanying families can be traced, the donor can also be searched 
for: when a donation was made in an anonymous system, no information is exchanged 
via the official ways. In those cases, donors and families can sign up on the registry 
hoping to find a match.  
Clearly, several systems exist each emphasizing the interests and rights of other 
parties. While an anonymous system underlines the interests of the donor and the 
protection of the family integrity, an open-identity system emphasizes the rights of the 
donor conceived children to information about their genetic roots and the benefits of 
openness and honesty in families. What interests are exactly at stake here? What rights 
can be used to support the possible release of information?  
2.2.2 Children 
Respect for identity and private life and the best interests of the child 
Respect for identity and private life is considered to be a human right (UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, 1989). It has been argued that denying such information can 
be harmful for the child (Turner, 1993). Not having access to knowledge about one’s 
genetic parents can have a detrimental effect, which was named ‘genealogical 
bewilderment’ (Sants, 1964). This term was originally used for adopted children, but it 
was argued that this equally applied to donor conceived offspring (McWhinny, 1996; 
Haimes, 1988).This analogy between adoption and gamete donation was one of the 
prime movers behind the shift towards more openness and the exchange of 
information. Based on the adoption context, identifying information about the donor 
was said to be essential for the child to obtain a fuller sense of his or her identity (Blyth, 
1998; Scheib & Cushing, 2007). Consequently, it was often argued that because of the 
need of this information for a fuller self-image, identifying information was in the best 
interest of the child. The UN Convention included the best interest of the child in article 
3 as a general principle: the child’s best interest should be a primary consideration in all 
actions concerning children. The problem here is what is in the child’s best interest. 
Proponents of open identity and disclosure use evidence from the literature on adoption 
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to support the position that children are harmed when they do not have identifying 
information about their donor. However, it can be questioned whether both contexts 
are comparable (Shenfield, 1994). The position in the family of a child conceived 
through gamete donation differs a lot from an adopted child: a donor conceived child 
does not have to deal with feelings of abandonment and most of them still have a 
genetic link with one of their parents. The meaning of genetic (un)relatedness is 
different for donor conceived children than for adopted children (Golombok, 1998). 
Therefore, we should be careful in generalizing possible consequences for both 
contexts. In addition, even if knowing one’s donor would contribute to one’s self-image, 
this information is not necessary for one’s psychological wellbeing (Pennings, 2001a). 
Many donor conceived people do not have information about the donor and seem to be 
perfectly happy. Also, reasons for children to desire information about their donor can 
often be brought down to mere curiosity, rather than to a search to complete their 
identity (Vanfraussen, et al., 2001; Rumball & Adair, 1999, Jadva et al., 2010). For some, 
not having access to such information results in frustration while for others, it is 
unimportant (Ravelingien et al., 2013). All this shows that these children do not need 
the identity of the donor to complete their own identity. On the contrary, some have 
argued that it is in their best interest not to know anything about their genetic origins 
(hereby promoting anonymity) because this would differentiate them from other 
children (Primarolo, 1990). In conclusion, at the moment, it is not clear what would be 
in the best interest of the child. 
Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
It has been argued that children have an absolute right to know their donor, whether or 
not this knowledge would be in their best interest. As for the disclosure debate, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN Convention on rights of the Child, 1989) was 
one of a prime movers for a legislative change for gamete donation. The European 
Convention of the Protection of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Council 
of Europe, 1950), and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine 
(Council of Europe, 1996) also contain themes used in support of a shift towards open-
identity systems (Blyth, 1998). Changing legislation to oblige donors to release 
identifying information about themselves was the result of trying to meet the formal 
rights of the child.  
The most frequently cited rights in support of releasing identifying information 
about the donor to the child are article 7 of the UN Convention, the right to know his or 
her parents, and the right to respect for family and private life (Council of Europe, 1950 
art 8; UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 art 18). As previously mentioned, 
the right to know one’s parents implies disclosure. Strangely enough, these two main 
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arguments face the most obvious critiques. With regard to the right to know one’s 
parents, the question is whether knowing one’s donor falls under this right. The 
problem lies in the definition of ‘parents’ (Frith, 2001b). Most countries treat the donor 
as a person who transfers his or her parental rights and obligations towards the 
recipient, implying that the donor is not seen as a parent of the child. Therefore, it is 
hard to see why this right would say anything about a child having the right to 
information about his or her donor. With regard to the right to respect for family and 
private life, one could wonder in which sense a donor can be seen as part of the family 
life of the child: creating a family relationship is not the intention of a donation 
program. Moreover, the ‘relationship’ between a donor and his offspring is not 
recognized by law as a family relationship (Blyth, 1998). It is difficult to defend the 
child’s right to information about the donor on this basis. 
Two rights offer a better basis in support of the right to information about the donor. 
The first right involves the protection against discrimination (UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 1989 art 2; Council of Europe, 1996 art 1). As explained when 
discussing the secrecy/disclosure debate, most other children automatically have 
information about their genetic parents. Not allowing donor conceived children to have 
access to this information, would be discriminating. Indeed, on this basis, it can be 
argued that children should be able to know the identity of their donor. Speirs (1998) 
argued that the consequence of this right would indeed lead to questions about the use 
of gamete donation. When a certain practice results in discrimination of one of the 
parties involved, maybe the practice itself should be questioned. A second right in 
support is the general right to information (UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
1989 art 13; Council of Europe, 1950 art 10, Council of Europe, 1996 art 10). When donor 
offspring are denied information even when official records are available, this right is 
breached. It is easy to see why this right would lead to an open-identity system. 
However, both rights touch upon the most crucial problem of this rights-based 
discourse: the rights of the child conflict with the right to privacy of the parents and the 
donor. Even when the child has a right to identifying information about the donor, a 
balance must be made between the rights of the other parties involved. The most 
controversial point in using the Convention and other fundamental rights to support 
the particular situation of donor conceived children is that these rights were not 
written with gamete donation in mind (Frith, 2001a). We should consequently be careful 
to draw decisive conclusions about disclosure or identifiability from these rights. 
Possible consequences 
Creating the possibility for donor conceived children to meet their donor by releasing 
identifying information can have several consequences which should also be taken into 
account. Opponents of an open-identity system argue that such a system suggests that 
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the genetic relationship between the donor and the child is important and consequently 
that knowing one’s genetic roots is important. By underlining the importance of genetic 
ties, greater curiosity is developed, a more significant place is given to the donor in the 
child’s mind and a greater drive to contact him or her is established (Fortescue, 2003). 
This focus is opposed to what the practice of gamete donation stands for. Also, practical 
implications arise in the form of expectations. The child’s expectation of type and 
frequency of contact might differ a great deal with the idea of the donor. Conversely, 
this concern applies to donors as well: they might want to have regular contact while 
the donor conceived child only wants to meet once. A third concern that might be 
stipulated is that donors are matched physically with the recipient family, but not 
socially. A child might end up meeting a man or woman with a wealthier or poorer 
background than itself. Negative feelings about him- or herself and towards the parents 
might be developed by the child. It has also been suggested that the ‘real-life’ distinction 
between the biological and non-biological father could create confusion for donor 
offspring. Instead of completing the child’s identity, this would only fragment notions 
about paternity and identity (Grace et al., 2008; Rose, 2004). Only one study about donor 
offspring who have met the donor has been conducted so far. Jadva et al. (2010) 
conducted a study about the experiences of offspring concerning their contact with the 
donor. The authors showed that such meetings were a positive experience overall. Also, 
the search for the donor was reported as not having a negative impact on the 
relationship with the parents. These data show that when offspring and donors get in 
touch and both agree to meet, this might result into positive experiences. Nonetheless, 
further research is necessary to draw general conclusions about experiences of contact 
with the donor. Moreover, these data were obtained through children who searched for 
their donor via the Donor Sibling Registry. Although many children already signed in on 
this registry, this remains a minority within the large group of donor conceived 
children. We should be careful in generalizing the results of these studies to the whole 
pool of donor conceived children. In addition, we should keep in mind that these data 
show the experiences after arranging a meeting. It is possible that many donors do not 
want any contact years after their donation. The experiences of donor conceived 
children who do not succeed in contacting the donor should also be investigated and 
taken into account. 
2.2.3 The donor 
Right to privacy 
The revelation of his or her identity to the offspring might have several consequences 
for the donor. It opens up the possibility to be contacted by offspring. This contact 
might also lead to the disclosure of the man or woman as a donor to his or her family 
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and environment. The possibility exists that a donation of this kind was not shared with 
family members. The coming out of a person as a donor, can have a big impact on the 
donor’s relationships. When the donor did inform the family members, this family faces 
several years in which it is not clear whether a donor conceived child will ever turn up. 
Also, the presence of a real individual conceived via the donor’s material might disturb 
his or her family life. Another point of consideration is that the family constitution of 
the donor might change between the moment of donation and the moment of a request 
for contact. The donor may have remarried and may not have told his new family about 
the donation, the donor may have lost a child in the meantime, or the donor was not 
able to have a child of his or her own due to medical problems with his or her spouse 
(Fortescue, 2003). Since identifiable information about the donor can be considered as 
revealing intimate information about oneself and his or her family, the donor has a 
right to privacy. One could argue that therefore, a donor should be respected in his or 
her wish to block the information flow to the offspring.  
Possible consequences 
Very often it is argued that installing an open-identity system would diminish the 
recruitment of sperm and egg donors (Fortescue, 2003; Pennings, 2001c; Craft & 
Thornhill, 2005). The reduction of the donor candidates would even jeopardize the 
whole donation practice. Initially, studies conducted in several countries seemed to 
confirm this fear by showing that current donors would not donate when anonymity 
would be abolished with results such as 80% (Denmark, UK), 59% (USA) and 74% 
(Belgium) (Pedersen et al., 1994; Schover et al., 1992; Baetens et al., 1999; Cook & 
Golombok, 1995). However, a cautious interpretation of these data is warranted since 
these studies reflect the opinion of donors who chose to donate in an anonymous 
system. This means that the data are biased towards donors preferring anonymity. What 
these data actually say is that in the pool of anonymous donors, a significant part would 
not be donating in an identifiable system (Pennings, 2001c). When this point is taken 
into account when interpreting the data, the findings become more comprehensible. It 
was argued that another type of donor would be attracted by an identifiable system and 
that these donors would neutralize the decline in the existing donor pool (Pennings, 
2001c). Indeed, research indicates that the number of donor candidates did not fall back, 
because a ‘new type’ of donor stepped in (Blyth & Frith, 2008). Several studies showed 
that older men in relationships who already had children of themselves were attracted 
by the new system. This is in contrast to the usual student population, which involves 
young, single and heterosexual men (Daniels and Lalos, 1995; Daniels et al., 1996; 
Janssens et al., 2006; Thorn et al., 2008). It was argued that an identifiable system brings 
forward the more ‘responsible’ donor (Yee, 2009). However, other studies contested this 
new profile by showing that single heterosexual men were more likely to donate in such 
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a system than married men (Frith et al., 2007). Another study conducted in the 
Netherlands showed that single men without a child wish were more prepared to 
donate in an identifiable system (Trommelen et al., 1999). In a report published by the 
Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA), a similar trend was found. The 
proportion of the youngest donor group (aged 25 or younger) increased from 15% to 
22% of the total amount of sperm donors, while the proportion of older groups 
decreased in 2013. The study also showed that the number of donors with own children 
is decreasing since 2005 (HFEA, 2014). Next to the heterosexual men, gay men were also 
found to be more interested to donate in an identifiable system (Riggs, 2008; Ripper, 
2008). More important than the profile, are the expectations these men have when 
donating. While the married men were more inclined to a one time meeting with their 
donor offspring, the single heterosexual and gay men indicated to be open for an 
ongoing relationship (Godman et al., 2006; Riggs, 2008; Ripper, 2008). Not so much the 
fear for a decrease in donor candidates is grounded, it is more important to guard the 
motives and expectations of the new donors who present themselves. We should be 
careful in creating a system where donors are attracted because of paternal motives. 
This could lead to unrealistic expectations about the relationship with the child and 
could possibly become a threat for the parents of the child. 
 
Next to the impact of the shift on donor recruitment, also the impact of actual 
contact on the donors should be investigated. Not much literature exists so far on the 
viewpoint of the donor in this regard. So far, no study exists on the experiences of 
donors who donated in an identifiable system after contact with either donor offspring 
or the parents of the donor offspring. Studies focus in this regard on the experiences of 
the donor offspring and parents. A study by Kirkman et al. (2014) investigated the 
expectations of Australian donors who donated before mandatory release of identifying 
information was installed. Expectations ranged from wanting no contact and fearing 
contact, to accepting the need of the donor offspring to know the donor, personal 
interests in the offspring and desiring a relationship with the offspring. Jadva et al. 
(2011) conducted a study about initially anonymous donors who agreed to release their 
identity to their offspring later on. All the donors included in this study reported 
meeting offspring as a positive experience and as having positive consequences. 
Although no information is available yet on identifiable donors, the current data show 
that when contact takes place under these circumstances (with agreement of the 
donor), this leads to positive experiences. It is however not yet clear how such meetings 
will develop with the new type of donor and his specific expectations. Other important 
findings from the current studies towards donors who agree to subsequent contact with 
their offspring concerns the donor’s wellbeing, their wish for information about the 
number of children born from their donation, or even the wish for identifying 
information. In the open-identity debate, the focus lies solely on the information 
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exchange from the donor towards the offspring. However, it is equally important to 
investigate what the interests of the donor are in information about his or her offspring. 
In chapter 5, arguments in favour of an information exchange in the direction of the 
donor are scrutinized. 
2.2.4 Parents 
The right to autonomy 
In the anonymity/open-identity debate, the focus is particularly on the children and the 
donor, since the discussion involves an information exchange between these two 
parties. The parents seem to be a forgotten group in this discussion. However, it is 
unclear why this party should not also be taken into account here. The most important 
interest of the parents is their autonomy. The right to autonomy means, as already 
defined above, making autonomous informed decisions and being respected for these 
decisions. For this particular discussion, that means that parents have the right to 
decide how they build their family. This implies that parents should be able to choose 
autonomously what type of donor (anonymous, identifiable, or known) they want to use 
to build that family. The right to choose how to build one’s family implies inevitably 
that they should be able to take decisions that will have an impact on the child’s life. 
This should not pose a problem. Most of the time, parents have the right to make 
decisions that can have a big impact on the child’s life. When it comes to donor 
conception, suddenly this autonomy is no longer respected. Parents can only opt for the 
system that is legal in their country. When they do not agree, they have to cross borders 
to another country where a different system applies (Van Hoof & Pennings, 2012). 
However, this is only possible for people who have the necessary financial resources 
(Janssens et al., 2006). 
Possible consequences 
The goal of an open-identity system is to provide donor conceived children with the 
right to information about their genetic origin (Lampic et al., 2014). Forcing would-be 
parents into an open-identity system has proven not to be as effective as hoped to reach 
this goal. Gottlieb at al. (2000) showed for the Swedish situation that for couples 
conceived between 1985 (when anonymity was abolished by law) and 1997, secrecy was 
preferred by 89% of the parents, with only 41% having the intention to disclose the 
donor conception to the child. As already discussed, the intention to tell does not always 
result in actual telling. Moreover, it can be hypothesized that an open-identity system 
might even support secrecy. The threat a donor poses to the intimacy of a family 
becomes more real by releasing identifiable information. This hypothesis is supported 
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by a study of Brewaeys et al. (2005) who showed that when would-be parents had the 
choice between an anonymous or non-anonymous donor, 37% would opt for an 
anonymous donor mostly because of the fear of interference of an identifiable donor. On 
the other hand, a compulsory anonymous system might also lead to more secrecy in 
different ways. It can be hypothesized that parents will be more prepared to share the 
conception story with their child when enough information on the donor is available. 
This hypothesis is supported by several studies showing that parents who intent to 
disclose are more in favour of identifiable donors (Lycett et al., 2004; Scheib et al., 2003; 
Hunter et al., 2000). In that case, parents who had to agree to an anonymous donor 
might have disclosed if the donor would have been identifiable. In both systems the 
possibility exists that parents are forced into secrecy even when they do not intend to 
do so, because of the type of donor. When the aim is to reach more openness 
surrounding the practice of third party reproduction in order for donor conceived 
children to find out information about their genetic origins, the parents’ wishes should 
be respected. The implications of an open-identity system on the parents should not be 
overlooked in this debate. As already discussed, the motivation and expectations of 
donors attracted by such a system differ from the donors in an anonymous system, with 
procreation being a more important motive than altruism (Janssens et al., 2006; Thorn 
et al., 2008). The effects have yet to be investigated, but it could be argued that an open-
identity system may result in interference of the donor in the recipient families and 
may add to the complexity of multiple familial relationships (Janssens et al., 2006; 
Saywer, 2010).  
Not all parents will experience the possibility to meet the donor as a threat. The 
number of parents enrolling for the Donor Sibling Registry who look for their child’s 
donor and/or donor siblings proves this point. Until now, one study was conducted 
about the experiences of parents who looked for their child’s donor and these parents 
generally reported positive experiences (Freeman et al., 2009). However, the 
implications of the open-identity system have yet to be fully investigated, so no final 
conclusions about the psychosocial impact of the system can be made. 
2.3 Balancing rights 
The deontological theories use rights to support an outcome in favour of the child, the 
donor and the parents. This discourse faces several problems. First, as shown above, 
some of the rights do not support the argument they aim to support. Second, as already 
mentioned in the secrecy debate, these rights were not made with gamete donation in 
mind. The problem with this rights-based discourse in general is that it does not 
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explicitly support one party in favour of another: it is not clear whether the conflict 
should be resolved in favour of the child, the donor or the parents (Blyth, 1998). In this 
regard, an important distinction should be made between prima facie rights and actual 
rights (Pennings, 2001b). With regard to the secrecy debate (but this also applies to the 
anonymity debate), the child can have a prima facie right to information, which means 
that the child is justified to receive certain information, in this case, information about 
his or her conception method. A prima facie right is binding and obligatory until it 
conflicts with another prima facie right, which in this case is the parents’ right to 
privacy. This means that the original prima facie right still counts – the child does not 
lose his or her right to information – however, this right can be overridden by the other 
prima facie right. This means that a child might have a prima facie right to information 
about his or her donor conception, but this does not mean the child also has the actual 
right. Rights are not absolute rules: when several parties are involved with different 
rights, it is impossible to acknowledge all rights because this would lead to 
contradicting outcomes. In the secrecy and disclosure discussion, the parents’ right not 
to tell and the child’s right to be informed each support a different outcome. In the 
anonymity and open-identity debate, the donors’ right to privacy conflicts with the 
children’s right to information about their roots, and this again conflicts with the 
parents’ right to autonomy. To decide which right should have priority, a balance must 
be made by evaluating the empirical evidence available.  
In both debates, the focus is often solely the best interest of the child. However, take 
for instance the anonymity debate, it is unclear how information about the donor is 
necessary for the development of the child’s identity. It is clear that some donor 
conceived children want information about the donor, for instance because of curiosity 
about physical similarities or shared interests. When we look at the parents and the 
donor, an open-identity system imposes a role on the donor that might not be the 
desired role for either of the parties. Indeed, data show that the type of donor changes 
in an open-identity system. It seems that this change is motivated by the assigned role 
to the donor. Some donors welcome the possibility to be contacted by their offspring 
while others do not. With regard to the parents, although for some the involvement of a 
donor is seen as an enrichment of family relationships, for others it is seen as a threat 
and an intrusion of their family life. So far, a wide spectrum of opinions is found for all 
three parties and it is not clear why one opinion should be prioritized. In order not to 
impose a particular system, the double track system would offer a solution (Pennings, 
1997). Instead of forcing all parties into a certain system, let the parties make their own 
choice. Donors can choose to donate anonymously or identifiably, and parents can 
choose to pick an anonymous or an identifiable donor. A double track system respects 
the parents’ autonomy and the donors’ right to privacy. Such a system recognizes moral 
pluralism and supports a morality that is reached by agreement of the parties involved 
(Pennings, 1997). Given the lack of evidence about the best interest of the child, the 
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choice should be left to the parents themselves, especially in an area as personal as 
reproduction (Leenen, 1993). This might turn out to be the best for all parties involved, 
instead of forcing them into a system in which they might not feel comfortable 
(Shenfield & Steele, 1997). Hereby, the interests of the child are indirectly recognized as 
well. The argument against a double track policy stating that this does not take into 
account the child’s interest is thus not entirely valid. Another counterargument is that 
such a system would install discrimination because some children would have access to 
information about the donor and others would not. It is unclear how this would not also 
be an argument against an anonymous or an open-identity system. The same 
discrimination applies here since parents still have the authority to decide about the 
disclosure to the child.  
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In this doctoral dissertation, each party involved in third party reproduction is 
highlighted separately by one or two particular research questions. My doctoral 
research is twofold: I include a normative section where theoretical analyses are made 
based on already existing empirical data, and an empirical section where the 
(normative) views of the actors involved in third party reproduction are investigated. In 
the normative part, the points of view of the donors (chapter 5) and the counsellors 
(chapter 6) are considered. In the empirical part, the views of parents (chapter 7 and 8) 
and children (chapter 9) are scrutinized. In the following, I briefly explain what is 
discussed in each chapter and how my research adds to the literature on third party 
reproduction.  
Normative research 
Donors: information exchange from the child to the donor 
As shown previously, anonymous gamete donation was long the preferred practice. 
Since a few decades, a new focus on the rights and interests of donor-conceived children 
has led a number of countries to shift towards an open-identity system. However, this 
evolution appears to overlook whether information exchange could also be of interest 
to the other parties involved, in particular the gamete donors. In this chapter, the 
question is analysed whether donors should be granted a right to some information 
about the offspring conceived by their donations. Five arguments are offered - along the 
same lines of the arguments given in favour of granting information to the donor 
conceived children - which donors could use in support of such a claim: (1) It can be of 
great importance to the donors’ and their own children’s health that they receive 
medical information (in particular, evidence of an unsuspected genetic disease) about 
the donor offspring; (2) basic information (such as whether any children were born) 
could be a way to acknowledge donors for their altruistic behaviour; (3) general 
information (information about the child’s wellbeing) about the donor offspring could 
ease the donors’ potential concern about and sense of responsibility for the offspring; 
(4) an extended profile could provide an important enrichment of the donors’ identities; 
(5) identifying information would be useful for donors who want to contact the donor 
offspring. We will show that arguments (1) and (2) prove to be sufficient reasons for 
granting donors a right to certain information. Argument (4) can be defended with 
regard to another type of information than the one that is claimed. 
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Counsellors: giving advice in the secrecy and disclosure debate 
In the above section, I showed that much discussion exist on whether the conception 
method should be disclosed to the child or not. Both arguments in favour and 
arguments against disclosure have been presented. For a long time, secrecy was advised. 
Nowadays, a shift towards openness seems to be developing. The question is, however, 
whether such a directive counselling approach is ethically justified. In this chapter, an 
analysis is made by balancing the two underlying principles of autonomy for the parents 
(non-directive approach) and beneficence for the child (directive approach). We analyse 
the arguments and evidence available at this point that support the beneficence 
principle. This analysis shows that no sufficient arguments can be given in favour of the 
beneficence principle; the parents’ autonomy should not be overridden.  
Empirical research 
Parents 
(a) The grounds for parenthood 
 
In the first chapter, an overview of normative theories about the grounds of parenthood 
was given. Clearly, a large variety of normative theories exists on what should be the 
basis of parenthood. In this chapter, a study about the moral reasoning of the parents 
involved in the field on the basis of parenthood and parental rights and responsibilities 
is presented. Via a hypothetical scenario, we investigated their arguments and views 
with regard to the grounds of parenthood. For this study, we aimed at including a large 
variety of parents. We focused on lesbian couples post and during treatment, and on 
heterosexual couples post treatment who had a child either via anonymous sperm 
donation or via (known-) anonymous oocyte donation. The aim was to add new insights 
from the stakeholders to the normative debates concerning parenthood. Looking into 
the moral experiences of the people involved can enrich current moral frameworks 
with views that were overlooked by ethicists. The study shows that the people use 
traditional grounds such as intentionalism and geneticism, as well as new grounds such 
as the relationship between the partners. 
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(b) The influence of the genetic link on the experience of parenthood 
One of the central topics in the literature on parenthood after treatment via gamete 
donation, is the relevance of genetic ties for parenthood. To enrich normative analyses 
and descriptive background theories, a qualitative analysis is presented on how lesbian 
couples experience and deal with the difference in genetic relatedness in their family 
and to what extend parenthood and being a parent depends on a genetic link. Previous 
research showed that lesbian couples handle the difference with regard to genetic 
relatedness, for instance, by creating a narrative about physical resemblances or by 
focusing on the social bond and its influence on children. The difference with regard to 
the genetic link brought up complex and context-specific experiences for these parents. 
Generally, the genetic link was described as irrelevant: equality between both parents 
was presented as a given. However, some experiences of difference due to the presence 
of one genetic link were found.  
 
Children: the influence of the genetic link on the definition of family concepts 
In the last chapter, a qualitative study is presented that explores how children (9 to 10 
years old) from lesbian families define the three actors involved in the building of their 
family: the biological mother, the non-biological mother and the donor. The aim of this 
research is to outline how a child conceived via third party reproduction (sperm 
donation) makes sense of his or her family relationships, and to what extend this is 
influenced by the (non-)existence of a genetic link. Two findings stand out. First, the 
biological and non-biological mother were described as equal parents. Second, the 
concepts ‘non-biological mother’ and ‘donor’ were defined by looking at the hetero-
normative concepts of ‘mummy’ and ‘daddy’. With regard to the donor, the comparison 
with a ‘daddy’ turned out to be complex due to the conflict between the role as a 
progenitor and the lack of a social relationship. 
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Chapter 4  
Methodological background to this dissertation 
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4.1 General background 
This doctoral dissertation is the result of a larger interdisciplinary research project. The 
aim was to gain a better understanding of social and genetic parenthood. Three 
departments of the Ghent University were part of the project: the department of 
Philosophy and Moral science, the department of Experimental-Clinical and Health 
Psychology and the Centre for Reproductive Medicine of the Ghent University Hospital. 
Each department was represented by a supervisor, and one or more researchers. The 
involvement of these three parties was necessary for the approach that was chosen for 
this research, which is increasingly known as an empirical bioethics approach. First, I 
will discuss the approach in general. Then, I will focus on the goal of this research 
project and the methods used for the studies included in this dissertation. 
4.1.1 The development of empirical bioethics 
The bioethical field is a relatively young research field that is booming since the late 
1960s (Borry et al., 2005). Although theology and philosophy shaped the bioethical 
movement a great deal, the field was essentially interdisciplinary, with important 
contributions from physicians, lawyers, nurses and social scientists. Nonetheless, the 
relationship between the human sciences and ethics did not run smoothly. Data 
gathering was unknown to ethicists, and the methods used in ethics were unknown to 
social scientists. Although an interdisciplinary approach was aimed for, a gap existed 
between the normative and the empirical research. One of the reasons for the difficult 
cooperation can be found in the distinction between descriptive and normative ethics. 
While descriptive ethics (sociology, psychology, anthropology,…) aims at describing 
people’s values, rules and norms – they describe the ‘is’ -, normative ethics discusses 
what is morally acceptable – they describe the ‘ought’ (Borry et al., 2005). Therefore, 
ethicists believed that the empirical data gathered by social sciences were not useful for 
ethical reflection. In the medical field for instance, this lead to a top-down applied 
ethics approach with ethicists arguing about principles and rules that were then applied 
in practice. Practical recommendations concerning for instance abortion and euthanasia 
were made by people who did not have enough understanding of what was going on in 
practice. This form of applied ethics was criticized in recent years as too abstract, too 
general, too speculative and insensitive to reality (Ives, 2008; Borry et al., 2005). 
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 The empirical bioethics approach developed and is still developing in response to 
this ‘traditional’ or ‘philosophical’ bioethics. The theory-driven focus is gradually 
replaced by an ethical approach that is more grounded in practical reality. The 
empirical bioethics approach seeks a way to contextualize moral theory by combining 
both empirical data and moral theory (Musschenga, 2005). The aim is to create an 
ethical analysis in which moral theories, principles and rules are developed, justified 
and investigated together with real-life experience of the actors involved in the field. 
One could say that the ultimate goal of empirical ethics is to improve the contextuality 
of ethics (Haimes, 2002). Real-life experiences are thus used to inform ethical theories: 
the ‘is’ of the world is used to inform the debate about the ‘ought’ of the world (Ives, 
2008). Empirical research contributes to that goal by showing the socially constructed 
nature of the issues discussed in bioethics (Light & McGee,1998). Instead of ethicists 
thinking about solutions and how practical ethical dilemmas should be solved in their 
ivory towers, the aim is to get them out of their tower into the practice in cooperation 
with other experts in the field such as psychologists and social scientists, in order to 
enrich their views on how dilemmas should be solved. Ethics is about people, not just 
about good arguments (Ives, 2008).  
4.1.2 The value of including empirical data into practical ethics  
The objections against this method can be summarized in the fear of a loss of 
normativity due to the use of empirical data as a single basis of normative judgments 
(van der Scheer & Widdershoven, 2004). The deduction of normative statements from 
descriptive statements is seen as a great difficulty. Several responses to this critique can 
be offered. Ives (2008) argued that empirical bioethics should not be confused with some 
forms of social science in which the experiences of people are merely documented. The 
leading idea behind this approach is not to investigate what people think, but why 
people think what they think, which is then again subject to critical analysis. The moral 
reasoning behind people’s ideas, arguments, accompanying inconsistencies and their 
explanations of these inconsistencies are the topic of investigation. An ethical analysis 
should at least in part start from an understanding of the ethical considerations made 
by the actors in the field. Of course, the empirical bioethicist’s task is to evaluate these 
normative values; when people value something, this does not mean they should value 
it. The mere data gathering should not be used as the single truth and should not define 
policy. The data gathering is there to inform ethical analysis, not to govern ethical 
analysis. The critique that an empirical bioethical approach would lead to relativism is 
not grounded either. Even though empirical bioethics works with behaviour and 
phenomena that are contextualized, the normative judgments following are not 
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arbitrary since they are evaluated on their capacity to lead to satisfying solutions (van 
der Scheer & Widdershoven, 2004).  
Empirical research can at least in four ways contribute to ethics (Musschenga, 2005). 
First of all, empirical data give us insight into the actual conduct of the people involved 
in the field. An example of this is the literature on secrecy and disclosure about the 
conception to the child. Empirical data gives us insight into what people actually do 
(telling or not telling) and more importantly, why (MacDougall et al., 2007). This 
information adds to the ethical rights discussion, as shown in the introduction. A second 
reason why empirical data are valuable for practical ethics, is the identification of 
relevant issues that were not present (or largely underestimated) in the purely 
normative analysis. Ethicists can be informed about moral considerations which 
escaped their attention, the empirical data hereby enriching the normative analysis. An 
example of this is the research by Provoost et al. (2009) on the status of the embryo. 
Their research showed that parents saw the embryo as an embodiment of the couple; 
this symbolic value had a great influence on their decisions regarding the donation of 
their spare embryos to another couple or for scientific research. This moral 
consideration was not included in the ethical literature before. Thirdly, empirical data 
give insight into the institutional aspects of a context relevant for the practicality of 
ethical guidelines. In the discussion of single embryo transfer, empirical data showed 
that for actors in the field, the reimbursement system determined their view on the 
system: patients who need to pay a large amount of money for an IVF cycle, want a 
maximum chance of success in return, thus favouring a multiple embryo transfer and 
ignoring the possible negative consequences of this choice (Porter & Bhattacharya, 
2005). Empirical research showed that financial factors can play a role in people’s 
decision making process. Fourth, adding empirical research creates an insight into the 
description of the actual moral opinions and reasoning patterns of the people involved 
in the practice. An example of this is the study of Ives et al. (2008b) which demonstrated 
that fathers who were separated from their children tended to focus on genetic 
constructions of fatherhood since they are unable to use their caring relationship as a 
basis for claiming parental status. The value of an empirical bioethics approach lies thus 
in enriching ethical theories with new information that would otherwise not have been 
taken into account in the ethical debate. 
Van der Scheer and Widdershoven (2004) suggested a way to combine both 
descriptive and normative disciplines and called it integrated empirical-ethical 
research. This can be seen as the hybridization of the two fields in which normative 
rules are formulated on the basis of empirical research. The most frequently used 
integrating model, however, is the Wide Reflective Equilibrium (WRE) (Daniels, 1996). 
The distinction between integrating models and the other traditional models is that 
integrating models are interactive and embedded in the specific practice. While other 
models build on pre-existing data, integrating models gather data specifically for the 
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purpose of informing ethical debate. This allows the researchers to delve deeper into 
the normative concerns and constructions of the participants by challenging their 
views, pointing out inconsistencies, bringing up counterfactual cases and using thought 
experiments (Ives et al., 2008b). Since this is an emerging field in full development, no 
standard or traditional methods are available (Ives, 2008). 
4.2 An empirical bioethics approach to parenthood 
Our research project consisted of a normative and an empirical part. In this dissertation, 
I followed that idea by distinguishing a normative and empirical section. The goal of the 
project was to eventually integrate normative (the views of ethicists and policy makers) 
and empirical (the views of the major agents involved) research by using the WRE. 
4.2.1 Normative part 
For the normative part, literature searches were conducted towards both normative and 
empirical papers on parenthood after medically assisted reproduction and all related 
ethical topics. This literature search started at the beginning of the project and was 
continued during the whole project. Familiarizing with the already existing data and 
moral discussions and scrutinizing the principles, arguments and background theories 
used in the academic and political discussions on medically assisted reproduction with 
donor material were seen as important factors in reaching three goals. First, the aim 
was to actively add to the normative literature by developing new normative analyses 
that integrated the already existing empirical research. Second, reading about the 
already existing normative research on this topic helped the team to pin down which 
topics should be included and which focus should be maintained in our own interview 
guides. It also helped the team to think about concepts, arguments and moral reasoning; 
this was useful background information to investigate the participants’ own moral 
reasoning about certain topics. 
 The final goal of the project was to integrate the normative and empirical part 
using the WRE (Daniels, 1996). The aim of WRE is to enrich already existing ethical 
frameworks with considerations of the people involved in the field. Participation in a 
real practice (for instance, gamete donation), makes people experts. They therefore 
might have views, opinions, or moral considerations which are overlooked by ethicists. 
After critical examination of people’s views, the resulting new insights might be added 
to the ethical framework. The WRE consequently starts from the moral judgements of a 
  63 
person or group of persons that are confronted in daily life with moral problems. To 
include those moral judgements made in ‘the best circumstances’, a selection is made 
based on (1) cognitive conditions and (2) specific moral conditions. The cognitive 
conditions include for instance being fully informed, being rational or not being 
influenced by emotions during moral judgment. The specific moral conditions depends 
largely on the moral theory. A utilitarian will demand thinking about the consequences 
of an action, while a deontologist will demand thinking about motives and rules. One 
specific moral condition that is generally agreed upon, is impartiality. The aim of 
applying such conditions is to reach a set of well-considered moral judgements. These 
well-considered moral judgements are then summarized into moral principles, which 
are again tested in specific situations to see whether they lead to acceptable 
judgements. This method of justification is repeated until a balance is reached. 
However, to prevent a summary of moral judgements and a mere descriptive ethics, an 
independent and external third set of beliefs, namely background theories, is added. 
This third set is used as an independent support for the moral principles (instead of the 
mere support of the well-considered judgements). They include philosophical, 
sociological, anthropological and psychological theories. By adding background theories 
to the balance, the method moves from a representation of the people’s capacity to 
make moral judgements to a justified framework. The aim is thus to reach a moral 
framework that is a balance between well-considered moral judgements made by people 
in specific situations, moral principles and background theories. The following example 
can clarify the above. Think about the ethical framework of directed gamete donation. 
Imagine that from an interview study, the following well-considered moral judgement 
can be derived: “Donor X has the right to decide that recipient Y cannot receive his 
gametes”. This can be justified by the rule “a donor has the right to select or screen the 
recipients of his or her donation”. To investigate the coherence between the moral 
judgement and the justifying principle, we go back to our judgements in daily life, 
change the situation and see whether the principle still counts. For instance, the 
situation can be changed to organ donation. Either you agree with the judgement that 
also organ donors should be allowed to select the recipients, or you disagree and the 
principle is no longer defensible. The next step is then to specify the initial principle 
into one that includes the gamete donation context and excludes the organ donation 
context. The grounds for making a difference should be made clear. For instance, the 
initial principle can be changed into “a gamete donor has the right to select his or her 
recipients” on the grounds that donating gametes leads to the creation of a human 
being while donating organs only has implications for the recipient. Again, this 
specified principle should be tested in other situations. The aim of the final principle is 
to incorporate all relevant moral judgements with the greatest coherence. At the same 
time, the principle should be justified by one or more background theories. A 
background theory that supports the principle of recipient selection is that of 
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responsibility for one’s gametes and for the children following from one’s gametes. In 
practice, the moral judgements on recipient selection by donors differ. Recipient 
selection by the donor is not accepted by everyone. The aim is then to make a well-
justified choice between both positions. Therefore, we should also work towards an 
equilibrium starting from the opposite moral judgement “Donor X has no right to 
choose recipient Y instead of recipient Z” and an accompanying opposite principle “a 
donor has no right to select or screen the recipients of his or her donation”. The main 
background theory supporting this principle is the theory of fair allocation of scarce 
goods. The equilibrium with the least contradictions or contra-intuitive judgements, 
and the most coherence between the moral judgements, is the preferred option.  
 In this dissertation, I attempt to contribute to such an equilibrium on parenthood 
after assisted reproduction with gamete donation by focusing on the experiences and 
moral reasonings of families built via gamete donation. Three chapters are included 
adding to the empirical literature and which can used as background information in a 
WRE. 
4.2.2 Epistemology: social constructivism  
The research project was conceptualized within a specific epistemological position in 
which knowledge is a compilation of human-made constructions, not the neutral 
discovery of an objective truth. This postmodern position underpins a social 
constructivist approach and involves a radical questioning of positivism by claiming 
that knowledge and truth are not fixed, but are culturally and historically local (Burr, 
2003; Gergen, 1999). Social constructivism is based on the belief that versions of 
knowledge are produced through the daily interactions between people in the course of 
social life and do not reflect an objective observation of the world (Burr, 1995). Thus, 
what we see and experience is never a direct reflection of an external reality but is 
instead a negotiated creation of meaning. 
Taking this epistemological stance as a starting point seems to explain perfectly 
why in the WRE as an ethical justification theory, we can rely on the well-considered 
judgements of the people. Several opponents of the WRE have argued that the well-
considered judgements cannot be seen as reliable or credible and that the WRE is not 
able to point out and exclude the ‘bad’ moral judgements (Brandt, 1979; Hare, 1988; 
Singer, 1974). In addition, all our judgements are influenced by personal, cultural, 
political and religious systems. Therefore, the reliability of the constructed framework 
cannot be guaranteed, according to opponents, in the sense that the framework cannot 
be seen as an independent and rational theory. A constructionist approach counters 
these critiques with defining ethics as a framework for practical use in society, a useful 
moral code, rather than a search for an ‘ethical truth’ or an ‘objective ethical 
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framework’ to justify moral acts or judgements. If we want to reach such a goal, it is 
reasonable to include the everyday and common moral judgements into the ethical 
framework. These judgements justify the construction of new principles, instead of 
having a probability of being ‘true’.  
However, if one accepts this epistemology and the combination with the WRE, 
inevitably, one should recognise and accept moral pluralism. Common sense and moral 
judgements are tradition-bound. Consequently, a moral framework only applies to the 
particular moral society. The framework is not fit for solving problems between 
different moral societies, or even within each society. A framework that aims to do that, 
should try to include all elements and beliefs of the different societies into one WRE. 
The problem is thus that constructivism understands moral objectivity as a social 
agreement that is accepted by everybody. Reaching such a common ground seems to be 
an unrealistic goal. The coherence that is prescribed by the WRE consequently does not 
necessarily lead to a useful system when combined with social constructivism.  
Using this epistemological framework has several implications for the interpretation 
of the data we gathered during the project. First of all, because parenting is a social 
construction, it is highly culturally determined and it needs to be considered within its 
broader societal and cultural context. Although having children is desired and expected 
in all cultures, the meanings attached to parenthood and children vary from culture to 
culture (Hynie & Hammer Burns, 2006). For people from collectivist cultures, the family 
is the most important social unit, with parental obligations and relationships prevailing 
over spousal relationships. Therefore, infertility may be extremely stressful because it 
signifies a failure to fulfil one’s social role and obligations. In patrilineal African 
societies, childless women are blamed for the couple’s infertility and may be cast out of 
their community and excluded from inheriting property or participating in family life 
(Hynie & Hammer Burns, 2006). Within a social constructivism approach, one tries to 
pay attention to those broader social discourses that provide people with the words to 
think and talk about their experiences. Secondly, consistent with our epistemological 
position, we aimed to capture people’s meaning-making processes about their 
experiences and therefore we applied a qualitative research design. Qualitative research 
best fits experiential and explorative research questions and enables to study persons as 
meaning-making beings (Smith et al., 2009). Finally, a qualitative researcher cannot be 
an objective, politically neutral observer who stands outside and above the social world. 
The process of exploring how participants make sense of their personal and social world 
is inevitably influenced and complicated by the researcher’s own conceptions (Smith & 
Osborn, 2008) and theoretical and epistemological commitments (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
A so-called “double hermeneutic” is involved: the researcher is trying to make sense of 
the participants trying to make sense of their world (Smith & Osborn, 2008). This 
dynamic interaction between researcher and participant is central to the constructivist 
paradigm.  
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4.2.3 Empirical part 
In order to gain a thorough image of the views and opinions of the actors themselves on 
social and genetic parenthood after medically assisted reproduction, a large variety of 
participants was included. In the first place, we concentrated on parents post treatment 
and would-be parents in treatment during the time of the interview. We included 
lesbian and heterosexual (would-be)parents who used sperm donation and heterosexual 
(would-be) parents who used anonymous, known-anonymous or known donation. We 
also included heterosexual (would-be) parents who used their own gametes. Secondly, 
we focused on the children of the post treatment parents and lastly, we included the 
known oocyte donors of the parents that were interviewed. For this doctoral 
dissertation, five interview studies were analysed. The results are presented in the 
empirical part of this dissertation: chapter 7 incorporates four interview studies, 
namely heterosexual parents through anonymous sperm donation and known-
anonymous oocyte donation and lesbian parents after and during treatment with 
anonymous sperm donation, chapter 8 presents a study towards lesbian parents 
through anonymous sperm donation, and chapter 9 includes an interview study with 
these lesbian parents’ children. I will explain some features of the participants, the 
interviews we conducted and how we analysed the data, followed by some reflections on 
the validity of these qualitative studies. More detailed information on the methods for 
each particular study will be presented in the chapters. 
Participants 
All participants were recruited via the Department of Reproductive Medicine of the 
Ghent University Hospital. We purposefully sampled a maximum of 10 couples, in line 
with the literature on qualitative methods, in order to guarantee sufficient in-depth 
engagement with each individual case (Smith & Osborn, 2008). Also the practical reason 
of time lead to the choice for this number, since we chose to focus on a large variety of 
sub groups rather than on a larger group of participants per sub study. During 
recruitment it became clear that even reaching the set number of 10 couples was 
difficult for some sub studies. No data ‘saturation’ technique was used; the addition of 
new data to the analysis until there is nothing new or relevant to emerge was not 
applied. The department’s counsellor was involved in the recruitment process as she 
had met each couple during a counselling session before they started treatment. She 
contacted all participants by phone based on the same recruitment protocol. Besides the 
perspective of parents, we also attempted to capture the children’s perspective. Again, a 
set number of 10 children was agreed upon. These children were recruited via the 
parents. After each interview, the parents were asked whether their child (aged 7 to 10 
years) would also want to participate in the study and whether the parents themselves 
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would agree to this interview. During the course of the project, it became clear that the 
recruitment of children was very difficult. Few parents were willing to let their child 
participate, mainly due to the secrecy concerning the donor conception. We were able 
to recruit a maximum of 7 children in the lesbian families, with all other groups only 
providing 1 to 3 children. Lastly, we included the known donors of the families who used 
known donation. These donors were contacted after the interview with the couple had 
taken place and the interviewer had informed them about the upcoming recruitment of 
the known donor, which in all cases, was the mother’s sister. All known donors agreed 
to participate. All studies were approved by the Ethics Committee of the Ghent 
University Hospital.  
Interviews 
Data were collected through semi-structured in-depth interviews. This form of 
interviewing allows the researcher and the participant to introduce new issues, to 
modify initial questions in the light of the participants’ responses and to probe 
interesting and important areas which arise (Smith & Osborn, 2008). The interview was 
supported by an interview schedule that covered the following topics: the experience of 
the fertility treatments, the experience of the genetic versus non-genetic tie between 
parents, the meaning of the donor, the experience of parenthood and the assumed 
rights and responsibilities of the different parties. The interview guides were 
constructed by the research team that consisted of psychologists, ethicists, a midwive 
and professionals part of the reproductive field. An overview of the existing literature, 
as well as theoretical and practical insights were used to construct the interview guide. 
For instance, bidirectional models advancing the child’s agency (De Mol & Buysse, 2008a; 
De Mol & Buysse, 2008b) influenced our interview schedule. The bidirectional 
framework ads the child-to-parent direction of influence to the widely accepted parent-
to-child influence within the context of an intimate, long-term parent-child 
relationship (De Mol & Buysse, 2008a; De Mol & Buysse, 2008b). As a result, questions 
about the way the children reacted to the knowledge of their genetic origin were 
included, as well as how processes differed among multiple children in the same family 
(by probing). Several pilot studies were conducted in order to test and to fine tune the 
guides. During the data collection, the guides were evaluated on for instance clarity of 
the questions, word choice, or whether the questions lead to the information we 
wanted. Final guides can therefore differ slightly with regard to certain questions and 
wording (the guides are included as appendices). The interview topics were put in an 
appropriate sequence meaning that more sensitive topics were introduced later in the 
interview. This sequence was set up for two reasons: it allowed the respondents to (1) 
become relaxed and comfortable and (2) to mention certain issues spontaneously, 
before the interviewer introduced them (Smith & Osborn, 2008). The latter could 
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indicate that the issues are not merely experienced as relevant by the interviewer, but 
indeed particularly by the participants. We chose to use a semi-structured interview 
guide for several reasons. First of all, we wanted to cover a large amount of information, 
going from experiences about the treatment to normative reasoning about parental 
rights and responsibilities. The semi-structured guide was meant as a support for the 
interviewer not to forget certain topics. Second, our team included two interviewers 
which both did interviews within one sub study. The use of a semi-structured guide 
maintained as much uniformity as possible within one group with regard to topics. 
Nonetheless, the interviewers were free in how they used the guide during the 
interview. The sequence of the topics was not strict, on the contrary, the interviewer 
was free to adapt the sequence according to what the participants said. The participants 
partially guided the interview. 
Only conjoint interviews were conducted in order to obtain couples’ shared 
constructions and to observe interactions between the partners. As argued by Bjornholt 
and Farstad (2012), conjoint interviews provide a “common reflective space”, which 
enables partners to complement and contradict each other; they can challenge and 
reinforce each other’s ideas. By interviewing couples together, the researcher can 
observe family practices and dynamics as they occur in family life and topics of 
disagreements can be identified (Bjornholt & Farstad, 2012).  
Analysis 
The data were analysed using an inductive thematic analysis method (as presented by 
Braun & Clarke, 2006). We chose this method because it provides a flexible research tool 
suited for a large and complex data set. Also, this method is compatible with the 
constructionist paradigm of the research project. Cases were analysed in a cumulative 
way, with a focus on the content of the people’s experiences. The coding process was 
iterative, allowing the researcher to move back and forth during the analysis.  
For the studies included in this dissertation, the analyses consisted of a phased 
process, starting with familiarizing with the data and memo writing. The transcripts 
were then screened with the research question in mind and relevant text units were 
coded inductively. From these codes, higher level codes and themes were derived. 
During this process, a team of auditors was invited to challenge the initial codes and 
themes via alternatives and counterexamples (Hill et al., 1997). The structure of the 
themes was written down in an analysis report which was extensively examined and 
discussed by the auditor team. Through discussions, the final structure of the themes 
was agreed upon. To improve data analysis, discussions and intensive trainings with the 
whole team were organised in order to learn from each other and to become aware of 
alternative view points on the matter. 
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Validity of the analyses 
While in quantitative research exact numbers can be given to ensure the reliability and 
validity of the analysis, in qualitative research it is much more complex to verify the 
validity of the findings. The researcher plays a much more central role and is inevitably 
involved in the research. To ensure the reliability and validity of an analysis, the 
‘credibility’, ‘transferability’ of the data and ‘reflexivity’ towards the data should be 
taken into account. In the following, our attempts to strengthen the validity of our 
research through these three methods will be explained.  
Credibility. The credibility of qualitative research is referred to by Kvale and 
Brinkmann (2009) as ‘defensible claims’: are the claims faithful to the data? In order to 
enhance the credibility of the research, two steps were taken. First, we worked in an 
interdisciplinary team to discuss the data collection method and analysis. Our team 
engaged in intensive training and collaboration in order to learn from each other, 
challenge views and findings and to become aware of alternative interpretations. For 
every analysis, an internal auditor (usually from a different discipline) and an external 
auditor (the supervisor) was involved. The auditing consisted of a detailed analysis of 
the research report that was provided by the analyst. Based on the report, the auditors 
questioned the constructed categories and challenged the analysis via alternatives and 
counterexamples until final themes were agreed upon (Hill et al., 1997). Further, we 
tried to increase the transparency of our interpretative work by providing analysis 
reports with the identified themes, illustrated by quotes of the participants. The 
interpretation of the quotes was presented transparently, enabling the reader to 
identify how interferences were made (Hill et al., 1997). Second, data triangulation was 
applied to achieve multiple ways of understanding (Daly 2007; Hill et al., 1997). We 
established triangulation of data sources by including at a large variety of participants 
(heterosexual couples and lesbian couples), and data analysis methods by using both 
thematic analysis and interpretative phenomenological analysis. 
Transferability. Transferability is known as the ‘qualitative counterpart’ of the term 
‘generalizability’. In the context of qualitative studies, it means that research findings 
can be transferred to other contexts (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Instead of aiming at 
statistical generalizability, the aim is to enhance theoretical generalizability; i.e. the 
extent to which knowledge produced in one situation can be transferred to other 
situations (Hill et al., 1997; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). The eventual goal of qualitative 
research is to provide a rich, contextualized understanding of human experiences, that 
results in idiographic and local insight of particular persons in a particular context, 
which is not generalizable nor universal (Marecek, 2003). During team discussions, we 
constantly reminded each other of the very specific context of our data. For one, the 
participants were recruited in Dutch-speaking Belgium which means that the patients 
we recruited should be contextualized in the context of anonymous gamete donation. 
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Another example is the recruitment of the children of the lesbian families. By 
coincidence, all children turned out to be boys. During team discussions, we wondered 
whether the results would have been different if more girls had been included. More 
generally, we often discussed the topics we investigated, such as genetic relatedness or 
secrecy and disclosure, in relation to other contexts such as adoption or reconstituted 
families. 
Reflexivity. Reflexivity is defined as a process in which your own position as 
researcher is taken into consideration. Reflexivity needs to be applied throughout all 
the steps of the research process. In the first phase of this project, a phase of ‘settling in’ 
the research field was implemented. In order to get closer to the participant’s world and 
to try to take an insider’s perspective, each team member did a short internship in the 
Department of Reproductive Medicine in Ghent. We followed patients during the 
different phases of their treatment and learned about the implications of certain 
techniques for the couple. Seeing the work that is done in the laboratory, listening to 
patients during their first counselling session, but especially experiencing a live 
insemination learned me about the massive impact and importance of reproductive 
techniques on people’s lives. At that point, I was overwhelmed by the experience, but it 
opened my eyes for the reality of the practice I had been reading about before. Parallel 
with this process, the literature regarding different topics on parenthood after ART was 
reviewed. Second, reflections on one’s orientation and assumptions were made explicit 
by means of a Socratic dialogue held in our research team and by keeping track of 
personal reflections in a diary. We often discussed rather informally our own ideas 
about gamete donation and related topics such as disclosure to the child. Not only did I 
discuss this in the research team, I often talked about my opinions and struggles with 
the practice of gamete donation with friends and family. These discussion helped me to 
get insight into my own views on the matter. Third, in the data collection phase, I was 
reflective of my own position as young, female researcher without children and 
discussed the meaning that gamete donation or anonymous donation would have for 
myself with my team members, friends and family. Finally, regarding data 
interpretation, presuppositions were identified by the internal and external auditors 
and reflected upon by the analyst. It is believed that knowing one’s presuppositions 
prevents the design of narrow research questions, problematic reactions during the 
interview and interpretation biases during the analysis. As a result, the position of the 
researcher becomes more self-conscious (Parker, 2005). 
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Chapter 5  
The right of the donor to information about 
children conceived from his or her gametes 
Based on published journal articles: 
Raes, I., Ravelingien, A., and Pennings, G. (2013) The right of the donor to 
information about children conceived from his or her gametes. Hum Reprod, 28, 
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Raes, I., Ravelingien, A., and Pennings, G. (2014) Informatieverwerving vanuit het 
perspectief van de gametendonor: mogen sperma- en eiceldonoren informatie 
ontvangen over hun donorkinderen? Tijdschr. voor Geneeskunde, 70, 3-10. 
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5.1 Introduction 
As already previously discussed in the introduction, over the past two decades, there 
has been a remarkable trend towards more openness in the practice of gamete donation 
(Janssens et al., 2011). In these so called ‘open-identity’ countries, donors are no longer 
allowed to donate anonymously. Instead, they have to consent to the release of their 
identity to the children conceived from their gametes if they request this once they 
become mature.  
This shift towards identifiable donation is the result of a new focus on the rights and 
interests of donor-conceived children (Scheib & Cushing, 2007). However, this evolution 
appears to focus exclusively on this party. Policy makers seem to overlook whether 
information exchange could also be of interest to the other parties involved, in 
particular the gamete donors. As it stands today, donors rarely receive information 
about the result of their donation. Therefore, it would be useful to scrutinize the donors’ 
perspective on the practice of gamete donation. It is not clear why donors would not be 
justified to receive information about their donor offspring, similarly to their donor 
offspring who are justified to receive information about the donor. We need to analyse 
whether donors also have an interest in receiving some kind of information about the 
offspring conceived by their donations and whether they consequently have a right to 
such information. 
5.2 Possible arguments in favour of the donor 
As a first step of our analysis, we distinguish between various types of information that 
a donor could claim. 
o Basic information: this would include information about the outcome of the 
donation, in particular the number and sex of the donor offspring; 
o Medical information: this would involve medical and genetic facts about the 
donor offspring; 
o Phenotypic information: this information type would contain a description of 
the general body characteristics of the donor-conceived children, such as hair 
and eye colour, length and weight; 
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o Extended donor child profile: this is a counterpart of the extended donor 
profile and would consist of elements like a personality description, 
information about the child’s interests and hobbies, and perhaps a letter to 
the donor; 
o Identifying information: the name and contact details of the donor child. Such 
information would be given in addition to some of the information types 
mentioned above.  
 
Remarkable is that in some countries such as Belgium, policy already allows the 
exchange of the above information for a particular group of donors, namely for the 
group of known donors. In practice, this group mainly consists of oocyte donors. These 
are sisters, nieces or close friends of the recipient women (in rare cases, the mother). 
The allowance of such known donors developed in support of the constant shortage of 
oocyte donors. Because of the particular personal relationship between the donor and 
the recipient, it is evident that the donor has all information about her donor child. The 
donor indeed knows the child. In case of an anonymous or identifiable donor, however, 
the ethical judgement of this information exchange is clearly very different: it is not 
seen as self-evident. It should therefore be investigated whether such donors should 
also be able to receive information about their donor offspring. 
We identify five arguments on which donors could base their claim for a right to 
some type of information about the offspring conceived by their donations: 
 
o Medical information, in particular evidence of an unsuspected genetic disease, 
about the donor offspring can be of great importance to the donors’ and their 
own children’s health. 
o Donors should be acknowledged for their altruistic behaviour. Basic 
information is a minimal reward for their donation. 
o General information about the donor offspring should be given as a means to 
ease the donors’ potential concern about and sense of responsibility for the 
offspring. 
o An extended profile can provide an important enrichment of the donors’ 
identities. 
o The open-identity system creates a ‘new’ type of donor – one that desires 
contact with the donor offspring. Identifying information enables such 
contact.  
 
In what follows, we analyse all arguments and evaluate whether or not a donor is 
justified to claim the proposed information. 
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5.2.1 Desire versus need 
Whether a donor can claim one or several of these information types depends on two 
conditions. First, we have to take into account the weight of the donors’ interests in 
obtaining such information. Are these interests related to the recognised needs of a 
person? After all, a mere desire for something does not necessarily point to important 
needs that must be addressed. A right cannot be based on a mere desire (Savulescu, 
1999). “At the root of rights are interests” (Freeman, 1996). It should be investigated 
first what the effect of (not) granting a right would have on the quality of life of the 
person (suffering, social contacts, knowledge, development of skills,…), independent of 
that person’s personal desire. When the quality of life would be highly increased when 
certain information is released, or when the quality of life would be severely decreased 
when certain information is not released, it would be justifiable to grant the right to 
such information. It is important to distinct the need from a desire, since it is perfectly 
possible for a person to desire something he or she does not need or which even 
opposes his or her interests, or the other way around, it is possible for a person not to 
desire what he or she actually needs. The evident question is then when the threshold 
between a desire and a need is crossed and when it is not (Savulescu, 1999). A clear line 
cannot be drawn. Nonetheless, we can investigate whether the release of certain 
information about the donor offspring would have a positive effect on the donors’ 
quality of life.  
A second condition is that we must take into account that the interests of the donor 
potentially oppose with the interests of the other parties involved, namely the parents 
and the children. A balance should be made between the donors’ positive right to 
privacy (the right to information which contributes to the development of his or her 
identity) and the parents’ and children’s negative right to privacy (the right to withhold 
the release of personal information to a third person). In what follows, we will analyse 
the proposed arguments and evaluate the weight of the underlying interests. 
5.3 Analysis of arguments 
Five arguments will be discussed. The first two arguments are top-down, meaning that 
the arguments follow from an ethical reasoning about the possible interests of the 
donor. The three other arguments are based on the wishes of donors themselves. In 
these cases, it will be investigated whether sufficient ethical justification can be found 
to grant a right to such information. 
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5.3.1 Medical information about the donor offspring for the benefit of 
the donors’ health 
The importance of exchanging medical information became clear in the US in 2009 
when a sperm donor passed on a lethal genetic heart disease to some of the donor 
offspring. This condition was discovered when one of the offspring died of the disease. 
The medical information was then passed on to the other offspring so they could be 
examined, and treated if necessary, and regular observation was made possible (Jones, 
2009). The exchange of medical information from donor to donor-conceived children is 
now increasingly accepted as a means for securing their health (Ethics Committee of the 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 2009; McGee et al., 2001; Ravitsky, 2012). 
But this line of reasoning might be just as convincing for the donor: not exchanging 
medical information might endanger to donors’ quality of life. 
We can identify at least three reasons why donors could claim an equal right to 
medical information about the donor offspring. The first reason has to do with their 
own wellbeing. If a donor-conceived child develops a genetic disease and this 
information is passed on to the donor, the donor can be tested for the disease. At best, 
adequate measures can then be taken to prevent the disease. If the donor were to 
develop the disease, at least appropriate treatment could be started timely. Releasing 
information about one’s genetic make-up could also inflict damage, for instance when 
nothing can be done about a life-threatening disease or when no treatment is available. 
One could argue that this argument only applies to preventable diseases, or diseases for 
which early treatment is advantageous. However, one could also argue that the donor 
should be informed anyway so at least he or she knows what is coming. The second 
reason has to do with the donors’ reproduction. With medical information about their 
donor offspring, donors could make informed reproductive decisions about whether or 
not they should have children of their own, and about the need for prenatal or 
preimplantation diagnosis. Finally, this information could also benefit the donors’ own 
children. They have an interest in this information for the same reasons as the donor: it 
could lead to a suitable treatment if needed and it could help them make informed 
reproductive decisions in the future. In addition, donors and their own children have an 
interest in medical information about the donor offspring to prevent the small but 
existing risk of incest. When the partner of a donor’s own child was conceived via 
gamete donation, the hospital should provide information on whether the gametes that 
were used were not his- or her selves. Of course, no information should be released of 
the actual donor. 
In other donation contexts – for instance with blood and tissue donation – relevant 
medical information is already passed on to the donor. In these practices, there are 
international guidelines concerning the release of information that benefits the donor’s 
wellbeing (Knoppers et al., 2006). The current wisdom is that blood and tissue donors 
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should be informed if tests reveal a relevant medical condition. This reasoning is also 
applied in the context of medical scientific research. All persons need to be informed 
when information relevant to their health is found. Both the Council for International 
Organizations of Medical Sciences and the Council of Europe prescribe this right of the 
participants. Three basic ethical principles form the basis of this right: respect for an 
individual, wellbeing and justice (Knoppers et al., 2006). It is unclear why the same 
reasoning should not apply for gamete donors, particularly because their interest in this 
type of information can be met without intruding the rights and interests of the 
offspring and their parents. After all, medical information can be made anonymous and 
be passed on by for instance the fertility centre or general practitioner. That way, the 
anonymity of the child is protected. To conclude, it would be reasonable to provide 
gamete donors information about genetic disorders exhibited by the donor offspring. 
5.3.2 Basic information as a way to reward the donors 
The practice of gamete donation is often compared with the act of giving someone a 
gift. Donors are seen as altruistic helpers who do the recipients a favour. Particularly in 
those donation settings where they do not receive payment, the question arises whether 
donors do not deserve to be rewarded for this gift, on top of whatever social recognition 
they may receive. Particularly for oocyte donors, the physical burden they endure 
supports the idea of some kind of compensation. There are other comparable donation 
contexts in which the donors are rewarded for their altruistic behaviour by granting 
them relevant feedback. For instance, people who donate to charity usually receive 
information about how their money was put to use and what their donation has helped 
to achieve. Also, within scientific research, it is common practice that participants are 
informed about the results of the research (Fernandez et al., 2003; Knoppers et al., 2006). 
This appears to be a good way to acknowledge their role and not to treat them as a mere 
‘means to an end’. For gamete donors too, information about the ‘result’ of their 
donation could be an appropriate form of reciprocity (Pennings, 2005). Given that the 
main motivation of donors is to help other couples have a child of their own, the 
minimum feedback they deserve is information about whether, and if so, how many, 
children were born from their donation. Indeed, several studies show that both sperm 
and egg donors ask questions about the outcome of their donation, such as the number 
or sex of the offspring (Cook & Golombok, 1995; Frith et al., 2007; Kalfoglou & Geller, 
2000; Purewal & van den Akker, 2009). By granting them this type of information, we 
would allow them to feel positive about their donation, because this way at least they 
would know whether or not they actually helped other couples.  
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There is a second reason why donors should receive such basic information. This 
information offers identifiable donors in particular more than just recognition for what 
they have done. The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine (2009) states that “this information can offer psychological closure to the donor, 
caution the donor that contact may later occur, and give donors who already have children the 
opportunity to consider the impact of future contacts on their children and/or partner” (p. 26). A 
study conducted by Kalfoglou and Geller (2000) shows that some egg donors wish to 
receive information about the outcome of the donation precisely for this last reason. 
Therefore, it could be argued that basic information is also important for the 
psychological wellbeing of the donors. 
5.3.3 General information about the donor offspring’s wellbeing in 
response to the donors’ concerns 
Both egg and sperm donors wonder about the wellbeing and whereabouts of the 
offspring conceived by their donations. One study on ‘egg-sharing’ donors reports that 
they often think about the donor offspring (Gürtin et al., 2012). Another study showed 
that some egg donors feel somewhat responsible for the donor offspring and are 
worried about the parenting style of the parents (Jordan et al., 2004). Other studies 
indicate that sperm donors as well worry about the wellbeing of the donor offspring 
(Jadva et al., 2011; Daniels et al., 2005). Jadva et al. (2011) and Baetens et al. (2000) report 
that some donors would even feel morally obliged to help the child if this were to be 
necessary. These concerns can be explained by the fact that the donors helped create 
the child. Our society is in general highly sensitive to the needs and wellbeing of 
children, so it is not surprising that this concern heightens when it involves children 
who carry part of your genes.  
Granting donors general information about the offspring conceived by their 
donations could be a way to reassure them about the children’s wellbeing. Indeed, based 
on this same motivation, during the 1970-80’s, in the practice of adoption, arguments 
were raised in favour of allowing birth parents (often birth mothers) to participate in 
the choice of the adoption parents and to gain information about the development of 
the child (Wolfgram, 2008). Studies conducted in the US showed that birth parents were 
concerned about their adopted child and desired a more active involvement in the 
adoption process and life of the child (Wolfgram, 2008). This concern was one of the 
motivations for the development of an ‘open adoption’ system. 
The question is, however, whether a donor needs identifying information to reduce 
these potential concerns, as was proposed in the adoption context. Although gamete 
donation is comparable to the practice of adoption in the sense that both birth parents 
and gamete donors have a genetic child that is raised in another family, there is also an 
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important difference. Donors do not have to cope with negative feelings about giving up 
the child. Therefore, donors do not have the same interests in contact with the offspring 
as the birth parents and there is much less ground for granting them identifying 
information about the donor offspring. Nonetheless, it could suffice to give donors 
anonymous feedback on the general wellbeing of the donor offspring, for instance 
through a rating scale that covers various welfare issues, as used in scientific research 
about the psychological wellbeing of children (Golombok et al., 2011). This information 
could be updated every 5 to 10 years. This anonymous information could then be passed 
on to the donor.  
Problems with this argument 
The proposed argument seems to suppose that a concern is a sufficient reason for 
granting donors a right to the information. As previously discussed, a concern is not 
sufficient as a basis for a right. Some remarks should be made in answer to the 
argument. First of all, only a part of the total donor pool is concerned about his or her 
donor offspring. Second, it is questionable whether donors who wish for this 
information but do not receive it, would lose quality of life. Of course, donors who wish 
for such information and do receive it, will be happier. However, all this should be 
balanced with the impact of the suggested psychological tests on the family. It is most 
likely that in practice, such tests would result in negative feelings such as feelings of 
being controlled, constantly being reminded of the existence of the donor, feelings of 
liability to the donor, or the possibility of endangering the secret about the use of 
gamete donation. Some donors’ concern about the wellbeing of their donor offspring 
does not weigh against the possible negative impact on the family. Donors who are 
concerned should be comforted by trusting the screening programs of the reproductive 
centre. Thirdly, it is not certain that such anonymous general information about the 
donor offspring would be able to ease the donors’ concern. More effectively would be to 
inform the donor before conception with information about the recipient family. By 
granting donors such information, they are given a mere passive role; they cannot 
influence the selection procedure. However, this practice could even indulge more 
concerns in the case when the donor would not agree with the recipient family. One 
could argue then, to solve this concern, that donors should have an influence on the 
selection of the recipients. When donors are able to select their recipient family, they 
could ensure themselves of a good and caring family for their donor offspring. This 
would be similar to the policy in some countries where the recipient family can choose 
their donor. Nonetheless, for several reasons directed gamete donation seems to be a 
bridge too far. First, the general rule that donors relinquish all rights and duties is 
breached. Second, when the distribution of gametes is left to the donors, this might 
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conflict with distributional justice (Pennings, 1995). In conclusion, donors are not 
justified to claim general information about their donor offspring.  
5.3.4 Phenotypic and extended information about the donor offspring 
for the enrichment of one’s identity 
One can easily imagine that a gamete donor may now and then wonder about his or her 
donor offspring, for instance about whether they share certain physical or personality 
traits. Some studies confirm that there is curiosity among donors about physical 
resemblances, and this appears to be a major motivation for them to inquire about the 
donor offspring (Jadva et al., 2010; Kalfoglou & Geller, 2000; Scheib et al., 2005). A 
curiosity about resemblances in personality traits was found as well (Daniels et al., 
2005). However, as explained above, mere curiosity about the donor offspring is no 
sufficient reason to pass on information to the donor. A right to information must be 
based on a significant interest. According to advocates of the current open-identity 
gamete policies, this is undoubtedly the case for donor offspring. Even though their 
wish to know more about the donor also appears to stem mainly from curiosity (Jadva, 
et al., 2009; Jadva et al., 2010; Scheib et al., 2005), they do get the opportunity to fulfil 
this curiosity. In some countries, they are granted phenotypic information, an extended 
donor profile or even identifying information because this is said to be important in 
terms of the development of their identity (Daniels, 1998; McWhinnie, 2001; Velleman, 
2008). With information about their second genetic parent, it is argued, they are able to 
gain a better insight in who they are, in particular in those aspects of their identity that 
are ‘unique’ and those that they have in common with one or both progenitors. If this is 
a valid reasoning, does a similar argument not apply equally for the donor? After all, 
donors too share 50% of their genes with the offspring conceived by their donations. 
They too could discover similarities and differences, both physically and behaviourally, 
and use this information for a more correct perception or an enrichment of their 
identity (Kaebnick, 2004). One could thus argue that donors should receive phenotypic 
information and extended profiles of the donor offspring. An obvious problem is that 
children change over time. A solution could be to collect the information when the 
donor-conceived child reaches the age of eighteen. At that age, his or her personality 
traits and physical characteristics will have reached a more or less stable point. 
Alternatively, information could be exchanged when the child is still younger, but 
provide an update every five years. Since donors typically have more than one donor-
conceived child, they would receive several extended profiles and various types of 
phenotypic information. This should make it easier for donors to discover similarities or 
differences between themselves and the donor offspring. 
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Problems with this argument 
However, there appear to be more differences than similarities between both cases. 
First, contrary to the donor offspring, donors generally do know (about) both their 
parents and therefore have been able to develop a personal identity based on sufficient 
information about their genetic origin. This is exactly what the donor offspring are 
looking for. Both parties are in effect seeking a different kind of feedback. The Law 
Reform Committee (2012) puts it as follows: “While some donors may feel that knowledge of 
their donor-conceived children is important, the identity of a donor’s offspring is not central to a 
donor’s self-identity. The donor knows who his or her family is, and where he or she came from” 
(p. 105). Second, donors are adults. This means that their identity is already formed. 
Therefore, the information can no longer be useful for the actual development of his or 
identity, at least not in the way it could help the donor offspring who are often children 
or teenagers. Moreover, donors can access the information they need by having 
children of their own and by watching them grow up. The impact caused by the lack of 
this ‘genetic’ information is much bigger for the donor offspring than it is for donors. 
Furthermore, there is a certain danger involved in exchanging this information with 
donors: it concerns personal information about a child. The idea that such information 
is passed on to a stranger without the child’s explicit consent (because the child is too 
young to understand) and possibly against his or her will is a severe breach of the child’s 
right to privacy (and also of the parents). The donors’ interest at stake is not a sufficient 
argument to grant them phenotypic information or extended profiles of the offspring.  
Another type of information 
Nonetheless, although there is an asymmetry in the need for phenotypic and extended 
information between donor and offspring, there is another sense in which information 
about one’s donor offspring could complement the donors’ identity, and here the 
information can remain anonymous. One could argue that the mere fact of procreation 
in itself creates an extra dimension to the identity of a person. Knowing that you are a 
‘mother’ or a ‘father’ (in the strict biological sense), that you have procreated, can be 
important for a person and creates an extra meaning to one’s self-image (Robertson, 
1994). Moreover, having children in itself can be valuable because it is a form of ‘self-
replication’. It is a way to make your own person live on when you pass away (Dillard, 
2010). A study by Janssens et al. (2006) shows indeed that some identifiable sperm 
donors donate with procreative reasons. For them, the mere knowledge that they did 
reproduce, that children have resulted from the donation, could already contribute to 
their identity and be sufficient for them to feel satisfied about the donation. Therefore it 
could be argued that for this reason basic information should be passed on to donors. 
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5.3.5 Identifying information about the donor offspring for donors who 
want contact 
Donors within an open-identity system differ from anonymous donors in that they must 
be available in the future if the donor offspring were to desire contact. This change of 
expectations attracts sperm donors with a different profile and different motivations 
(Daniels et al., 2005; Pennings, 2001). Anonymous sperm donors appear to be mainly 
single heterosexual young men, most commonly motivated by altruism or financial 
reimbursement (Cook & Golombok, 1995; Janssens et al., 2006; Thorn et al., 2008). 
Studies show that this profile alters when anonymity is abolished. If one changes the 
conditions and laws about gamete donation, the recruited donor profile will change too 
(Pennings, 2005). With the change towards open-identity systems, new donor profiles 
do indeed appear: according to some studies, particularly older married men with 
children are now prepared to donate (Daniels, 2007; Daniels & Lalos, 1995; Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 2005). Results of another study contest these 
findings and show a greater willingness for contact among single donors than donors 
who are in a relationship (Godman et al., 2006). 
This last finding makes sense. The system of open-identity donation is highly suited, 
apart from the altruistic motivation, for men who choose to donate precisely because it 
offers the opportunity to have contact with one’s donor offspring (Ripper, 2008). For 
some, an open-identity system is seen as attractive because they have a desire for future 
contact (Riggs, 2008; Ripper, 2008). A study shows that a considerable part of the new 
group of donors is therefore homosexual (Riggs & Russell, 2011). They appear to see 
their donation as a way to have genetic children and to meet them. Riggs and Russell 
(2011) state that “gay men, in general, are more willing to be identified, and that while donating 
for altruistic reasons, may also donate as a way of staking an identity claim to paternity if it is 
perceived that there are no other options available in this regard” (p. 267). 
From the point of view of donors who wish to play a part or have a say in the donor 
offspring’s life, it is logical to desire information that enables them to contact the 
offspring. However, we cannot just grant them a right to identifying information based 
on a desire. On the one hand, this could harm the interests of the other parties involved 
if they are not willing to be contacted. This is especially the case when the social parents 
have not informed the child about its donor conception. Even a request by a donor for 
contact could have disastrous consequences for the family in such circumstances. On 
the other hand, donors simply do not have an interest in receiving identifiable 
information: these donors have a desire to receive identifying information, but this does 
not imply that there is a need for them to receive this information. By not receiving this 
information, they are not likely to be harmed. However, there is no obvious reason why 
it should be prohibited either. If all parties desire contact, the possibility of mutual 
identity exchange could be offered, while not granting a particular right to it. This could 
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for instance be accomplished by creating an online register to which both the gamete 
donor and the offspring can subscribe if contact is desired. Only when the donor child 
also registers on his own initiative and consent, should the exchange of identifying 
information be made possible. This system is already being used in the United Kingdom 
in the form of the UK Donor Link and in the USA in the form of the Donor Sibling 
Registry.  
Nonetheless, a particular danger must be brought to attention. It is possible that the 
donors have high expectations about the contact which the donor offspring and their 
parents may not be willing to meet up to. There are at least two ways to prevent this 
kind of situation. For one, we could screen donor candidates in advance in terms of their 
personality, expectations, coping skills and perspective on donation. According to 
Sydsjö et al. (2012) and Sydsjö et al. (2011), who conducted a study on the personality 
traits of current identifiable donors in Sweden, preventive screening resulted in the 
recruitment of mature and stable donors. However, this screening can only partially 
filter the donors’ motivations. An additional solution would be to offer psychological 
counselling to those donors who wish to contact the donor child, so that unrealistic 
expectations can be identified and dealt with in time. 
5.3.6 Different interpretations of having a right 
Donors seem to be justified to claim the right to two types of information: medical 
information and basic information. It is important to point out in detail what exactly 
this right would entail. At least four different interpretations of what ‘having a right’ 
entails can be distinguished (Räikkä, 1998). Räikkä mentions an obligation to give 
information, an obligation not to prevent a person from obtaining information, an 
obligation to give information whether or not the person asks and an obligation not to 
prevent a person from obtaining information whether or not the person asks. In this 
regard, it should be remembered that not all donors want the information they are 
entitled to. In addition, passing on the information donors are entitled to can have 
negative consequences. Receiving information about one’s genetic make-up can have 
negative consequences when nothing can be done about the disease. When basic 
information about one’s donation is given and no children have resulted from the 
donation, this could have negative consequences for the donor. It is easy to imagine that 
when someone decides to help other couples and the donation did not result in a child, 
this is no pleasurable news. Therefore, having a right should be clearly distinguished 
from having an obligation to receive information. The right entails a possibility - 
information should only be passed on to those donors who ask for it – not a duty. The 
right should entail an obligation not to prevent a person from obtaining information. 
They have, as is the case in other medical contexts (for instance, paternity cases) a right 
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not to know (Knoppers et al., 2006). In practice, information could be gathered in a 
register that is available for the donor when he or she wishes, instead of automatically 
sending him or her the information. Hereby, the right is respected, but not forced upon 
the donor. At the moment of donation, the possible channels through which 
information can be obtained can be explained. Either way, donors should be informed 
about the possibility of receiving negative news. In addition, accompanying measures 
such as counselling, should be offered when needed.  
5.4 Conclusion 
Our analysis shows that gamete donors are justified to claim a right to two types of 
information about the offspring conceived by their donations. Information about 
genetic disorders can be important for the donors’ and their own children’s health. 
Basic information about the offspring can be regarded as an appropriate reward for 
their altruistic behaviour. Such information can also play a role in the enrichment of 
their identity by confirming their procreation. In contrast, both general information 
about the child’s wellbeing and an extended profile cannot be granted to the donor due 
to the lack of a need. Finally, it can be argued that a possibility to get in touch should be 
offered when all parties involved agree. However, arguments in defence of a right to 
identifying information about the donor offspring have not been found. 
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directive counselling? 
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6.1 Introduction 
It is widely agreed among health professionals, as well as medical and governmental 
organizations and associations, that couples using Assisted Reproductive Techniques 
(ART) should be offered counselling (Boivin 2003; HFEA 2012). It differs from country to 
country whether this counselling is mandatory or not. The European Society for Human 
Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) and the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine guidelines (ASRM) (the two largest professional societies) prescribe that 
counselling should be offered at all stages of ART treatment (Strauss & Boivin, 2001; 
Boivin et al., 2001; ASRM, 2013). Counselling can be seen as a process which takes place 
between a counsellor and a patient “in a private and confidential setting to explore any 
difficulty, distress or dissatisfaction with life that the client may be experiencing. Counselling can 
increase a client’s ability to make choices and change aspects of their situation” (British 
Infertility Counselling Association, 2013, para. 1.1). Counselling in the context of 
infertility treatment covers many specific tasks such as information giving, implications 
and decision-making counselling, support counselling and therapeutic counselling 
(Strauss & Boivin, 2001). In this chapter, the focus is on the approach that should be 
used during implications and decision-making counselling: should the counsellor assist 
the patient in making decisions according to the patient’s own values (the non-directive 
counselling approach), or should the counsellor direct the patient to a decision that is 
seen as the most appropriate, even if this decision does not correspond with the 
patient’s own values (the directive counselling approach)? Here, we will focus 
specifically on the much debated topic of donor conception (DC) disclosure. For a long 
time, a directive approach pro secrecy was used in counselling sessions (Nachtigall, 
1993; Allan, 2012). Patients were advised not to tell their child(ren) and environment 
about the use of donor material. Nowadays, both a directive and a non-directive 
approach are defended, with the directive approach now favouring disclosure, and this 
preferably at an early age (HFEA, 2012; Australian and New Zealand Infertility 
Counsellors Association, 2012; Peterson et al., 2012; Hertz, et al., 2013; Klock, 2013). The 
defence of the directive approach in this counselling context is rather remarkable for 
two reasons. First, psychosocial counselling is generally considered to be non-directive: 
In the psychosocial field it is agreed that patients should not be directed towards a 
certain behaviour. Counselling otherwise is seen as manipulative and unprofessional 
(British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy, 2013). Second, both in law and 
ethics it is considered that parents should be able - in most cases - to make decisions 
concerning the well-being of their child free from external intervention (McHaffie et al., 
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2001). This parental responsibility - which includes both rights and duties - towards a 
child is based on the supposition that parents will act in the best interests of their child. 
In a medical setting, this can be translated for instance into the right to an informed 
consent on the child’s behalf (British Medical Association, 2008). A directive counselling 
approach promoting openness interferes with the privacy and autonomy of the parents, 
hereby challenging this general belief in the parental autonomy. In the following, we 
will discuss whether this exception to the non-directivity rule is ethically justifiable for 
the specific topic of DC disclosure.  
Defining the two approaches 
First, it should be clarified what is meant by ‘non-directive’ and ‘directive’ counselling. 
While there is no single accepted definition of these two approaches, an agreement 
exists on how to differentiate both approaches and what they generally stand for 
(Oduncu, 2002; Xafis et al., 2014). Non-directive counselling is seen as an approach by 
which the counsellor takes a neutral position in order to facilitate the weighing of pros 
and cons of an action by the patient(s) (Klock, 1997, 2013; Sachs & Hammer Burns, 2006). 
Patients are provided with information in order to make a decision in accordance with 
their own personal views and beliefs; they are not influenced by the opinion of the 
person communicating that information (Hayden, 2005; Kirklin, 2007; Xafis et al., 2014). 
Non-directive counselling “may include the offer of information but does not involve giving 
advice or directing a client to take a particular course of action” (British Infertility Counselling 
Association 2013, para. 1.1). Directive counselling can, consequently, be defined as the 
opposite. In this approach, the counsellor directs the patients towards a goal that does 
not originate in them and that may not correspond with their own beliefs. The 
counsellor has a clear goal in mind and tries to convince the patients to comply to his or 
her advice (Kessler, 1997; Bernhardt, 1997). Such advice can be convincing for patients 
who regard their counsellor as an “expert” or an “authority”, someone who knows 
“what is best”. A counsellor can be directive in many ways. An option can be favoured 
overtly, or it can be communicated in a more subtle way by putting an unbalanced focus 
on only one position (Xafis et al., 2014). For instance, a counsellor who were to say: “It is 
best you do this” or “If I were you, I would do that,” would be using a directive approach 
because the position he or she favours is openly promoted. An example of more subtle 
directive counselling in the context we wish to discuss here would be a counsellor who 
only explains the risks of non-disclosure, and withholds mentioning risks of informing 
the child about the donor conception (or vice versa). An extreme version of directivity 
is when a certain decision is said to be a condition for access to treatment. The approach 
can thus be seen as a continuum with on the one end counsellors giving one-
sided/biased advice or guidance regarding a certain decision, and on the other end 
threatening not to offer treatment if the patient does not agree with certain conditions.  
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In this chapter we hold a strict dichotomy between non-directive and directive 
counselling for the sake of the argument. In practice, this distinction is often not so 
clear. However, the practice is not the focus of this analysis. We take the normative 
position that is presented in the guidelines as a basis. 
6.2 Counselling and the disclosure decision: guidelines and 
opinions 
As already mentioned, the guidelines and recommendations of several associations and 
organizations in the ART- field differ in terms of how counsellors should approach 
couples seeking ART and gamete donation with regard to the decision whether or not to 
disclose the conception method to the child.  
6.2.1 Counsellors’ positions 
Non-directive counselling 
With regard to directive counselling in general, it is argued that recommending certain 
behaviour (in this case, disclosure) is detrimental because it shuts the door to future 
counselling when the patients do not follow the counsellor’s opinion (Klock, 2013). A 
neutral position is also deemed important because the counselling session should be an 
opportunity for the couple to freely discuss their thoughts and feelings without feeling 
judged (Sachs & Hammer Burns, 2006). If the counsellor imposes his or her view, 
patients may feel uncomfortable and sense a conflict with their own opinion (Klock, 
1997, 2013). Another consideration in favour of this neutral position has to do with the 
effectiveness of directive counselling (Klock, 2013). We do not know whether couples 
actually follow the recommendations the counsellor gives regarding for instance the 
disclosure decision. It is possible that the patients will say they agree just to avoid 
problems or further questions. Patients might feel constrained to discuss their 
difficulties regarding the disclosure decision and could be driven to hold back their own 
opinion and intentions.  
With regard to counselling on the topic of DC disclosure, Kainz (2001) said that “the 
therapist should remain neutral and help the couple come to their own decision 
regarding disclosure” because “at this point, there is no evidence in the literature that 
there is a ‘best’ option for all couples” (Kainz, 2001, 484). The Counselling Special 
Interest Group of the Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society recommends counselling 
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concerning “the implications of privacy/secrecy and openness and the level of 
disclosure recipients are comfortable with” (Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society 
Counselling Special Interest Group, 2009, 31). In this case, it is not clear whether the 
counsellor should provide specific advice, particularly because the starting point of the 
guideline is that disclosure is the better option (they argue that enough evidence is 
available to support this). 
Directive counselling 
The second position is represented by a group of mental health professionals who 
support the idea of promoting openness. Their arguments question the moral value of 
privacy and they warn for the possible harms to the psychological well-being of both 
the parents (the burden of a secret) and the child (the awareness that something is not 
right) (Daniels et al., 2011). A secret can create a barrier to open communication in the 
family and there is always the risk of accidental discovery at a later, unsuspected and 
possibly inappropriate time, which could be particularly damaging for the child (Turner 
& Coyle 2000). In contrast, disclosure, and specifically disclosure at an early age, is said 
to be best for the development of the child’s self-concept and identity (Kirkman, 2003; 
Landau, 1998; McGee et al., 2001). Informing children about their conception is thought 
to render them capable of forming a ‘correct’ identity based on all the information 
available regarding their own life (Horowitz et al., 2010). This view is for instance 
supported by the Australian and New Zealand Infertility Counsellors Association 
(ANZICA). According to ANZICA, the recipient parents “need to tell the offspring themselves 
about circumstances of their conception” (Australian and New Zealand Infertility 
Counsellors Association, 2012, para. 6). Peterson et al. (2012) also state in this regard 
that “counselors can assist couples in understanding the importance of disclosing the nature of 
the conception to the child” (p. 246). 
6.2.2 Guidelines and legislations 
Several guidelines from numerous instances have been developed on the topic of DC 
disclosure, while only few legislations concern this topic. Focussing on the guidelines 
first, in a report on the ethical aspects of information sharing after DC, the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics (2013) argues that openness is not intrinsically valuable. The 
Council takes the view that openness towards donor conceived children is important as 
long as it contributes to the quality of family relationships. According to the Council, 
the decision whether or not to disclose should be made by the parents because it 
depends on their social context whether openness is valuable or not. If parents believe 
that non-disclosure is the better option for their particular situation, this should be 
respected and supported by the counsellor (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2013). 
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Nonetheless, the Council also adds that it will “usually be better for children to be told, by 
their parents and at any early age” (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2013, 102). Hereby, a 
directive stance is taken with regard to what should be considered by the parents. Along 
the same lines, the German guidelines on psychosocial counselling take an ambiguous 
position on what approach should be used during counselling. On the one hand, they 
underline the parents’ autonomy in the disclosure decision. On the other hand, early 
disclosure is recommended to avoid family secrets (Thorn & Wischmann 2009). The 
American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) is also ambiguous about the 
counselling approach that should be used. For instance, the Ethics Committee of the 
ASRM states that “it is the recipient parents' choice whether to disclose the fact of donor 
conception to their offspring” (Ethics Committee of ASRM, 2013, 4). However, the 
Committee also states that “although whether to reveal the fact of donor conception to 
offspring has long been the subject of debate, more recently a strong trend in favor of encouraging 
disclosure has emerged (1–3). The Ethics Committee finds that disclosure to the child of the fact of 
donor conception […] may serve the best interests of offspring” (Ethics Committee of ASRM, 
2004 2013, 1).  
Along with organizations, some legislators have also decided upon the issue. For 
instance, in Victoria, Australia, it is now mandatory to offer pre-treatment counselling 
that includes the advice that children conceived via donor insemination should be told 
about their donor origin (Thorn, 2006; Blyth, 2012). The HFEA provides similar 
regulation. In its Code of Practice, the authority states that “the centre should tell people 
who seek treatment with donated gametes or embryos that it is best for any resulting child to be 
told about their origin early in childhood” (HFEA, 2012, guidance note 20.7). Our question 
regarding the justification indirectly also affects the evaluation of the legislation on this 
topic: if directive counselling cannot be justified, then legislation obliging counsellors to 
provide directive counselling is also unjustified. 
6.3 Balancing two ethical principles 
The discussion about non-directive and directive counselling can be seen as a balancing 
of two ethical principles: the principle of autonomy versus the principle of beneficence 
(Oduncu, 2002; De Wert et al., 2012). Advocates of the principle of autonomy refer to 
respect for an individual’s right to self-determination and the need to provide all the 
relevant information available in an unbiased way so that the patient can make an 
informed and free decision. In the genetic context, the support for this principle and 
consequently, the non-directive approach, developed in part as a reaction to the 
coercive policies used in for instance Nazi Germany and the accompanying fear for 
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eugenics (Oduncu, 2002). In the psychosocial context, it was Carl Rogers (1942) who first 
used the term to define his patient-centred therapy, characterized by the idea that 
counsellors can only assist the patient during their decision-making process, but cannot 
influence the outcome. Rogers specifically used this term to show his rejection of the 
medical model, which was based on the beneficence principle. This principle states that 
the well-being of a person should be protected at all times and that active steps should 
be taken towards achieving it. The beneficence principle is nowadays still often adhered 
to by health care providers who consider a certain behaviour as beneficial for their 
patients (and their future child). For instance, most health care providers take a 
directive stance about taking folic acid when a woman is trying to get pregnant 
(Oduncu, 2002; Bonte et al., 2014).  
When two principles conflict, a balance must be made in order to decide which 
principle should be preferred (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013). Since advocates of 
advising openness challenge the highly valued autonomy of the parents, it is up to them 
to show why the beneficence principle is morally preferable to the autonomy principle. 
Beauchamp and Childress proposed six ethical conditions to guide such balancing, 
which are sound and practical rules to weigh the principles at stake here: 
 
(1) Better reasons exist to act according to the overriding principle rather than to 
the overridden principle. 
(2) The goal of breaching one principle in favour of another must have a 
reasonable chance of success.  
(3) The breach must be the smallest breach possible and its proportion must be in 
line with the goal.  
(4) No alternatives for a breach must be available.  
(5) The consequences of the breach must be as small as possible.  
(6) All parties affected by the breach must be treated impartially. 
6.4 Analysis of the conditions 
6.4.1 Condition 1: better reasons for the overriding principle 
Advocates of the directive approach have to show that the child’s well-being is 
promoted when it is informed at an early age about his or her donor conception and 
that it is harmed when not informed or only informed late in life. If this is the case, 
better reasons exist for following the beneficence principle and consequently, 
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overruling the parents’ autonomy. In the following, an analysis is made of the 
arguments given by advocates of the directive approach. First, we discuss the health risk 
when a child is not informed or only informed late in life. Then, we zoom in on different 
aspects with regard to psychological harm done to children when the information is not 
disclosed, or not in a timely fashion.  
(a) Health risk  
Children can be medically harmed when the DC is not disclosed or only disclosed at a 
later time (for instance, after the child has reproduced). Uninformed donor conceived 
offspring make wrong assumptions about their genetic heritage because they believe 
their social father is also their genetic father. When a genetic predisposition is 
overlooked because of the lack of correct genetic information, the consequences can be 
severe. An inaccurate diagnosis can be followed by inappropriate treatment. Disclosure 
about the donor conception can be necessary for a better diagnosis of emerging 
conditions, for preventive actions, and for making informed decisions about one’s 
reproduction (Ravitsky, 2012).  
It is impossible to know how many children are medically harmed by not being 
(timely) informed about their DC. Proper genetic screening of the donor is prescribed by 
guidelines for reproductive centres (ASRM, 2013; Association of Biomedical 
Andrologists, 2008; ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law, 2014). Of course, the hope to 
thereby avoid harm presupposes that donors are properly screened for the most 
common genetic disorders and that they provide truthful and extensive information 
about their family medical history. In the US, screening differs significantly among 
centres (Sims et al. 2010). Daar and Brzyski (2009) argue that a substantial number of 
centres does not follow the guidelines. Also, even if screening is done properly, a rare 
genetic condition may be overlooked, a genetic condition may manifest only years after 
donation or donors may not be entirely honest or complete when the anamnesis is 
investigated. The occasional cases where a genetic disease was found despite genetic 
screening illustrate this (Maron et al. 2009). Nonetheless, we can assume that the 
probability of such risk of medical harm caused by secrecy is low given that donors are 
screened for the most common genetic disorders and asked to provide extensive 
information about their family medical history. Moreover, openness about the donor 
conception is not going to improve this situation much. Apart from the fact that the 
child knows that it should not look at the father for genetic information, no useful 
information comes from being informed about the donor conception. 
Another important aspect is the possibility of consanguineous relations when donor 
conceived children are not informed (Landau, 1998). One could argue that disclosing the 
DC intercepts incestuous relationships between donor conceived persons. However, the 
first question that needs to be addressed is the probability of such relations. Serre et al. 
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(2014) investigated the probability of consanguineous events in France where a 
maximum of 10 children per donor is allowed (comparable to other countries using an 
anonymous system). They showed that even when both the current number of 
pregnancies and the current number of donor descendants were ten times higher, the 
risk of such relations would still be lower than the risk associated with rare first-cousin 
relationships. Promoting openness about the donor conception out of fear for 
consanguinity is not grounded since the probability is too low. Moreover, as in the case 
of the medical risk, it is unclear how openness would prevent such relationships. Being 
informed about one’s donor conception does not mean that one is informed about the 
donor’s file number or identifying information in order to be able to compare donors. In 
addition, parents should not solve the problem of possible at-risk relationships; this 
should be done by restricting the number of children per donor. At this moment, the 
number of offspring is set in an arbitrary manner while norms should be decided on the 
basis of, among other elements, realistic consanguinity risk estimates (Janssens et al., 
2011). 
(b) Psychological risk: knowledge about the conception 
The case of non-disclosure  
Some papers claim that a certain degree of psychological harm is done to the child when 
the DC is never revealed. For instance, the child could suffer psychologically if he or she 
is aware that something is not right or that something is kept secret from him or her 
(Daniels et al., 2011). It is argued that family secrets, such as the use of donor material, 
may have a negative impact on family dynamics in general. There is an unequal 
distribution of power with the person aware of the secret having more power than the 
person for whom the secret is concealed. Also, with the two parents being aware of 
something the child does not know, the child is excluded from the coalition between his 
or her parents, which can deteriorate relationships (Slepian et al., 2012; Turner & Coyle, 
2000; Baran & Pannor, 1993). First of all, parents always have more power than their 
children until a certain age. The unequal distribution of power is a given in a parent-
child relationship. Second, not all family secrets are harmful. Many people and families 
conceal a secret, it is inherent to human interaction (Vangelisti & Caughlin, 1997; 
Imber-Black, 1993). Recent research has shown that whether or not a secret is harmful, 
depends on the motivation for keeping the secret. Caughlin & Afifi (2004) found for 
instance that when the motivation for avoiding a topic was the protection of the 
relationships, a diminishment in negative association between avoidance and 
dissatisfaction appeared. Third, the probability of this harm cannot be measured since 
such effects can only be reported by those who found out. However, several studies have 
shown that children who are not informed have positive relationships with their 
parents and develop normally, which shows that this specific family secret does not 
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always have an impact on the child’s life (Golombok et al., 2002; Brewaeys et al., 1997; 
MacCallum et al., 2007; Lycett et al., 2004; Nachtigall et al., 1997; Shenfield & Steele, 
1997). We should be careful in generalizing all secrets as harmful (Shenfield & Steele, 
1997). In this regard, a distinction should be made between never revealed secrets and 
secrets that are disclosed at a later and possibly inappropriate time, or by inappropriate 
people. Secrets such as the use of donor material may indeed be harmful when they are 
revealed in anger (Snowden & Snowden, 1993). In that case, not the secret itself (the use 
of donor material), but rather the fact that the parents ‘betrayed’ their child can be 
damaging for the child. This is often accompanied with feelings of frustration when they 
are not able to receive information on their donor (McWhinnie, 2001; Kirkman, 2004). 
It is often argued that the adoption context illustrates the harm caused by non-
disclosure (Feast, 2003). However, in that context, the shift in legislation (the move 
towards open adoption) was immediately linked to the provision of identifying 
information about the birth parents (Feast, 2003; Haimes, 1988). It was the lack of such 
information that was claimed to be damaging for the adopted child, causing a so-called 
‘genealogical bewilderment’ and identity problems, and not the secrecy itself 
(McWhinnie, 1984; Baran & Pannor, 1993). A distinction should be made between the 
‘secrecy or openness’ discussion and the ‘anonymous or identifiable donor’ discussion. If 
lessons can be learned from the adoption context, it may only be about providing 
information about the donor and not about possible harm caused by secrecy. Moreover, 
it is under discussion whether both contexts are similar and we should be careful to 
generalize possibly problematic consequences (Horowitz et al., 2010). As Shenfield 
(1999) already pointed out, “children born of gamete donation have been wanted long before 
their conception by their psychosocial parents. An adopted child, by contrast, was first abandoned 
by two biological parents before adoption by the psychological parents” (Shenfield 1999, 8). 
Both adopted and donor conceived children need to deal with their genetic origins. On 
top of that, adopted children need to deal with their social origins, while donor 
conceived children do not, meaning that the context and background adopted children 
need to deal with (being abandoned) differs a great deal from the context and 
background of a donor conceived child. 
The case of disclosure  
While gamete donation seems to be a widely accepted method of reproduction in 
Western society, openness about the conception method is not unproblematic for every 
single person.  Western society still highly values genetic ties, and genes are seen as 
the primary basis for kinship (Edwards, 2009). This means that families using sperm or 
egg donation are still potentially subject to stigmatization. There are some indications 
that stigmatization is slowly decreasing in Western countries. The number of people 
who disclose or at least have the intention to disclose is rising compared to for instance 
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30 years ago. The attitude towards gamete donation is also changing. However, at the 
same time, the number of disclosers is still low which might indicate that people still 
fear stigmatization. Data on this point are hard to gather; it is not clear at all whether or 
not social stigmatization has disappeared within Western society. Outside the Western 
world, there are many communities where donor conception is not accepted (Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, 2013). This is for instance the case in Muslim communities where 
the ‘lineage’, as traced through the paternal line, is considered highly important. In 
British South Asian communities it is for this reason feared that the family and social 
environment will reject donor conceived children as soon as the DC is known. In 
addition, in these families, infertility raises questions about manhood and masculinity 
(Culley & Hudson, 2007). Consequently, non-disclosure can serve as an important 
protection for the child and the family against the stigma surrounding infertility and 
other detrimental effects of openness about the DC (Nuffield Council Bioethics, 2013). 
The broader social environment is clearly an important factor in deciding whether or 
not it is best to disclose. This concern regarding stigmatization is frequently raised by 
parents as a justification for non-disclosure and should not be dismissed without 
argument (Thorn, 2006; Horowitz et al., 2010). 
(c) Psychological risk: timing 
The case of late disclosure  
Several studies show that some children, in case of late (and (un)intended) disclosure, 
develop psychological problems due to the feeling of ‘betrayal’. This revelation may lead 
to long and frustrating searches for the donor or for donor information (Lalos et al., 
2007). The impact of late disclosure may be severe. However, we have no idea what 
proportion of donor conceived children is at risk, since we do not know how many 
donor conceived offspring find out about their conception method at a late age. It is 
possible that many more people find out about their DC at a later age but do not have a 
problem with it. We should keep in mind that the current research on the donor 
conceived persons’ attitudes towards their DC disclosure only involves biased samples. 
Individuals who are aware of their DC but do not have a problem with it and did not 
have a problem with the method or timing of disclosure will probably remain under the 
radar. Donor conceived people who are angry or discontent are more likely to 
contribute to websites, networks or internet forums and participate in studies. 
Moreover, revealing the donor conception, even at a later time, can also have positive 
effects on the family relationships. In a few cases of accidental discovery of non-
paternity in a medical context, it was found that the (unintended) disclosure was 
appreciated by the parties involved and did not disrupt family relationships 
(Ravelingien & Pennings, 2013).  
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The case of early disclosure  
Defenders of directive counselling for DC disclosure assume that early disclosure will be 
beneficial or will at least prevent possible future harm to the child. Recent studies do 
indeed show that, in case of early disclosure (prior to adolescence), the children appear 
to accept the information, integrate it into their life story and have positive reactions to 
the disclosure decision (Hewitt, 2002; Jadva et al., 2009). Nonetheless, possibly negative 
effects of early disclosure on the child and his or her family should not be overlooked. In 
Jadva et al. (2009), for instance, some adults who were told during childhood reported 
that they felt confused, frustrated or upset about being a donor conceived child. We 
should be careful in considering early disclosure as beneficial by definition. 
6.4.2 Condition 2: reaching the goal 
Another condition for allowing a breach of the autonomy principle is that the goal of 
this breach has to have a reasonable chance of success. Advising the parents to disclose 
the information, does not mean they will actually disclose (Klock, 2013). It is possible 
that parents feel uncomfortable with disclosure and say that they will disclose to please 
the counsellor, but never have the intention to actually disclose. The counselling 
approach is only rarely mentioned in research papers about disclosure decisions of the 
parents. Visser et al. (2012) reviewed papers that reported on counselling in gamete 
donation. The review showed that only five studies specified the use of a directive 
counselling approach pro (early) openness by the counsellor. This was for instance the 
case in a study by Rumball and Adair (1999), early openness was advised by the 
counsellor. In this study, 181 of 308 participants completed a questionnaire on 
disclosure attitudes. Of these 181 participants, 127 had not told their child (minimum 
one year old) about the donor conception but 98 participants declared an intention to 
disclose in the future. In another study by Hammarberg et al. (2008) where a directive 
approach was used with regard to the disclosure decision, 41% of the parents stated that 
the counselling had some impact on their disclosure decision, with 26% reporting no 
impact at all. 
Although little is known about the counselling approach, most studies show that the 
majority of heterosexual parents do not plan to disclose the DC to their child with study 
outcomes ranging from 54% to 81% (Nachtigall et al., 1998; Golombok et al., 2002; Owen 
& Golombok, 2009). In addition, the intention to disclose is not necessarily the same as 
actual disclosure. During pre-treatment counselling, a couple might be convinced of 
disclosure, but the actual decision to disclose might be postponed and eventually 
abandoned during the life of the child because barriers such as discomfort and anxiety 
rise (Gottlieb et al., 2000; Nordqvist & Smart, 2014; Klock, 2013; Cook et al., 1995; Daniels 
et al., 2009). Most of the heterosexual couples who intend to disclose, do not do so 
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(Gottlieb et al., 2000; Lindblad et al., 2000; Lalos et al., 2007). The combination of the 
empirical evidence on actual disclosure and the uncertain effect of promoting openness, 
raises doubts about the reasonable chance of success of a directive approach. 
6.4.3 Condition 3, 4 & 5: proportionality, necessity and consequences 
The following three conditions are treated together, because they all aim at minimizing 
the breach. In this regard, the following question should be answered: Is advising 
parents to disclose the information among the smallest breaches possible to achieve the 
goal of informing children about their donor conception? One smaller breach to reach 
this goal would be to raise awareness by sensitisation actions, for instance via 
advertisements, posters and brochures. The “Time to Tell” campaign held in 2006 in 
Victoria, Australia is an example of such a sensitisation action with the goal of spreading 
information about the benefits of disclosure and about the donor-linking service. 
Electronic and print media information was spread, and community education activities 
were organised (Johnson et al., 2012). This promotion of the donor registers resulted in 
an increase of applicants for the registers, and an increase in uptake of resources 
concerning how to disclose from the website.  
Both sensitisation campaigns and directive counselling are directive, albeit on a 
different scale. Nonetheless, there is a difference between both actions with regard to 
their nature, with sensitisation actions being impersonal and indirect. Parents are not 
personally addressed and large-scale campaigns can more easily be ignored, thus 
resulting in a smaller breach of their autonomy. However, due to this impersonal and 
large scale nature, there is no room for, for instance, personal advice about how to tell. 
DC disclosure can be a delicate subject to discuss and when openness is promoted, 
personal advice adjusted to each particular family would be preferable. In addition, the 
effects of the campaign are unknown in the sense that it is impossible to measure 
whether more parents disclosed the donor conception to their children after the 
campaign. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that, given for instance the increase 
in uptake of resources from the website, there was a need for information. Sensitisation 
actions , could be proportional even if fewer children were informed about their DC 
than in case of directive counselling because they also involve a smaller breach of the 
parental autonomy. However, they still assume that good is done to the children, and 
this, as we argued above, is uncertain. 
Another option to inform children about their donor conception, would be adding 
the information to their birth certificate (Blyth et al., 2009). This interventionist 
approach would ascertain that children are informed because the disclosure would not 
depend on actions of the parents. In this case, the parents’ autonomy is breached more 
severely than in the directive approach. To justify this, it should be demonstrated - in 
  107 
line with the severity of the breach – that a high risk of serious harm to the child exists 
when it is not informed. From the analysis above, it is clear that no sufficient evidence 
so far is available for even a lesser degree of risk to the child. This means that a fortiori a 
more severe breach of the parents’ autonomy cannot be justified.  
 
Following the above, one could argue that sensitisation campaigns are preferable to 
directive counselling since they imply a smaller breach of parental autonomy but they 
also are less likely to convince parents to disclose. However, the decisive element in the 
balance will remain the demonstration of the positive effects of disclosure on the child.  
6.4.4 Condition 6: impartial treatment of all parties 
The last condition prescribes a consistent policy regarding the breach of a principle. The 
advocates of a directive approach propose a breach of the autonomy of the parents. To 
fulfil the sixth condition, all parents who have valuable information about the child’s 
conception should be treated equally. Not only parents using donor insemination 
should be affected, also adoption parents should be included. In the adoption context, 
an open policy is already implemented. Parents are stimulated to tell their child about 
its adoption. Another large group of parents that should be included are the mothers 
(and fathers, if informed by the mother) in misattributed paternity cases (Ravelingien & 
Pennings, 2013). Also in this context at least one of the parents possesses, in most cases, 
valuable information about the child’s conception. Therefore, it could be argued that, 
also in this context a directive approach pro openness should be applied. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this analysis was to investigate whether or not a directive counselling 
approach is ethically justified in the context of DC disclosure. Although, in general, a 
non-directive approach is adopted within the context of medically assisted 
reproduction, some counsellors favour a directive approach pro early openness when it 
comes to the specific topic of donor conception. To decide whether or not the DC 
disclosure context can indeed be an exception to the rule, the two underlying principles 
of autonomy and beneficence should be balanced. To allow a breach of the autonomy 
principle, several conditions should be satisfied. Following this analysis, two conditions 
are not fulfilled. With regard to the first condition, so far, the evidence available in 
favour of promoting openness is insufficient. The risk of non-disclosure should not be 
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overestimated and the risk of disclosure should not simply be put aside. At this moment, 
there are no better reasons for advising openness than for respecting the parents’ own 
beliefs and wishes. Moreover, studies about the intention to disclose show that the 
desired effect of a directive counselling approach may not have a reasonable chance of 
success, thus failing the second condition.  
Following this analysis, at this moment, directive counselling - whether in favour of 
disclosure or secrecy - is ethically unjustified. In practice, this means that counsellors 
should aim to counsel ‘as neutrally as possible’, paying equal attention to the possible 
(psychological and medical) harms of secrecy as well as of disclosure. Counsellors should 
point out the possible dangers of keeping a secret on the one hand and disclosing 
personal information on the other hand, as well as the possible consequences of timing. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Medical developments in the reproductive field have enabled a disconnection between 
genetic, gestational and social ties. This introduced a variety of non-traditional families 
that challenged the traditional basis for attributing parental rights and responsibilities. 
The question of (what should be) the ‘new’ basis of parenthood has been of interest to a 
number of disciplines. From a psychological point of view, a large number of studies 
were conducted on the effect of this disconnection on the families’ wellbeing (Golombok 
et al., 2012; Blake et al., 2014; Turner & Coyle, 2000; Vanfraussen et al., 2002; Brewaeys, 
1996). In the sociological and anthropological disciplines, one looked at the changing 
notions of family and kinship (Nordqvist, 2010, 2012, 2014; Edwards & Salazar, 2009; 
Edwards et al., 1999). From a philosophical point of view, the question was raised about 
the moral basis of parenthood and parental rights and duties. Roughly speaking, two 
approaches have been developed in an attempt to answer this question, a theoretical 
normative approach and an empirical approach (Ives et al., 2008).  
As shown in the introduction of this dissertation (chapter 1), many divergent moral 
grounds for parenthood have been suggested and defended, ranging from voluntary 
grounds, to causal, intentional or genetic grounds, with some accounts being monistic 
and others pluralistic. All these theoretical accounts try to pin down a sound basis for 
granting parental duties and rights by offering theoretical arguments. Then the theories 
are applied to the practice. Following the geneticism account for instance, genetic ties 
are the sole basis of parental duties and rights. This is translated into the argument that 
donors should take up certain parental duties and rights towards the children who are 
conceived with their gametes. In contrast, the empirical approach to the moral question 
of the basis of parental rights and responsibilities does not aim to answer the question 
with a theoretical construction based on ethical principles. This approach looks into the 
moral judgements of the people who participate in the practice. For instance, the 
constructions of biological and social fatherhood by fathers have been explored (Ives et 
al., 2008; Hargreaves, 2006; Kirkman, 2004; Snowden et al., 1983). One of the findings of 
Ives et al. (2008) was the distinction between the father-as-carer and the father-as-
progenitor. Many of the fathers interviewed did not have contact with their child and 
those who did, have had to gain the right through court. The genetic link was 
considered as a unique bond that made a man the real dad in contrast to a stepdad (a 
non-biological father). However, at the same time, the father-as-carer was valued much 
more highly than the father-as-progenitor. Being there for the child involved 
commitment, whereas being the progenitor was considered to be a purely biological 
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relationship. In evaluating the role of the father, the father-as-carer was considered as 
the good father.  
While the empirical approach provides valuable insights into how people in the field 
think about moral concepts, this merely achieves a descriptive ethics. Similarly, while 
the philosophical approach adds valuable theoretical insights, it misses the social 
context. If we want to apply our moral framework to the real world (for instance, via 
policy), we need to include the perspectives of the people in the field. A combination 
can be achieved via the WRE, as explained in the methodology of this dissertation.  
In this chapter, we aim to offer new insights into the grounds for parenthood and the 
basis of parental rights and responsibilities by focussing on the moral views of the 
people involved in the field. We performed a qualitative study of the opinions and 
reasoning of couples who used third party reproduction to fulfil their child wish. Via a 
hypothetical scenario (see further), we investigated their considerations about what is 
relevant for granting parental rights and duties. The aim of this study is consequently 
twofold. We want to (1) offer data to contextualize the current philosophical theorizing 
on this subject and (2) to provide empirical evidence that can be used in support of an 
ethical argument. In this chapter, an overview and discussion is given of the results of 
our data analysis. The contribution of these results for the normative framework is 
discussed in the general discussion of this dissertation. 
7.1.1 Parenthood and the accompanying rights and responsibilities. 
Parenthood and parental rights and responsibilities are often mentioned together, as if 
parenthood is the same as parental rights and duties and vice versa. However, this 
presupposition is open for debate. According to Bayne and Kolers (2003), first of all, a 
distinction should be made between ‘natural’ parenthood and legal parenthood, with 
the first defined as grounded in a natural relationship with the child and the second 
implying rights and responsibilities. They argue that a relationship between both 
concepts exist. ‘Natural’ parenthood makes someone liable for parental responsibilities 
and parental rights. However, neither rights nor responsibilities are necessarily granted 
to a ‘natural’ parent. Custody is for instance not always granted to the natural parents. 
In addition, natural parenthood is not necessary for being granted rights and 
responsibilities towards a child. For instance, grandparents can receive visitation rights 
to their grandchild. However, Bayne and Kolers argue that natural parenthood does 
indeed generate a likelihood of legal parenthood.  
 Another discussion in this regard concerns the acquisition of parental rights and 
responsibilities. One position is that rights and responsibilities are always acquired 
together. This is called the ‘parental package’ thesis and is defended by Bayne and 
Kolers (Bayne and Kolers, 2003). They argued that if parenthood generates both rights 
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and responsibilities, it generates these all together. One cannot be granted merely all 
the parental rights or merely all the responsibilities. The ‘no parental rights’ thesis and 
the ‘priority’ thesis contest that assumption. The first thesis argues that parents only 
have duties, and no rights over their children although they can make decisions about 
how to discharge the duties they have to the child (Montague, 2000). The argument goes 
that if parents would have rights over their children, they would have a discretion as to 
‘whether or not’ (instead of only ‘how’) they could discharge their parental obligations. 
Rights would offer the opportunity to disregard the parental duties. The ‘priority’ thesis, 
in contrast, argues that parents do have parental rights, but that they are subordinate to 
their duties. Parents have rights over their children because they are bound by duties 
towards their child (Blustein, 1982). Archard (2010) argues that the terminology used in 
the parental package thesis should be clearer. A distinction should be made between 
‘responsibilities’, which is defined as hands-on, day-to-day rearing of the child, and 
‘obligations’, which should be understood as the duty to ensure that the child is 
adequately cared for, not as a duty to take care of the child himself. Parental rights and 
obligations are not necessarily acquired together. He argues for instance that a rapist 
whose victim conceived and gave birth has acquired obligations towards that child but 
does not acquire rights. Moreover, once acquired, rights and obligations do not 
necessarily go together. People can lose their rights but keep their obligations to the 
child. An abusive parent loses his or her right to custody but maintains his or her 
financial obligations towards the child (Archard, 2010).  
7.2 Method 
Participants 
For this analysis, four interview studies were included. We focussed on lesbian couples 
post treatment (group 1) and during or immediately after (group 2) treatment with 
anonymous sperm. We also included post treatment heterosexual couples; one group 
had been treated with anonymous sperm (group 3) and one group had been treated with 
anonymous or known-anonymous oocytes (group 4).  
The participants of group 1 were the same as in chapter 8. For the participants’ 
characteristics, I refer to the method in that chapter. The participants of group 2 were 
recruited in January 2013 based on a list of lesbian couples (n = 17) who started 
treatment only a few months before the interview took place (which was between 
November 2012 and February 2013). The sample was completed with two couples who 
had an ICSI treatment between November 2012 and January 2013. Couples were eligible  
 122 
 
 
when they came for their first child as a couple, were pregnant or had the intention to 
continue with the fertility treatment, were counselled by the same person who did the 
recruitment, had the Belgian nationality and were Dutch speaking. Nine couples could 
not be included due to different reasons: no correct phone number (1), did not call back 
after receiving info about the study protocol (1), the partner refused (1), too occupied 
(1), partner was native French speaking (1), overwhelmed by the change to IVF (1), 
pregnant and not willing to be involved in hospital related issues (1) or refused without 
an explicit reason (2). The aimed total of 10 couples was reached for this group. 
The participants of group 3 were recruited between June and October 2013 based on a 
list of heterosexual couples (n=31) who were accepted for treatment (and subsequently 
treated) with anonymous sperm donation between 2002 and 2005 and who met the same 
inclusion criteria as group 1: Belgian citizenship; Dutch-speaking; at least one child via 
donor insemination between seven and ten years old at the time of the interview. The 
couples were enlisted according to the year of birth of their first-born; couples with the 
eldest children were contacted first. Seven couples could not be included due to wrong 
phone number (5), being unreachable (1), and no response after receiving limited info 
about the study protocol on voice mail (1). Twelve couples refused participation because 
they wanted to keep the method of conception a secret (7), because they perceived it as 
a closed chapter (1), or because it was a sensitive topic for the male partner (3) or for 
both (1). One woman refused because she lost her partner and one couple pulled out 
after initial consent (busy schedule). All the couples that refused participation planned 
not to disclose the sperm donation to the child. All eligible couples needed to be 
contacted in order to be able to include 9 couples and 1 individual participant. In this 
last couple, the man refused participation. 
The participants of group 4 were recruited between October 2013 and February 2014, 
also based on a list of heterosexual couples (n=21) who were accepted for treatment 
(and treated) with anonymous or known-anonymous oocytes between 2002 and 2006. 
They met the same inclusion criteria as group 1 and 3. The same recruitment protocol 
was maintained. Again, all eligible couples needed to be contacted to be able to include 
Table 1. Overview participant groups 
 
 
 
Sexual Orientation 
 
Timing interview 
 
Type of donation 
 
Nr  
     
Group 1 Lesbian couples Post treatment Anonymous sperm donation 10 
Group 2 Lesbian couples During treatment Anonymous sperm donation 10 
Group 3 Heterosexual couples Post treatment Anonymous sperm donation 9 + 1 
Group 4 Heterosexual couples Post treatment (Known-)anonymous oocyte 
donation 
7 + 2 
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six couples and three individual participants. One couple had separated but agreed to 
individual interviews. In another couple, the partner refused to participate but he 
joined his partner at the end of the interview. The partner was present during the part 
of the interview relevant for this analysis. Four couples could not be included because 
they were unreachable (wrong phone number). Eight couples refused participation for 
several reasons: wanting to keep the method of conception a secret (4), the woman 
thought her partner would not want to participate (1), divorce (2) or they perceived it as 
a closed chapter (1). One last couple pulled out after initial consent. Tables 1 and 2 
provide more detailed information about the participant groups. An informed consent 
form was signed by both partners at the time of the interview. The studies were 
approved by the Ethics Committee of the Ghent University Hospital. 
 
Table 2. Participants’ characteristicsa 
 
 
Group 1 
 
 
n Biological mother (34-47)b Non-biological mother (37-52) Children (1-9) 
1 Sara Lisa Timothy, Lynn 
2 Mia & Kim Mia & Kim Tom, Eva 
3 Rose Liz Ben, Jessica 
4 Nicole Angela Travis, Rian, Antonio, Milo 
5 Mary Monica Charlie 
6 Lauren Jill Walter 
7 Beth Lydia Neil, Florence 
8 Kate Sandy Kenny, Marilou 
9 Martha Lexi Bart, Mathilda 
10 Ysa Annie Brenda, Geena, Louise 
 
 
Group 2 
 
 
n Biological mother (22-31) Non-biological mother (21-31) Children 
1 Grace Evie / 
2 Emily Ruby  
3 Lola April  
4 Ada Frances  
5 Myriam Patricia  
6 Kelly Marilyn  
7 Ruth Tamara  
8 Klara Bo  
9 Molly Abigail  
10 Leila Christine  
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Group 3 
 
 
n Biological mother (32-47) Non-biological father (36-60) Children (2-9) 
1 Maya Joseph Victoria 
2 Brooke Theo Iris, Max 
3 Jessica Samuel Sienna, Laura 
4 Amelia Matt Sebastian, Gus 
5 Candice Patrick Isaac, Joshua 
6 Jacqueline Harry Uma 
7 Cynthia Oliver June 
8 Charlotte Luke Daphne, Thomas 
9 Jillian Oscar Elaine, Dylan 
10 Rebecca / Ramses, Lorcan 
 
 
Group 4 
 
 
 
n 
Non-biological mother (34-
51) Biological father (36-57) Children (2-11) 
1 Leah Blake Luca 
2 Alexa Casper Casimir, Connor, Daniel 
3 Stella (ex-partner Aiden) Cliff 
4 Yolanda Redmond Layla, Inigo 
5 Priscilla Chad Lewis 
6 Melanie Erik Savannah, Violet 
7 (ex-partner Stella) Aiden Cliff 
8 Xenia Raoul Morgan 
9 Madison Lucas Olivia, Shawn 
aPseudonyms are given to protect the privacy of the participants 
bYears of age, range 
 
Interviews 
Couple interviews were conducted by two psychologists of the research team between 
March 2013 and February 2014 at a location of the couples’ preference: the Ghent 
University Hospital or their own home. The interviews were semi-structured and lasted 
approximately 50-120 minutes. They were audio-taped and transcribed with 
participants’ consent. Transcripts were checked for accuracy, first by a team member 
and then by the interviewer. Pseudonyms were used in order to protect the anonymity 
of the participants. The interview guides are added as appendices in this dissertation. 
This chapter presents the analysis of responses to a hypothetical scenario of a gamete 
mix-up in an IVF lab that resulted in a baby and three adults with different links to the 
child: one person with a genetic and a social link to the child (A), one person with only a 
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social connection to the child (B) and one person with only a genetic link to the child 
(C). The scenario was used as an elicitation technique to allow an exploration of 
participants’ views and moral reasoning regarding the grounds of parenthood. It was 
introduced as fictional and was read aloud while the participants could read along on 
their own sheet. Several features of the scenario were installed purposely: (1) the child 
was very young to rule out solutions depending on the child’s own preference; (2) each 
of the protagonists separately claimed parental rights to enable the consideration of 
each aspiring parent; (3) the gender (and the names) of the protagonists were not 
specified to allow for various and unsolicited interpretations with regard to gender; (4) 
the baby and a (distant) location were named (both fictional) to make the scenario more 
tangible.  
Baby Jeff was born late 2011 to A and B following an IVF-treatment at an American 
clinic. A and B were overjoyed but their relationship broke down a year later. 
They parted in friendship and agreed on a week-on/week-off co-parenting 
arrangement. Later that year, it became clear that a mistake had been made in the 
lab of the American clinic. A was genetically linked to Jeff, B was not. Instead of 
the gametes of B, the lab used the gametes of another person (C) who underwent 
an IVF-treatment in the same clinic. All three parties were notified by the hospital 
and all three now request parenthood. 
Following the assumption of Bayne and Kolers (2003) that parenthood carries both 
rights and responsibilities together, we posed a general open question about 
parenthood: ‘What (if any) type of parenthood would you attribute to each of these 
persons and why?’. To facilitate the discussion on this complex topic, the participants 
were offered cards with a non-exhaustive number of parenthood statuses and/or 
parental rights (also blank cards were offered to allow other resolutions) they could give 
to each of the protagonists: ‘full parenthood’, ‘co-parenthood’, ‘no parenthood, but 
sporadic contact’ and ‘no parenthood, no contact’. The participants were invited to 
think out loud and questions were asked based on what they said or did. They were 
explicitly asked not to base their response on what was legally possible but to elaborate 
on how they would respond to a situation like this. We hereby aimed at revealing their 
moral views.  
Analysis 
For a description of the analysis, I refer to the methodology of this dissertation (chapter 
4). 
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7.3 Findings 
Below, we describe the elements and criteria considered relevant by the participants as 
they dealt with the scenario and decided about granting parental status or rights. 
Quotes and participants’ own wording (including gender specific personal pronouns) 
are used to support the findings.  
7.3.1 Framing the problem  
The spontaneous first reactions to the scenario were nearly always related to the 
challenging nature of the case. “Boy, I sure find that a difficult question” (Frances). Many 
participants sighed when referring to the troublesome situation pictured in it. However, 
they dealt with the scenario in an open way, frequently challenging each other’s views 
and stimulating further reflection. After reading the scenario, participants typically 
started framing the problem in their own words. A lot can be learned from their guesses 
and presumptions (e.g. the way they filled in missing facts) and from what they 
spontaneously mentioned as relevant, straightforward or problematic.  
In this phase, most participants spontaneously questioned the decision of the 
hospital to disclose the mix-up, with many thinking that “the best thing would be if the 
hospital kept quiet”. Especially those who already had children via DI doubted whether 
telling was the right thing. Interestingly, most of the lesbian participants specifically 
questioned the disclosure to C while almost none questioned the disclosure to A and B. 
Some thought it was better not to inform C because he would be confused or because it 
would disrupt the co-parenting arrangement of A and B. Several participants initially 
thought (or wondered whether) C was an anonymous sperm donor. In that case, the 
interviewer clarified this by pointing at the text of the scenario.  
Participants’ first elucidations showed that almost all of them automatically 
supposed that A was a woman while the other two were men. When further quizzed 
about gender, it was considered as something that was or ought to be irrelevant, 
although some admitted that this information could influence how people would deal 
with a case like this. The bond between a mother and a child was considered “somewhat 
more significant” than that between a father and a child.  
Whilst examining the scenario, many participants revealed their views on allowing 
more than two parents. Solutions with three parents were sometimes looked into but 
seldom considered realistic. Often, emotional expressions showed a negative attitude 
towards the idea, describing it as “bizarre”, “complicated” or even “unhealthy” for the 
child. One woman described the multi-parent family as a “weird blended family”. Tamara 
even thought that the fact that Jeff already had two parents should be reason enough 
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for C not to claim parenthood. Further elaborations largely dealt with the welfare of the 
child and practicalities of how such a family would be organized. When the three-parent 
family was considered a possibility, it was based on the principle of justice. Edmond and 
Yolanda, for instance, took into account that none of the actors had “asked for it” (the 
mix-up) to happen and that all three consciously chose to have a child.  
Several participants talked about the partner of C, as “there were not just three persons 
involved but four”, albeit not always with a clear impact on the outcome of the 
deliberation. When talking about the possibility that C’s partner also wanted Jeff, Molly 
said: “Yes, that one just has to do another [IVF] attempt, you know. Well, sorry, it is very sad for 
that lady but…”.  
Most participants started their exploration by spontaneously pointing to an 
unproblematic party. They all viewed A (sometimes together with B) as the party whose 
parental status was not or should not be questioned. Most lesbian couples treated A as 
an individual party and said that it was “self-evident” and “logical” that A should be 
granted parenthood. Even if, later on in their discussion, B and C were considered 
parents, this was never in a similar self-evident way as for A who was “the mother 
anyway”. Somehow, the mix-up changed B’s and C’s grounds for parenthood while 
leaving A unaffected. Most heterosexual couples saw A and B self-evidently as parents, 
hence considering only C to be the problematic party. “In any case, A and B are co-parents”. 
By considering A and B as a couple, an equal parental status was granted. 
JOSEPH: A and B are symmetrical, purely mathematically seen, so they need to get 
the same.  
7.3.2 Preconditions for assigning parenthood and parental rights or 
responsibilities 
In their search for a solution for the problem presented in the scenario, the participants 
discussed, next to criteria for parenthood (see further), some preconditions. Each 
precondition can be seen as some sort of goal. Granting or withholding parenthood 
status or parental rights was not only the result of criteria, it was the result of the 
combination of the criteria and the preconditions that they wished to be fulfilled. First, 
the preconditions that we found are explained. The criteria for parenthood are 
discussed further on. 
7.3.2.1 The age of the child and the welfare of the child argument  
In trying to determine parenthood, some participants referred to the best interest of the 
child: “you have to consider the child”, or “you should put yourself in the child’s place”. This 
was not a basis for a solution but a normative statement about what would be a good 
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way to solve the problem. For some, the child’s wellbeing was paramount because they 
considered Jeff “the most important person”. This argument was used especially when 
dealing with the position and rights of C, whereby the interests of C (who wanted to see 
his child) were perceived as being in conflict with those of Jeff (who would benefit from 
the continuation of family life).  
In most interviews, it appeared that Jeff’s age, while not directly decisive, was taken 
into account and used to support several arguments. Jeff’s young age meant that he 
could not be asked for his opinion. While some thought this made the case more 
difficult, others said it rather simplified it. Participants who had children sometimes 
said it was a good thing that the child was too young to realize what was going on. 
Several participants suggested that Jeff should decide once he was old enough. Mostly, 
the child’s age was a factor in the precondition welfare of the child. The precondition 
was used to support an argumentation based on criteria for parenthood (such as the 
social link or the genetic link). The precondition could be used in two lines of reasoning 
with very different outcomes for the protagonists B and C. Firstly, it was used in favour 
of granting parenthood to A and B because “they already raised him for a year” and taking 
Jeff away would be too disruptive for the child. Secondly, it was used in favour of 
allowing C into Jeff’s family because Jeff would easily adapt to the new situation as “he 
was only one”. In this line of reasoning, Jeff’s young age and his lack of comprehension of 
the situation seemed to open up possibilities that otherwise would not have been there. 
Jeff’s bond with his original parents (or with B) was not yet very strong and so it would 
not be too disruptive to diminish the parental roles of A and B in favour of C. In this 
respect, age was used as an indicator of to what extent the earlier family should be 
considered as a solidified construction and how well the child was aware of his family 
and had grown into it.  
When C was given no or a very limited status or rights, participants’ arguments were 
mostly or even exclusively based on considerations about the child’s best interests.  
AIDEN: I think it is in the interests of the child that you do not pull apart this 
world as it has been built. 
 Interestingly, when these participants had more nuanced positions, leaving some room 
for (later) contact with C, this was based on the same argument.  
MADISON: If the child were to really need it, then try.  
In this case, the welfare of the child was used usually in combination with an emphasis 
on the criterion genetic link: because of this link, C and Jeff would want to know each 
other and be involved in each other’s life. Thus, granting C parental status and rights 
would be also in Jeff’s best interests.  
  129 
7.3.2.2 Distributive justice by allocating parenthood 
About half of the couples, especially aspiring parents, considered it relevant to know 
whether C had children “of his own”. It was part of an attempt to take the context into 
account. This was considered important, it could “make this into something totally 
different”. On the one hand, it was used as a predictor for C’s desire.  
PATRICK: It just changes the situation, because of the fact that C would not have a 
child, he will want co-parenting.  
On the other hand, it was used as a criterion for allowing C to have contact with Jeff, 
based on a form of distributive justice.  
MAYA: If this one has no children at all and he also has a strong child wish and he 
knows that her, or his material is in a baby, than he is a little bit entitled to 
contact.  
In contrast, if C had children apart from Jeff, it diminished his right to parenthood over 
Jeff. This points to an instrumental view of children. Although not spelled out as such, 
the underlying idea was that Jeff was somehow interchangeable by having other 
children or that the wish of being a parent to Jeff could be fulfilled by being a parent to 
other children. So, as a solution, “C could go for another round of IVF”, according to some.  
7.3.2.3 Maintaining the status-quo 
Several participants indicated that the former situation (before the disclosure of the 
mix-up) was to be treated as a given. Overall, participants showed a tendency to confirm 
the given situation. Lola, for instance, argued that the hospital appointed B as a parent 
just by giving this person a child. 
LOLA: I think, well, the hospital offered this dad a child and then I think ‘this guy 
now has him [Jeff] as his child’, right? Probably registered or so. 
Also for another woman, the agreement between A and B should be taken into account.  
KATE: See, it had been agreed. Already before, so I think that… it can stay the way 
it was. Gosh, I would leave it as it was, A and B co-parenting. 
7.3.3 Criteria for parenthood 
Below, we describe the criteria as used by the participants. These include both known 
criteria found in the literature and additional criteria. We focussed on the participants’ 
reasoning and their use of criteria rather than on the outcome of their deliberation. 
Many criteria were used in ways that appeared entwined.  
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MONICA: I would say, that person [A] has been engaged in it from the start, and is 
genetically linked to that child. Then, I think, well, that is the parent, right. Both 
genetically as from the start, she is the parent, or he is the parent. And those two? 
Well, too bad this guy [C] was not there from the start but he is a genetic parent 
and he wants that child. And that guy [B] was there from the start, so he already 
had a share of that upbringing, thus, to me, he is equally as much a parent, see. 
Below, we try to disentangle these accounts while also examine how criteria were 
linked. 
7.3.3.1 Gestation and birth 
In five interviews, participants briefly mentioned gestation and birth as criteria for 
parenthood, saying that also for a non-genetic parent it was important to somehow 
share the experience of pregnancy. This shared experience (which C lacked) was 
considered an important albeit not essential element. This had almost certainly been 
influenced by the fact that most participants presumed the mix-up happened with 
sperm and not eggs, hence making A the genetic and gestational mother of Jeff.  
7.3.3.2 Causal grounds  
Only few references were made to clear causal links. Some pointed to A and B as 
“initiators” who “in principle, were the parents” but also for C causal links were mentioned 
to argue in favour of some parental rights “because he also took steps with his wife”. In 
most of these quotes it was difficult to distinguish causation from intention.  
LOLA: Actually, this is still the couple that made the child. You know, in their 
head, and made the decision ‘we are going to make a child in that way’.  
Quotes that leaned more to intention as a criterion were categorised as intentionalist 
accounts (see below). These quotes stressed the conscious decision that preceded the 
steps taken.  
In their deliberation about the parenthood status of the protagonists, almost all 
participants mentioned the accidental mix-up as significant. The mix-up was used to 
support a variety of positions and arguments, often in relation to causation (and 
responsibility) and/or intentionality (see below). A first line of thought was that 
participants thought that the mix-up showed that the protagonists were not responsible 
for the outcome as it was the clinic and not them that made the mistake and caused the 
existence of this child. One group of participants focussed exclusively on A and B: they 
did not intend for this to happen and for C “to show up”. Therefore, they were not 
responsible and should not be obliged to share parenthood with C. The same criterion 
also applied to C but this was not mentioned by them. Other participants pointed out 
that also C “could not be blamed” for what happened and, therefore, was entitled to some 
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(often limited) form of parental status or rights, for instance a right to receive 
information about the child.  
MATT: Because he is entitled to that. It was not his fault that it was switched. 
 Others recognized this and showed sympathy for C, but considered this element too 
insignificant to be a basis for granting parenthood, especially when it was C’s “only 
argument”.  
A second line of thought was that, since the mix-up was an accident, “it might as well 
not have happened”. The gametes “might as well” have been from A and B and “had it not 
come to light, nobody would have known”. Thus it was ok to simply ignore it in favour of the 
status-quo. Elly thought that the mistake somehow strengthened C’s claim. Because he 
had been harmed he had the right to be protected from further harm even if that meant 
allowing him some form of parenthood status or rights.  
ELLY: It’s absolutely not done, that, when you make a mistake like this, you don’t 
even allow this person to see the child.  
However, this line of reasoning was also used (by others) to the benefit of B; for instance 
when Lola said that, because of this mistake “B’s child was stolen from him” and it “would 
not be right to steal it even more” by granting rights to C or diminishing the rights of B. 
7.3.3.3 Genetic link 
For many participants the genetic link was an important element. The genetic link 
between C and Jeff was expressed in a variety of ways going from C being called the 
(genetic or biological) father or parent, to C “having something to do with the child”. Many 
women used several labels concurrently and struggled to label C: “you cannot really call 
that the father but…” (Clara). For many, a genetic link was (part of) a basis for parenthood 
but the weight attached to it varied. It appeared difficult to determine what exactly 
should be granted to C: for one woman a genetic link “clearly meant parenthood” while for 
others, it meant having a right to at least getting to know Jeff. Many thought C should 
be allowed at least some form of parental status or rights “because it is his material”, or 
“because in the end, it is a part of you”.  
The fact that B was not genetically linked to the child, although he initially presumed 
he was, was considered a loss and “a blow for B” (and A). B “lost” his genetic link to Jeff 
and thereby also lost (part of) his ground for parenthood. Although many participants 
sympathised with B, for some, the consequences of losing a genetic link were clear and 
far-reaching. Marie said B, “spoken bluntly, had nothing to do with it” and Liz even though B 
“was absolutely nothing” in terms of parental status. Anni said that B “should act sensibly 
now” since “in the end Jeff was not his child”. According to her “B had to consider [the best 
interests of] the child” while she did not request such an approach from C. These 
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spontaneous remarks about B’s lack of a ground for parenthood appeared to be rather 
intuitive and were mostly made in the first instances of dealing with this case.  
Despite the fact that all couples had one partner who did not share a genetic link 
with their (future) child, many participants attached a lot of meaning to the genetic 
link. However, while the genetic link was presented by many as unequivocal, it was also 
clearly difficult for them to put their finger on the exact impact this should have in the 
search for a solution. Interestingly, in seeing the genetic link as a ground for 
parenthood, several non-genetic parents somehow dismissed themselves as parents. 
This can be illustrated with a slip of the tongue of Oliver. At one point, Oliver said that C 
had limited rights based on his genetic link although he did attribute parenthood to C in 
some way. He suggested the following solution for C. 
OLIVER: So, sending a picture every other month and an email with ‘everything is 
fine with our child. With your child.’ 
When Oliver went on to consider how difficult and confusing this must be for Jeff, he 
dismissed B as a parent based on the lack of a genetic link, despite being in the same 
situation in relation to his own child.  
OLIVER: What if that child once realizes that ‘Ooh, I am going to person B. That is 
my parent.’ No, no, that is not your parent. No, these are. C is your father or 
mother.  
CYNTHIA: But no. You know, it’s the same, you are the father of our little June, 
you know.  
OLIVER: OK, but… no, I am speaking purely biologically, you see.  
In one couple, the non-genetic mother was clearly bothered by the weight attached to 
the genetic link by her partner, Sara. 
SARA: [C] is a parent, that’s biologically. Agreed, a mistake has been made, but he 
is a parent, end of story. He has a right to it.  
This was the only couple where such irritations occurred. Over the course of the 
discussion, the genetic mother, who ascribed full parental status to C and first suggested 
to exclude B from parenthood, later disconnected the parental status from parental 
rights. By the end of the discussion, she wanted a full parenthood status for C but only 
would agree to sporadic contact between C and Jeff while B could be allowed to play the 
role of a parent devoid of such a status, on the condition that the relationship between B 
and Jeff remains positive (see below, ‘the social link with Jeff’). Conceivably, while she 
clearly attached a lot of weight to the genetic link, this unusual resolution was part of an 
attempt to soothe her partner by making a compromise between her views and those of 
her partner.  
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In contrast to what was mentioned above, others thought that the genetic link was 
“absolutely not relevant” or could not be a (good) basis for parenthood because it was “not 
worth that much”. To explain this view, Frances and Ada used two arguments: (1) genetic 
material could be donated and (2) a hundred mistakes like the mix-up could be made, 
resulting in “a hundred children out there and one could not start co-parenting all of them”. A 
woman who also followed this line of thought described C as “having nothing to do with 
it”. For Erik also, a genetic link did not generate rights.  
ERIK: Now, we come to the question, ‘what about that genetic material? Is it a 
reason to contact someone? Is it a, uhm, bond?’ For me, it is not a reason. You see, 
do we know, all of us, for sure that our parents are our parents? As long as we do 
not take a DNA-test, we cannot know. And I do not feel an urge to do that. My 
parents told me that they were my parents. And until today, that appeared 
sufficiently true (laughs). 
7.3.3.4 Social link  
When the social link was deliberated as a possible ground for parental status or rights, 
several participants pointed to C’s lack of a social bond which jeopardized C’s 
entitlement to parenthood. The participants also discussed this element in relation to A 
and B who did share this bond, although here, some differences were found between the 
groups studied.  
In the heterosexual couples, the social bond that A and B shared with Jeff and their 
share in Jeff’s upbringing were seen as fundamental to offer equal parental status and 
rights to A and B. The social link was considered more important than the genetic link. 
Therefore, A was not granted a higher status or more rights than B. Very often, this 
argument was combined with an account of (shared) intention.  
For the lesbian couples, however, the social link was generally used to determine the 
outcome for B but not for A. The latter could imply that A’s case was already firm 
enough based on the genetic link with Jeff whereas for B this had to be examined. Most 
participants attached great value to the social link although, in spite of being in a 
similar situation themselves, not all of them thought this would be a convincing basis 
for parental status or rights. Molly thought the social link was the most important 
criterion. She said it would be “hell for B if the child were to be taken from him” only because, 
“by accident”, “not his cells” were used. Her partner, however, disagreed. 
ABIGAIL: Well, he [B] thinks it is his child but it is not his, right. Whatever is inside 
the child is not his.  
MOLLY: Just the cells. But the upbringing that this child already had? You can 
hardly say to B ‘well, so you raised it for a year but uhm, it is not yours. So, bye 
bye.’  
ABIGAIL: Yes, I think that is a difficult one.  
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MOLLY: I don’t! (laughs). 
The fact that B had spent the first year of Jeff’s life “raising him as his own child”, meant a 
lot for the majority of the participants. B had committed himself to Jeff’s upbringing, an 
engagement that was fundamental according to some. The duration of that social 
contact was significant and, because of that, he had somehow “earned” parenthood and 
Jeff should be considered “his child”. For others, this social bond was not a (significant) 
ground for parenthood because it could not outweigh the lack of a genetic link. The 
social and the genetic link were perceived as two competing criteria with different 
outcomes for this scenario. Sara, who considered the genetic link the most important 
element, agreed that the social link meant something, although not as a basis for 
parenthood. When she suggested that B could be allowed to continue this commitment, 
she installed a condition: the ongoing good relationship with Jeff:  
SARA: But from the moment it goes wrong, or it no longer works for one of the 
parties, then I think you should not oblige your child to go to someone, in the end, 
he does not even share a biological link with. Then, what has been, was fine, but at 
that point, it is finished. 
For some, the social link was not important in itself but in combination with an 
intention. The fact that B “loved the child” and the expectation that this would continue 
in the future (despite the lack of a genetic link) supported B’s claim for parenthood 
because he would still want the child. 
When combined with intention, the continuation of B’s relationship with Jeff 
depended upon his reaction since perhaps he would “not want the child any more”. This 
shows that the disclosure of the mix-up had two consequences for B. One the one hand, 
his claim for parenthood was weakened as a result of the disappearance of his genetic 
ground and, in contrast to A’s straightforward case, B’s claim had to be examined. On 
the other hand, compared to A, B did lose status but gained freedom of choice. So, while 
the loss of a genetic link was seen as a potential reason for B to end his relationship with 
Jeff, the loss also allowed him to voluntarily discharge himself from parenthood.  
NELLY: When all of a sudden, he hears that, genetically, he has nothing to do with 
it, he could say ‘yes, but you know, it is not mine, do as you please with it’. 
7.3.3.5 Intention 
The majority of participants referred to intention (to have a baby) as a criterion for 
parenthood. They also saw the intention of the protagonists as the most important 
element in differentiating the scenario from a donor conception situation. Their 
explanations contained many different types of intention: to create a child, to create a 
child in a specific situation/with a specific person, or to create a genetically related 
child. Again, most participants’ reasoning was not in compliance with the parity 
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principle: they did not use this criterion in an equivalent way for B and C. In fact, only 
few participants noted that both B and C had a similar intention, namely to conceive 
with their own genetic material.  
LYZ: They chose for it, all three of them, you know.  
MARTHA: Well no, because C actually has nothing to do with it, right. It was a 
mistake. 
Participants who thought intention was important, pointed at the causal role of 
intention: “Because it started with that intention” and “because the origin and the wish were 
here [pointing to A & B]”. For some participants, the mix-up revealed that C did not have 
the intention to have this particular child (with A) and should therefore not be granted 
parenthood. His involvement was based on a mistake, a weak basis for parenthood.  
SANDY: Because it was initially not intended for that material to be used for A, you 
know. It was just an unfortunate mistake.  
These participants used this argument to deny C (substantial) parental status or rights 
but did not mention that A and B also lacked this intention (to use these particular 
gametes). 
All but a few lesbian participants thought that B’s intention was more important than 
his lack of a genetic link. At the time, they said, B made a careful decision to be a parent, 
acted upon it by going to the hospital, and later fulfilled his responsibilities towards Jeff. 
They believed this was a clear basis for parenthood, frequently stating that B deserved 
parenthood more than C.  
Many other participants pointed at the relevance of C’s intention: he was going 
through IVF himself and had a “clear wish to make a child”, and “gave his material with the 
aim of becoming a father”. However, only few acknowledged that, C had the same 
intention as A and B and also had acted upon it. C’s intention was mentioned in negative 
wordings, to show that “he did not consciously choose” to end up in this mistake. C had not 
given his genetic material in order for A to conceive, unlike a gamete donor, who they 
thought could definitely not claim parental status or rights. This difference was 
considered extremely important.  
LEILA: But, see, that person did not consciously choose to not have contact with 
his child or to… This is not a donor.  
The fact that this was not done by him but to him gave C some entitlement to, albeit 
limited, parental status or rights.  
Interestingly, for many participants, especially the heterosexual couples, intention 
was treated differently when it was “a couple’s shared intention” for a parental project 
compared to an individual intention.  
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MARILYN: We talk about the individual wish to have a child, you know. Pfff, you 
start from the individual. But you do it together.  
At the time of conception, A and B shared an intention and “chose to conceive a child 
together”. This shared intention entitled them to an equal share of parental status or 
rights: “the child was meant for them”. Although C also had the intention to make a child, it 
was clearly not a shared intention with A.  
PATRICIA: Eventually C is someone who also, you know, stepped into the story but 
not into that story between those two persons and that child. 
According to this view, C had the right intention (to make a child) but not with the right 
partner. This extra requirement gave B the obvious advance over C. None of the 
participants specified why they demanded this shared intention with A (the parent with 
a straightforward case).  
OSCAR: He [C] has something to do with it, but not in that relationship of those 
two [A and B]. Those two chose to have a child together. 
7.3.3.6 Voluntary acceptance of parenthood 
For some participants, the outcome of the dilemma depended upon B’s reaction to the 
mix-up.  
SARA: The question is, B, well, how does B react to the message ‘this is not your 
child’.  
Some even thought that B should be allowed to decide the matter as he desired. 
Whereas some participants were convinced that B would want to continue his 
parenthood project with Jeff, others questioned this: he could reject the child as “not 
his” or “not wanting to have anything to do with him”.  
For some, in case C wanted the child, “you could not just ignore him”. In addition to his 
genetic link with Jeff, C’s voluntary acceptance was required in order to receive parental 
status or rights. Only for one parent, Sara, C’s intention was not seen as required 
because sharing genes was enough. Other participants who talked about C’s desires 
thought this was clearly decisive. Only if C wished so, and on the basis that he was 
genetically linked to Jeff, should he be allowed some (mostly rather limited) form of 
parental status or rights. 
MARTHA: Well, everything depends on this guy, right? If he says ‘I really want full 
parenthood’, then they really need to chat, I think.  
However, the participants thought it was not self-evident that C would want to be Jeff’s 
parent: perhaps he did not want the child “because he already had one” (with the right 
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woman), for instance. Sometimes this seemed like an easy way out of this puzzle or a 
playful way to escape further deliberation. 
LEILA: Perhaps one of them backs off. Then it will be easier [laughs]. 
7.3.3.7 The relationship with the undisputed parent  
Several lesbian (but none of the heterosexual) participants mentioned the (lack of a) 
relationship between the protagonists as relevant. Two women thought that B was 
entitled to some form of parenthood because “those two had been in a relationship”. When 
Anni suggested to create a co-parenting arrangement between A and C, her wife Ysa 
objected. 
YSA:  But there is nothing of a relationship between A and C? You cannot… co-
parenthood, I think, between two people who completely don’t know each other.  
The (lack of a) relationship was related to views about intention as a criterion: some 
women thought that the lack of a relationship with A would have a discouraging effect 
on C’ acceptance of a parental role: because it was not “a child with the right woman” and 
also because “C did not even know the woman”. B’s past relationship with A and their 
separation were thought to be relevant by some. B’s status was somehow weakened 
because of that. 
JOSEPH: Had A and B still been together, then it was evident, then it was A and B. 
But now A and B broke up. That’s A, B and C, that’s a triangle. But C and A never 
had a relationship. That really is a drawback for the baby. 
7.3.3.8 Being there from the start 
The parenthood project was sometimes described as a story where you could (or could 
not) be part of from the start. Partly, this depended on your own choice, which pointed 
to some overlap of this criterion with voluntarism. Rather than the mere duration of a 
parent-child relationship, they pointed to the continued relationship from the start of 
this story: those who were “there from the start” or who “had always been there” should be 
allowed a parental status.  
MONICA: I would ascribe full parenthood to the genetic parent. Because, yes 
because he/she is both genetically… and was right there, fully present, from the 
moment of birth. 
7.3.3.9 Identifying yourself as a parent 
Knowing that you were a parent or perceiving yourself as a parent, was sometimes 
considered a ground for parental status. The fact that B considered himself as Jeff’s 
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parent, in a way, made him become Jeff’s parent. B “presumed it was his child” and always 
saw Jeff in that way “so in their mind, and their experience and the way they feel it, it is their 
child” (Tamara). For these participants, resolving the case merely based on the genetic 
link would not prevent B from still perceiving Jeff as his child. For them, this was 
evidenced that, on other than genetic grounds, Jeff therefore still was B’s child. 
Conversely, not knowing that there was a child out there, for C, could be a reason not to 
be recognized as a parent. 
7.4 Discussion 
7.4.1 Thinking about criteria for parenthood 
One of the main results of the analysis of the hypothetical scenario was that the grounds 
for parenthood mentioned by the respondents were supplementary in the sense that 
many criteria counted at the same time. Moreover, criteria were selected with the aim 
of reaching a goal, such as the welfare of the child, or distributive justice.  
In a sense, assigning parenthood or parental rights or responsibilities can be 
compared to a slot machine. A particular sequence of criteria and preconditions led to a 
certain outcome which could be parenthood, parental rights, or explicitly none of these. 
Criteria and preconditions could be grounds both for attributing parenthood and for 
withholding parenthood, depending on the combination they were part of. Three 
criteria described in the literature returned systematically in the participants’ 
arguments: the genetic link, the social bond, and intention. Especially the genetic link 
and intention were often the basis of the combinations. For instance, the genetic link 
was combined with criteria and preconditions such as intention, causation, the welfare 
of the child or distributive justice. In a similar way, the criterion intention was 
combined with criteria as a genetic link, causation (for C) or a social bond (for B). A few 
combinations were fixed. For the lesbian couples, to be an undisputed parent, the 
combination of a genetic and a social link was necessary and sufficient (this was the case 
for A). For the heterosexual couples, an intention or a social link in combination with 
the criterion of ‘commonality’ was necessary and sufficient for equal parenthood (see 
further).  
The pluralistic account presented by the participants differed from Bayne and Kolers’ 
suggestion (Bayne and Kolers, 2003). For them, a pluralistic account means that several 
grounds are sufficient to grant parenthood, leading to possibly more than two parents. 
However, their account does not involve such complex combinations of criteria, and 
includes much fewer criteria than the number mentioned by the participants. 
  139 
Arguments undermining their own position 
There were substantial differences between participants (irrespective of their own link 
with the child) in the weight attributed to the genetic link. For the heterosexual 
couples, the genetic link was considered irrelevant for A and B, while for C, the link was 
hugely important in the sense that this was seen as a ground for giving this actor 
parental rights. Also for the lesbian couples the genetic link was considered an 
important criterion for determining parental rights. One would expect that these 
couples (who have a one-sided genetic link with their child) would diminish the 
importance of genetics and emphasize the social bond. Indeed, that idea was found in 
the entire interview when they were talking about their own situation. However, when 
they were thinking about the hypothetical scenario, many couples profoundly 
challenged either their own or their partner’s status. Some couples described a view 
that, when applied to their own situation, disqualified either themselves or their 
partners as parents. A discrepancy existed between talking about their own situation 
and talking about the baby Jeff case. Moreover, most couples did not notice this 
inconsistency. Only in one couple, this led to irritation in the non-biological mother. 
However, it could be argued that this discrepancy is not surprising since context has an 
influence on the moral judgement. “Context” can be defined as a particular set of 
circumstances that determines what is acceptable and what is not (Walker, 2003). 
Different contexts can differ with regard to what is considered morally acceptable or 
not. The difference between the hypothetical case and their own situation was the 
mistake made by the hospital. According to the participants, this mistake gave C 
another status than the donor in their own situation. In addition, because of this 
mistake, the status of the non-biological parent (B) was different than the status of the 
non-biological parent in their own situation. In the participants’ own situation it was 
decided beforehand that there would be a biological and a non-biological parent.  
A different mind-set with regard to the grounds of parenthood 
Another interesting finding was the difference between the lesbian couples and the 
heterosexual couples with regard to who they saw as the ‘obvious parents’ and who they 
saw as the problematic party. Most lesbian couples automatically granted maximum 
rights to A. Granting rights to parents with only one of the two ties was considered 
much more difficult. In contrast, for the heterosexual couples, the obvious parents were 
in almost all cases A and B. For them, only C was the problematic party. The lesbian 
couples seemed to be focussing more on the ties between one adult and the child, while 
for the heterosexual couples, the commonality (shared intention and social bond) 
between the partners was considered most important, disregarding the link between 
each party and the child. Lesbian couples regarded A and B as separate protagonists 
with each a particular link with the child and the heterosexual couples seemed to 
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consider A and B as a couple, meaning one unit with an equal relationship to the child. 
This idea returned when the couples talked about the position of A and B. For the 
lesbian couples, B was equally entitled to parenthood as A because of their particular 
relationship (the relationship with the undisputed parent); when the relationship 
ended, B lost his/her equal position. This was not the case for the heterosexual couples. 
A and B were put in an equal position because of the shared history with the child. 
When the relationship ended, B’s position did not change towards the child. 
 An explanation for this difference between lesbian and heterosexual couples is 
hard to find. A possible explanation could be a different approach towards third party 
reproduction by both groups. While heterosexual couples might see it as that ‘the 
couple’ is going for treatment, lesbian couples might consider it as that the birthmother 
is going for treatment and the non-biological mother is supporting her. This might be 
explained by the difference in cause of treatment (medical versus social cause). 
However, from the experiences of the lesbian mothers it was clear that this was not the 
case. The lesbian couples emphasised the engagement of both mothers in the ‘project’ of 
having children. Another explanation might be the different legal situation for both 
groups. In heterosexual couples, the woman’s husband automatically becomes the 
father of the child, while this was not the case for lesbian non-biological mothers (until 
recently). This might create a different perception of B. However, with regard to their 
own situation, the legal difference between both mothers did not influence their 
perception of the non-biological mothers as a parent.  
7.4.2 Thinking process 
Moral reasoning 
Looking at the participants thinking process, we found that the participants’ idea about 
the impossibility of three parents was clearly reflected in their reasoning. The 
conclusion that three parents with equal rights and responsibilities was not possible in 
practice was often decided beforehand. During their reasoning about A, B and C, they 
noticed that if they followed their own arguments (intention to have a child means 
parenthood), the three adults should be granted parental rights and responsibilities. To 
avoid that conclusion, a specification was then added. The intention was narrowed 
down to intention to have a child with A. That way, B could remain parent and C was 
excluded. One couple concluded that, according to their arguments, all protagonists 
should be given parenthood based on their arguments, although they did not regard it 
as a practical solution. 
Another finding that stood out in the participants’ moral reasoning was that at times 
criteria were not used consistently. Certain criteria were for instance applied to one 
protagonist but not to the other. The parity principle was not respected by the couples. 
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Bayne and Kolers (2003) defined this principle as follows: “the condition that makes one 
person a parent should, biology permitting, make anyone a parent.” (p. 225). For instance, the 
criterion of ‘intention to have that particular child’ was considered relevant for C. 
Because this criterion was absent, no parenthood status should be given. However, 
neither A nor B had the intention of having that particular child so the same criterion 
was not present for A and B as well. The argument was however not applied to them. 
This shows that people’s moral reasoning is at times not consistent. This should be 
taken into account when incorporating their arguments into theory. This raises 
questions about the value of people’s views and the status of their judgements. It, for 
one, shows that people’s moral judgements should not be given too high an epistemic 
status and that they should not be taken for granted without critical review. This will be 
discussed more thoroughly in the general discussion of this dissertation. 
Absent considerations 
All couples reflected on grounds for parenthood and parental rights, with A (and B) 
often entitled to parenthood and C often entitled to parental rights (more precisely, 
contact). Their definition of ‘parenthood’ was investigated during the interview before 
the discussion of the hypothetical case. All couples described being a parent and 
‘parenthood’ as having rights and responsibilities towards a child. They often gave 
examples of nourishment, education and health care. However, we did not elaborate on 
the definition of parenthood when discussing the hypothetical case. Possibly, another 
definition would have been given in that context. Next to this parental package view, in 
most of the cases, parental rights were granted separately (without the responsibilities) 
to a protagonist (often C). In that sense, the couples’ view matched Archard’s opinion 
that one can perfectly well have obligations towards a child, without having rights, and 
the other way around (Archard, 2010). The couples only reflected on possible parental 
rights. None of the couples mentioned that certain criteria would be the ground for 
obligations towards the child. The influence of our four cards should not be 
underestimated in this regard. We offered cards with either parenthood or with 
separate rights and no separate responsibilities/obligations. Nonetheless, none of the 
couples reflected on the distinction. 
Another interesting finding is that the couples, as they dealt with the scenario, took 
the perspectives of the three adults into account but only rarely mentioned the 
perspective of the child. For instance, when they spoke about the social link, they 
almost exclusively talked about what the child (and the parent-child relationship) 
meant for the adult (B) but they barely considered this from the child’s point of view. 
The few couples who did mention the child’s interests, used it as a precondition. The age 
of baby Jeff in this scenario is an explanation for the minor attention for the child’s 
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interests. Some couples made remarks about the young age and that, because of the age, 
the child’s opinion could not be taken into account.  
7.4.3 Limitations  
A first limitation of this study is that the hypothetical case discussions were planned at 
the end of the interview. This sometimes led to shorter time spend on this issue because 
both participants and interviewers were tired. Secondly, all findings are the result of 
moral reasoning about an hypothetical scenario. Caution is needed when making 
assumptions about how participants would (re)act in real life. Third, partners will have 
influenced each other’s views. However, a clear advantage of partner interviews is that 
the partners often quizzed each other’s views thereby stimulating each other to give the 
question further thought and deepening the conversation, which resulted in richer data 
(Bjornholt & Farstad, 2012). Fourth, data should be interpreted with the knowledge that 
four cards with options were offered beforehand.  
7.4.4 Wider implications of the findings 
The aim of this research was to gather insights into the perspectives of people who had 
used/who were using donor gametes on the criteria for parenthood and parental rights 
and responsibilities. This information should help to (1) contextualize the current 
philosophical theories on this subject and (2) to provide empirical evidence that can be 
used in support of an ethical argument. Therefore, in the following, we sum up those 
points that can be taken on board by philosophers. 
A first point that can be derived from these data is that people take a complex 
pluralistic stance towards the grounds for parenthood. Almost none of the couples 
presented one criterion as a basis, on the contrary. Different criteria were used 
together, with outcomes depending on the combination of criteria and preconditions. 
Most couples had the intuition that the genetic link with the child was important for 
parental rights. Two other criteria that are widespread in the literature were 
inextricably linked to parenthood by the participants, namely the social bond and 
intention. Next to those three, many other criteria were mentioned. In addition, they 
took into account several preconditions such as the baby’s age and welfare, or C’s family 
background. The data showed a complex knot of criteria. It seems that the pluralistic 
accounts of parenthood fit better with the moral reasoning of the people involved than 
the monistic accounts, but that the account (as described by Bayne and Kolers) should 
be broadened with more criteria. Secondly, a shared experience or relationship with the 
child (shared social bond or shared intentions) seemed to be one of the main grounds 
for parenthood. This idea of ‘shared history’ is a new criterion that is not present in the 
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theoretical literature. This finding shows the value of looking into a couples’ relation to 
the child (the couple as whole), instead of each protagonist’s relationship with the child. 
This finding enriches the current theories and should therefore be looked into in more 
detail. 
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Chapter 8  
Parental (in)equality and the genetic link in lesbian 
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8.1 Introduction 
As previously discussed, couples using third party reproduction challenge the classic 
Western notion of biogenetic parenthood since one parent has no genetic link with the 
child(ren) (Haimes & Weiner, 2001). Parenthood and kinship ties are until today often 
seen as having a genetic and/or biological basis. One major expression of this cultural 
norm is the resemblance talk (Becker et al., 2005). Physical resemblances are seen as a 
proof of kinship and, thus, as a support for the genetic relatedness (Hargreaves, 2006). In 
a society where parental roles and positions are often determined by genetic ties, these 
couples have to develop their own view on the importance of genetic ties and social 
connectedness with regard to parenthood and have to develop other deterministic 
factors for parental roles. 
Studies showed that these couples deal with this challenge in several ways. 
Sometimes, ‘proof’ of a connection between the child and both parents is created by 
matching certain characteristics of the donor to those of the social parent (Becker et al., 
2005; Burr, 2009; Scheib et al., 2000; Nordqvist, 2014). In addition, these couples 
compensate for this lack of a ‘full’ genetic connection by privileging social ties and 
valuing nurture over nature (Hargreaves, 2006; Frith et al., 2012). Narratives about 
physical resemblances are created and the focus is put on the social bond and its 
influence on children (Goldberg et al., 2008; Golombok et al., 1997; Jones, 2005; 
Nordqvist, 2010; Nordqvist, 2014; Vanfraussen, 2003). For lesbian couples, passing on the 
non-biological mother’s last name to the child appears to create a kinship link between 
the social parent and the child (Nordqvist, 2012).  
In this chapter, the focus lies specifically on lesbian families and the meaning of the 
genetic link they give for parenthood. The lesbian family is particularly interesting 
exactly because of the typical family structure which includes a non-biological mother. 
Being a female co-parent implies two things. First, she has no biological and genetic link 
with the child(ren) while the biological mother has. Second, she is a female partner and 
this does not fit into the societal definition of what constitutes parenthood 
(Vanfraussen et al., 2003). This becomes clear in the constraints of language. In contrast 
to heterosexual couples, the role of the non-biological mother can be described as “in 
the netherworld” (Muzio, 1999). The lesbian non-biological mother is ‘invisible’ both 
linguistically and legally, in Western society (de Kanther, 1996). She needs to define her 
role as a parent socially, as a care-giver, instead of basing it on biological notions 
(Dalton & Bielby, 2000). In this chapter, our aim is to investigate how these couples 
experience one mother’s genetic relatedness to her child(ren) while the other mother 
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has no genetic link, whether or not they experience this as a difference, whether or not 
this influences the mothers’ position, and how they deal with this difference. The 
mother that has a genetic and biological link with the child is referred to as the 
biological mother and the mother that has no such link is referred to as the non-
biological mother. 
Ideas about genetics and blood ties are complex and rarely present a watertight 
logical reasoning. People’s attitudes towards biogenetic ties are not ’rational’, on the 
contrary, they are often contradictory and fragmented (Bestard, 2009). In this study we 
want to carefully map these couples’ attitudes. Investigating these couples’ views on the 
meaning of the genetic link for parenthood offers a valuable insight into the views of 
the actors themselves on what constitutes parenthood. Such information can contribute 
to the ethical literature on the definition of parenthood. 
8.2 Method 
Participants 
Table 3. Participants’ characteristicsa     
 
n Biological mother (34-47)b Non-biological mother (37-52) Children (1-9) 
1 Sara Lisa Timothy, Lynn 
2 Mia & Kim Mia & Kim Tom, Eva 
3 Rose Liz Ben, Jessica 
4 Nicole Angela Travis, Rian, Antonio, Milo 
5 Mary Monica Charlie 
6 Lauren Jill Walter 
7 Beth Lydia Neil, Florence 
8 Kate Sandy Kenny, Marilou 
9 Martha Lexi Bart, Mathilda 
10 Ysa Annie Brenda, Geena, Louise 
aPseudonyms are given to protect the privacy of the participants 
bYears of age, range 
 
The participants were recruited in October 2012 based on a list of lesbian couples (n=42) 
who were accepted for treatment (and subsequently treated) with anonymous sperm 
donation between 2002 and 2004 and who met the following inclusion criteria: Belgian 
citizenship; Dutch-speaking; at least one child via donor insemination between seven 
and ten years old at the time of the interview. Couples who opted for intra-partner 
oocyte donation were excluded in order to obtain a homogeneous sample of couples 
(where one parent has a genetic link and the other does not) with a similar experience 
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(donor insemination and parenthood). The women were enlisted according to the year 
of birth of their first-born. Couples with the eldest child were contacted first. To reach 
the goal of 10 couples, sixteen women had to be contacted. Reasons for not including 
the six other couples were: inadequate contact information or language difficulties (5) 
and no response after receiving information about the study protocol (1). An informed 
consent form was signed by both partners at the time of the interview. The study was 
approved by the Ethics Committee of the Ghent University Hospital. Table 3 provides 
more detailed information about the participants’ characteristics. 
 
Interviews 
The participants were interviewed at home (n = 9) or at the fertility clinic (n = 1), 
according to their own preferences. The interview duration ranged from 90 to 120 
minutes. The interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Anonymity was 
ensured by replacing all the names of persons and places by either pseudonyms or a 
single letter. 
The interview was divided into two parts. The first part included open-ended 
questions about the couples’ experiences and perceptions of the treatment. The second 
part included more specific questions to investigate moral reasoning about certain 
topics. Topics such as what is parenthood and how is it experienced, the importance of 
resemblances, the importance of genetic and social ties and questions about the donor 
were touch upon. With regard to the donor, their opinion on donor anonymity and open 
identity were discussed, as well as their perception of the donor with specific questions 
about the rights and obligations of the donor and the selection of the donor. To end this 
part, a hypothetical scenario was presented to investigate their reasoning about 
parental rights and obligations in combination with the presence or lack of genetic and 
social ties with the child. This chapter focuses on one specific question we asked during 
the second part of the interview to investigate their perceptions about the genetic link: 
“You (to the genetic mother) have a genetic link with your children, you (to the non-biological 
mother) do not. How is that for you (to the couple)?”. Other parts of the interview were also 
included when relevant to our research question. The interview guide is added as an 
appendix in this dissertation. 
Analysis 
For a description of the analysis, I refer to the methodology of this dissertation (chapter 
4). 
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8.3 Findings 
We identified two major themes which offered a better insight into how lesbian couples 
experience the difference in genetic relatedness and how they deal with it. The first 
theme represented the general opinion that prevailed in all interviews, namely that the 
genetic link was not relevant in their family and did not create a difference between the 
parents. The second theme comprised the couples’ experience of differences due to the 
fact that one mother was genetically related to her child(ren) while the other mother 
was not. Figure 1 gives an overview of the themes and subthemes. The size of the circles 
shows which themes were more present in the couples’ experiences: the bigger the 
circle, the more present the theme was.  
Figure 1: thematic map  
 
8.3.1 The genetic link as irrelevant: equality between parents 
The general view put forward in all interviews was that the genetic link was not a 
relevant issue for them as parents. The mothers had the feeling that they were equal as 
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parents and that the presence of a genetic link with one of the mothers did not play a 
role. Both biological and non-biological mothers shared this general perception and 
they supported each other in explaining this to the interviewer.  
8.3.1.1 Equality as a given 
Several couples clarified that they did not make a distinction between each other. They 
explained it as that it “doesn’t make a difference” or referred to the genetic link as 
something that did not matter. 
NICOLE and ANGELA together: It doesn’t matter.  
NICOLE: Not for us. 
ANGELA: No. 
 Along the same lines, one non-biological mother said that she did not feel like she 
had to put more effort in the parenting because she was ‘merely’ the non-biological 
mother; she felt as much a mother as the biological mother. While it was often claimed 
that genetics was irrelevant for their parenting, one couple stressed their equality by 
drawing resemblances. They gave examples of ways in which the children were like the 
non-biological mother. Resemblances are typically seen as something exclusive to 
genetics and blood ties. By talking about resemblances between the non-biological 
mother and the children, the participants created a link between them that was equal to 
the genetic link between the genetic parent and the children. 
INTERVIEWER: You've also mentioned similarities between you and the children, 
especially with Angela? 
NICOLE: Yes, the spaghetti with brown sugar.  
ANGELA: Yes, like even in what they [the children] eat, and uhm, how they talk. 
Derek is exactly like me when he talks, you know, in his pronunciation and 
things.. 
NICOLE: yeah, indeed. 
Most couples also described the irrelevance of genetic relatedness by talking about 
how they perceived their relationship with their child(ren). They both viewed the 
children as equally ‘theirs’. Phrases such as ‘they couldn’t be more mine’ and ‘we simply have 
two kids’ were used by both partners. Some couples explained that the decision to have a 
child was a joint decision and that this was more important than the genetic grounds of 
parenting. This joint intention not only made them parents, it made them equal parents. 
MARY: We made those decisions together back then, and I consider Charlie as 
much as Monica’s son, as I consider him my son.  
This position was generally supported by factual statements. However, some couples 
also presented equality as a goal, hereby taking a normative position. Lisa and Sara, for 
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instance, were convinced that parents should be equal. Lisa (non-biological mother) said: 
‘If you know in advance, or if - in the back of your mind - you still think it makes a difference, then 
you better not even start.’ In another interview, it was mentioned that equality was 
achieved by, for instance, having the non-biological mother take care of the baby (e.g. 
changing diapers) from the moment he was born. 
LAUREN: From the moment he was born…  
JILL: …Getting up in the middle of the night, walking around with him, changing 
his diapers, yes, everything really.  
LAUREN: I tell her ‘this is your moment to bond, go on, go change his diapers!’ 
JILL: Yes, then I just took part in raising him, we both did that.  
8.3.1.2 Confirmation of parental equality 
Some couples not only talked about how they viewed the genetic link and its relation to 
parenthood, they also mentioned the behaviour of others which, according to them, 
proved their parental equality.  
Children 
Two couples took their children’s opinion into account, saying that the children did not 
distinguish between the mothers. They saw their children’s behaviour as a confirmation 
of their equality as parents.  
ANGELA: The children don't give me the feeling that she is the natural mum and 
that I'm merely the mommy, that-. They don't know any better. Well, of course 
they know that Nicole is the natural mum, but for me there really is no difference, 
at all. And I think that's because of the boys. If the boys were to keep more 
distance from me, maybe then it would be different. 
Social environment 
Some couples focussed on how they thought the wider social context perceived them 
and brought up the reaction from other people to support their equality. Four couples 
explained that strangers in the street saw the non-biological mother as the ‘real mother’ 
(the biogenetic mother) because of the perceived physical resemblances between her 
and the children. This was experienced as ‘good’ or ‘nice to hear’ by both mothers, but 
especially by the non-biological mother. Angela, for instance, said ‘Oh, when they say that 
they (the children) look like me, you feel more involved.’ Later on she added ‘yeah, it is 
something extra, like, you know, I didn't give birth, but they do look like me.’ This established 
her status as a full-fledged parent, because she was put at the same level as the 
biological mother. 
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LEXI: And she [a stranger in the street] went like: ‘Oh, is that your daughter?’ And 
I said: ‘Well, yes.’ But I didn't mention … and then: ‘Oh, but she really looks like 
you’. And it was like ‘Oh, okay’ (laughs). And that was a bit, yes… (Lexi and Martha 
laugh).  
MARTHA: … And there I was, completely left out of it. While I'm the one that did 
all the hard work! (laughing)  
LEXI: Yes, that was like: ‘Alright, that's good’. It was funny, too.  
MARTHA: She was so proud!  
LEXI: Yeah, I was.  
8.3.2 The genetic link as relevant: the experience of a difference 
Apart from the general view that they were and should be equal as parents, some 
experiences of a difference due to a one-sided/partial genetic relatedness were also 
mentioned in the interviews. Some couples described these experiences explicitly, while 
others mentioned them only subtly. Nearly all mothers said that they considered these 
experiences as insignificant and explained that equality prevailed. 
Differences were mainly reported by the non-biological mothers, but to a lesser 
degree also by the biological mothers. The non-biological mothers described more 
negative feelings, experiencing the genetic link as something they lacked. The biological 
mothers outlined more positive feelings, emphasizing the genetic link as something 
valuable they had on top of the social bond.  
8.3.2.1 The genetic link as a valuable extra 
 Three non-biological mothers explained their perception of the genetic link and 
described how it created a difference between them and their partner. They stated that 
genetic relatedness was a special feeling they would never experience; it was something 
on top of the social bond that both mothers had with their children. Monica, for 
instance, phrased this idea and also explained that the genetic link was something 
‘fundamental’.  
MONICA: I can't imagine the bond between a mother and her child. You know, I'm 
convinced that what she [genetic mother] experiences is something quite 
different from what I have with Benjamin (son). […] To me, Benjamin is my son, 
but I mean, yes, the deeper meaning of it, you know. […] flesh and blood is, yes, I 
cannot descri-, that bond, it’s like it’s on a higher level, I don’t know how to 
explain it.  
Anni explained that she recognized several physical characteristics (hereditary 
traits) of the biological mother in the children. She regretted that she would never have 
such resemblances due to the absence of a genetic link for her. 
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When talking about these particular experiences, the mothers immediately added 
that they were rare, that these thoughts only popped up sometimes or in specific 
situations and that they did not bother them much. For instance, Lydia continued: ‘And 
then I think ‘oh, well, that's a pity’, but then I immediately think ‘it is what it is’. Monica 
clarified that: ‘it's not that it's constantly on my mind, no.’ 
Experiences with regard to the genetic link were also mentioned by some of the 
biological mothers. In contrast to the non-biological mothers, these experiences were 
positive. Beth, for instance, described the presence of a genetic link as ‘a nice feeling’ that 
she regarded as valuable in some way. At the same time, like the non-biological 
mothers, she stressed that these feelings were rare and that she often forgot that her 
partner did not have such a link. By doing this, she confirmed the general framework 
that both parents were equal (cfr. Theme 1).  
BETH: It gives me a very good feeling, but, so for me, it's pleasant that, that there 
is such a bond. But that doesn’t mean I experience that, that ... (looks for words), 
that does not imply that I think ‘and she does not have that bond’, you know. But I 
do enjoy it myself. It gives me a good feeling, that that genetic bond exists. (short 
pause). But, I would not, you know, at times I almost think that she also has that 
[genetic bond]. Like you almost forget that ‘Oh no, that’s not the case at all’. 
Two biological mothers also mentioned differences due to hereditary traits. In their 
experience, recognizing characteristics of themselves in their child was a valuable 
privilege for the biological mother. Kate, for instance, explained it as ‘special’ to 
recognize physical traits of her father and other family members in her son.  
8.3.2.2 Challenges to parental equality 
In the first theme we described how parents found confirmation of their equality as 
parents in their environment. At the same time, they also mentioned cues that pointed 
towards the value of a genetic link and consequently also to the difference between 
them as parents. 
Children 
Even though parents generally had the feeling that the children approached them as 
equal parents, some couples reported that the behaviour of the children made them feel 
unequal. The couples described that their child at times preferred to be with the 
biological mother. They found an explanation for this particular behaviour in the 
presence of the genetic link.  
LYDIA: Well, yes, sometimes I notice that Florence tends to favour you. And then I 
think, you know, had she come out of my belly, she might have favoured me 
because I, because there is a kind of, connection, something, between flesh and 
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blood. I don't know. So that does cross my mind sometimes when I see her going 
on ‘Oh mummy this’ and ‘mummy that'. 
Again, a nuance to this experience was added. 
LYDIA: But it's only, it's only for a fraction of a second that you notice, that you 
think or feel like that, and then it is gone. Nothing, uhm, nothing special you 
know (laughs). 
Society 
Although the couples had the possibility to use donor insemination to start a family, the 
law only considered the birthmother as the legal mother. If the non-biological mother 
wanted to be recognised as a legal parent, she needed to adopt her child. According to 
them, this situation imposed an inequality on the mothers. Not being the legal parent 
had practical consequences such as not being able to make important decisions in case 
of illness of the child or in case something happens to the biological mother, and not 
being able to bequeath one’s possessions to the child. Four non-biological mothers 
adopted the children to avoid these consequences. However, regardless of this imposed 
legal inequality, they still felt equally worthy as a mother. 
SARA: Imagine that something happens to me, you’re never sure. Also with regard 
to inheritance, now the children can also inherit from you… and also, what if they 
are seriously ill and some very important decisions have to be taken, she would 
never have been able to take them […] that were all juridical things, because, for 
us, for our feeling, that was not necessary. 
LISA: No, that was not necessary.  
Donor 
Four non-biological mothers perceived the donor, who was a necessary factor to have 
the child, as another challenge to their equality as parents. In this respect, the choice 
for anonymous donation was very important. A known donor might have interfered and 
could have received the status of a ‘real parent’ or the second parent because of his 
genetic link with the children. The non-biological mothers believed that they would 
then come third in line. As for the donor, the genetic link was thus suddenly seen as an 
unconditional right to parenthood. In contrast to their initial views on the irrelevance 
of the genetic link for the two mothers as parents, this genetic link determined his 
position towards the child.  
JILL: I would say no. Because I always feel pushed back a bit. I don't have a 
natural…  
LAUREN: … You're afraid of losing your position…  
INTERVIEWER: Can you explain what you mean exactly with ‘being a step behind’?  
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JILL: That's why I'm glad we quickly agreed to choose someone anonymous. 
Because I said ‘I'd be one step behind’. (…) imagine, if the father gets involved, 
imagine that he calls tomorrow and says: ‘Look, I want to meet Andy (son)’, then, 
yes, I'd be one step behind. Then it's the mother and the father, the natural 
biological mother and father, so yes, I'm pushed aside. You know, that's how I 
would feel. 
8.4 Discussion 
Participants’ meaning making of genetic relatedness seemed to be complex and context-
specific. The couples’ experiences of the difference in genetic relatedness turned out to 
be inextricably linked with how they view themselves as parents, and thus, the 
development of their parental identity. 
Our findings in the first place showed that these couples thought of parental equality 
as a given. The focus on joint parental decisions and experiences with their children and 
the social environment were meant to support this equality idea. Previous studies have 
shown that equality in daily parenting practice is an important factor in the creation of 
these families (Vanfraussen et al., 2003; Dunne, 2000; Chan et al., 1998). Chan et al. (1998) 
investigated the division of labour between heterosexual and lesbian families using 
donor insemination and found that the child-care tasks were divided more equally in 
the lesbian families. The authors also showed that equality was highly valued and 
desired more in lesbian families than in heterosexual families. This was confirmed by a 
study conducted by Vanfraussen et al. (2003) who showed that in lesbian families, both 
children and parents described the mothers as equally involved as parents. In addition, 
this study showed similar results with regard to the importance of the absence of a 
biological link. As in our study, the absence did not prevent the mother from taking and 
receiving an equal parental role. However, our study revealed a tension in the sense that 
some couples mentioned equality as a goal, hereby adopting a normative position. This 
same tension also became clear when one couple described their search for similarities 
between the non-biological mother and the children in order to establish a balance with 
the physical similarities the biological mother had with their children. One may wonder 
why striving and searching for equality is necessary when it is already perceived to be 
there. Nonetheless, this actively striving for equality is not an exceptional practice in 
lesbian families. A more technical approach is sometimes used to achieve equality, 
namely intra partner donation: one woman donates the eggs and the other carries the 
pregnancy (Pelka, 2009). This technique makes it possible for lesbian prospective 
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parents to both participate biologically in the creation of a child (Dondorp et al., 2010; 
Marina et al., 2010). 
Together with the equality in parental roles, the one-sided/partial genetic 
relatedness appeared to be a source of experiences of a difference in parental roles and 
positions. These experiences were influenced by several factors, which can all be traced 
back to a difference in genetic relatedness. 
First, factors within the family were mentioned. Non-biological mothers talked about 
missing the genetic link, or seeing the genetic link as an extra bond on top of the social 
bond. Biological mothers enjoyed having a genetic link with the children, and 
considered genetic resemblances as valuable. Couples also talked about the (rare) 
favourising behaviour of the children. Preference for the biological mother in some 
situations, stressed the idea that there might be a difference between both mothers, a 
difference that was traced back by the non-biological mother to biological relatedness.  
Second, also factors from outside the family played an important role in these 
experiences. External factors influenced the (perceived) parental position of the non-
biological mother. First of all, at the time these couples were in treatment and gestated 
their children, the law made a distinction between the mothers by only seeing the 
genetic mother as the legal mother. The non-biological mother had to adopt the child in 
order to obtain this legal status. If she did not adopt the child, this had consequences in 
daily practice. For instance, she would not be allowed to sign school documents. Similar 
findings were presented by Nordqvist (2012). In her study, she showed that the legal 
status was perceived as a societal factor which imposed a difference on the two mothers. 
A second external factor that revealed experiences of a difference was the donor. Our 
findings showed that lesbian mothers found it difficult to deal with the genetic link 
when it concerned the link between the donor and their children. In the light of the 
general equality narrative, it is remarkable that some parents would grant the donor an 
unconditional right to parenthood if he were to turn up. The genetic link between the 
donor and their children seemed to have another status than the genetic link in their 
own family. For them as parents, the genetic link was not relevant for parenthood, but 
for the donor, it was the one sufficient element for claiming parenthood and the 
associated rights and duties. This suggests that these lesbian parents find genetic 
relatedness in their family and the presence of a genetic link for an anonymous donor 
with their children difficult to handle. The same reasoning was found by Nordqvist 
(2012b; 2014) and Donovan and Wilson (2008) who’s data showed that the decision 
against known donation was motivated by the threat the donor would form to the 
equality between both mothers. 
Several experiences seem to pop up during the course of these family lives which can 
be expected to have an impact on the perceived parental position. One could expect that 
a non-biological mother would feel second-best when the children seem to favourise the 
biological mother, or when a biological link is highly valued. However, overall, the 
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couples stressed that these experiences of a difference detracted nothing from the 
parental equality. These statements can be understood in two ways. One is that the 
parents indeed did not bother about the difference in genetic relatedness. The few times 
a difference popped up were considered insignificant and not worth the attention. The 
second hypothesis is that a difference was in fact experienced and that these statements 
should be seen as part of their ‘functional’ narrative to deal with the rather 
uncomfortable experiences of a difference. People construct coherent life stories in 
order to make sense of their lives (McAdams, 2006). This means that events that relate 
to the desired outcome are highlighted and events that do not fit the story are 
minimized or completely left out (Polkinghorne, 2004). The family narrative has to be 
‘manageable’ and functions as a way of dealing with complexities and contradictions 
(Crossley, 2007; Polkinghorne, 2004).  
Limitations and clinical implications 
First, we should take the context of the interview into account where the participants 
talked to both the interviewer and the partner. The downplaying of the difference with 
regard to genetic relatedness with the child(ren) can be understood as an attempt to 
protect the family cohesion in front of the other mother, and more importantly, not to 
offend the other mother by telling either positive or negative experiences related to the 
genetic link. Second, our study does not allow to compare the experiences and attitudes 
of homosexual and heterosexual families. Parental gender, however, may be a possible 
influencing factor. As a consequence, our findings only tell us something about the 
experiences of lesbian parents. It would be interesting to conduct the same research for 
heterosexual parents to see whether genetic relatedness in this case also triggers 
experiences of a difference. This study confirms what has also been found in other 
studies, namely that people’s views and attitudes may change over the years in reaction 
to the child’s development and the social environment. Counselling should try to make 
this clear to patients starting treatment with donor gametes.  
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Two mothers and a donor: exploration of 
children’s family concepts in lesbian households 
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9.1 Introduction 
Plenty of research has been done focusing on the social and psychological development 
of children in lesbian families, often in comparison to children growing up in 
heterosexual families (Biblarz & Stacey, 2010; Brewaeys, 2001; Golombok & Badger, 2010; 
Malmquist et al., 2014; Patterson, 2006). These studies have shown that there are no 
significant differences between both groups with regard to child outcomes such as 
psychological adjustment, development during primary school, and academic 
achievements. They have also shown that children growing up in lesbian families 
function well in terms of family identity and relationships (Tasker, 2005; Tasker & 
Golombok, 1995; Rosenfeld, 2010; Wainright et al., 2004). 
Next to these outcome studies, other research has been focusing specifically on the 
experiences of the children growing up in lesbian families. Several studies concentrated 
on their experiences regarding the donor conception. Topics such as disclosure, the 
image they have of and their curiosity towards the donor were investigated before 
(Jadva et al., 2010; Vanfraussen, et al., 2001, 2002). Vanfraussen et al. (2001) suggested 
that especially boys were interested in information about ‘who the donor is’. The 
difference between sexes may be due to the family structure, characterized by the 
absence of a father, and their search for a male role model. However, Vanfraussen et al. 
(2003) showed that the wish for information about the donor was mainly driven by 
curiosity and was not linked to the quality of the parent-child relationship.  
Defining family concepts 
There is a lack of research looking at how children growing up in lesbian families define 
family concepts. In contrast, the definitions of children from heterosexual families have 
been studied extensively. Piaget (1928) was one of the first to ask young boys about their 
family concept. He concluded that children’s concepts of family were subject to 
developmental changes. While young children (aged 7 to 8) concentrated on 
cohabitation, older children (aged 11 to 12) had a broader definition, focusing more on 
biological relations irrespective of the cohabiting facet. More recent research showed 
that children have a complex image of family, not so much focusing on biological ties 
and the nuclear family, but centering more around affective ties (Anyan & Pryor, 2002; 
Morrow, 1998; Rigg & Pryor, 2007). The focus on such emotional relationships exceeded 
gender, age and ethnicity (Morrow, 1998).  
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When it comes to research on how children from lesbian families talk about family 
structure, two ‘new’ – in contrast to children growing up in heterosexual families - 
elements come up: the absence of a father and the existence of a donor. In some 
families, the donor is an abstract concept, whereas in other families, this donor takes a 
prominent place in the family. Tasker and Granville (2006) asked children raised in 
lesbian families with a known donor how they defined their network of family 
relationships. One of the findings was that children had a clear idea about the 
differences between a donor and a father, although some donors clearly had the role of 
a father in some of the families. Malmquist et al. (2014) focused specifically on the 
children’s father concept, and to a minor extent on their donor concept when this was 
in relation to talk about fathers. They showed that these children described difficulties 
defining the father concept, one of the reasons being that they did not have a father. 
When children described the concept, they explained that a father was basically 
someone like a mother. Particularly interesting is that similar research with children 
from heterosexual families showed different results, namely that mothers were 
associated with caring and nurturing characteristics, while fathers were linked to sports 
and play (Oliveira-Formosinho, 2009). Perlesz et al. (2006) conducted a 
multigenerational qualitative study towards how children, their lesbian parents and 
their grandparents defined family. They found that during the development of the child, 
the understanding of and view on their parents being lesbian, changed, as well as how 
they handled information about their family structure in their social environment. Fear 
for being bullied lead them to be more careful in explaining their family structure to 
peers: being more conscious of the hetero-normative society leads to more secrecy 
about their ‘not normal’ family. 
This study aims to contribute to the literature on family and parental concepts held 
by children growing up in lesbian families. We explore in detail the concepts the 
children construct regarding the three actors involved in the building of their families: 
the biological mother, the non-biological mother and the donor. In comparison with 
children growing up in heterosexual families, these children have two uncommon 
concepts they need to understand and define, both for themselves and for their social 
environment: a non-biological mother and a donor. Because these concepts are absent 
in the majority of families, it is particularly interesting to study the definition of these 
concepts in this particular family type.  
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9.2 Method 
Participants 
The focus of this chapter is on the lesbian parents’ children. We were able to recruit six 
boys (aged 9 to 10), and one girl (aged 7). The girl was the sister of one of the boys. These 
siblings were interviewed separately. All other children had at least one younger sibling 
who was not included in this study due to the age restriction. The interview with the 
girl was eventually not included in the analysis because it contained little information. 
This was probably due to her young age in combination with her shy personality. All 
children were aware of the anonymous donor conception. An informed consent form 
was signed by both mothers before the interview took place.  
Interviews 
The interviews were performed by either H.V.P., a psychologist of the research team or 
V.P., a bioethicist and social health scientist with experience in interviewing children 
who was also part of the team. All children were interviewed at their home. In one 
interview, the child’s parents were present due to practical reasons. The interview 
duration ranged from 20 to 50 minutes. The interviews were recorded and transcribed 
verbatim and checked for accuracy. Anonymity was ensured by replacing all the names 
of persons and places by either pseudonyms or a single letter.  
The semi-structured interview consisted of three main successive themes: the family, 
the conception story and the donor. To start, an elicitation technique inspired by the 
Apple Tree Family, a technique for mapping children’s view on family relationships, was 
used (see Tasker & Granville, 2011). A drawing of a tree and small cards in the shape of 
apples were offered to the child. The tree was presented as the child’s ‘family’. The 
children were invited to write down their own name on an apple and place it 
somewhere on the sheet with the drawing. Then they were asked to think about who 
belonged to their family. They were invited to place an apple for each of these persons 
on the sheet. They were informed that they could choose freely whether they wanted to 
place this apple in the tree, or in any other place they saw fit. The results of this exercise 
were used further on in the interview as a tool for defining the concepts of biological 
and non-biological mother and as a point of reference for further questions about the 
child’s family. At the start of the second part of the interview, an apple for the donor 
was offered only to children who had mentioned a donor in their conception story. The 
children were asked to put the apple somewhere on the sheet (the tree, or any other 
place). Based on what the children chose to do with this apple, the concept was 
discussed. The interview guide is included as an appendix in this dissertation. 
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Analysis 
For a description of the analysis, I refer to the methodology of this dissertation (chapter 
4). 
9.3 Findings 
Four themes were identified offering insight into the children’s concepts of those who 
were involved in the building of their family: the biological mother, non-biological 
mother and donor. The first theme focuses on the children’s experience of their 
particular family structure within a heterosexual society. The second theme comprises 
the children’s views on the concept of a biological mother. The third theme explains 
how the children defined the concepts of the non-biological mother. Finally, the fourth 
theme describes the more complex definition of the meaning and role of the donor. 
9.3.1 A two-mother-family in a heterosexual society 
The first theme is related to the societal context in which children’s parental concepts 
are shaped. Already at a young age, these children learned that their family structure 
was not common. Especially in the school environment, the children were confronted 
with questions about their particular family structure. Peers had wondered about the 
reason for having two mothers instead of a mother and a father, and had asked the child 
to explain this. Tom mentioned that such questions had been addressed to him.  
TOM: Uhm, yes, sometimes they ask if it’s true that I have two mums. Yeah, they 
think it’s a bit strange. And, uhm, most of them don’t understand how that’s even 
possible. 
Tom was confronted with the exceptionality of his family structure and was called to 
explain. By describing it as weird and asking for a reason, the peers presented Tom’s 
family structure as deviating from the norm.  
Not only the presence of two mothers, also the method of conception was a source of 
unclarity for peers. Ben, for instance, described that peers asked him questions such as 
‘But, how come you were born?’, since there was no father. Again, such questions made the 
family structure look different from ‘how it should be’. Nonetheless, he dealt with this 
by explaining how his family was formed. 
In Timothy’s case, simply looking at his social environment made him aware that his 
family structure was different.  
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TIMOTHY: I used to think that, uhm, it wasn’t normal to have a dad and a mummy 
(…) So I thought that gays and lesbians were normal, not the hetero’s.  
Int: When did that change? When did you stop thinking that? 
Timothy: Well, once I got older, I started thinking about it, because everyone I 
knew had a mummy and a dad. So I wondered whether I was really normal. But I 
am normal, a normal boy, who also comes from a mummy and a dad. 
The confrontation with the heterosexual social context made him change his idea 
about what a family was supposed to look like: suddenly his family structure was not 
normal anymore. He then seemed to find ‘normality’ in the way he was conceived. He 
transformed his family structure in a certain way to a heterosexual one by focusing on 
his biological mother and donor, and called the latter ‘daddy’. By labelling the donor as 
a daddy, his family structure was like everyone else’s. Whether he actually saw the 
donor as a daddy did not matter at this point. Labelling the donor as daddy was more 
convenient because it made his family look more normal. 
 All children mentioned that at some point their social environment confronted 
them with their two-mother-household. Nevertheless, this did not make them question 
their two mothers as parents. On the contrary, the exercise with the apple tree at the 
start of the interview made it clear that both mothers were firmly mentioned together 
and put in the tree together. No distinction was made between the mothers, they were 
presented as equal and without considering biological or social relationships. The 
equality between the two mothers was self-evident and no doubts about the status of 
one of the mothers as a parent were raised. 
9.3.2 The meaning and role of the biological mother 
When they were asked to define ‘biological mother’, all children mentioned two 
characteristics: caring for the child and a biological/causal link. With the 
biological/causal link we mean that children referred to the idea that ‘I came out of her 
belly’ or ‘she made me’. It was not always clear whether the children talked about a 
biological (gestational) link, a genetic link or some kind of causal link. Some children 
addressed both characteristics, other children mentioned only one. Four children 
described the caring element in the sense that the biological mother was someone who 
takes care of you, prepares food, buys clothes and watches over you. In this regard, 
Kenny defined the biological mother as ‘a personal babysitter.’ Ben addressed the element 
of care and what can probably be seen as a causal link between him and this mother: 
BEN: Yes, uhm, a mummy means that, uhm, actually she should take care of you, 
because you can’t exist without parents, and without a mummy. […] But, uhm, 
yeah, the mummy takes care of you, makes your meal, changes your diapers when 
you’re little, … she made you really, it is important, a mummy. 
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Three children defined the biological mother in terms of the presence of a biological 
link. Timothy did this in a descriptive way by saying ‘So actually, your mummy made you.’ 
The two other children described this in a normative way. The link was considered 
unique, since they did not share this with their other mother. This made her special. 
According to Walter, for instance, it gave the mother the status of ‘real mother’. He 
described his biological mother as ‘my real mummy, the one who gave birth to me.’ By 
defining the biological mother in this particular way, a difference between the two 
mothers was created: when there is a ‘real mother’, then there must also be someone 
that is not real, or less real. This description was in contrast to his initial parental 
concept. In the exercise with the apple tree, he had presented the parents as equal. Also 
for Kenny, both parental concepts were not so clear. On the one hand, the biological 
mother was characterized by ‘care’, which was also the case for the non-biological 
mother – suggesting similarity - and on the other hand, the biological mother was 
someone special because of the biological link, which suggested a distinction.  
9.3.3 The meaning and role of the non-biological mother 
The biological mother as a reference  
While the concept of the biological mother was defined in itself, the concept of the non-
biological mother was defined by all children through a comparison with another 
parental concept. Three children explained the role and meaning of the non-biological 
mother by comparing her to the biological mother. For Tom and Timothy, the non-
biological mother was similar to the biological mother because she also took care of the 
children. 
TOM: Uhm, yeah, that’s a bit the same [as a biological mother]… but yes. A 
different name, and she usually does different things, like other work. And yeah, 
she also takes care of us all the time. 
Walter, too, defined non-biological motherhood in reference to a biological mother. 
However, he defined a non-biological mother through the difference with a biological 
mother, namely the biological link. The non-biological mother was defined as the wife 
of his mother, and as someone who had adopted him and had promised to take care of 
him. The non-biological mother was seen as someone who equally provided care, but 
who had a different ‘status’. The status of real mother was reserved for the person with 
a biological link (see previous theme). Again, this contrasted with his initial 
presentation during the exercise with the apple tree where both parents were described 
as equal. 
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WALTER: and mom, that’s actually the wife of mummy. And yes… she, uhm, 
promised by law or something that she would take care of me too. […] But she’s, 
uhm, actually not my real mummy, but yeah. 
The father as a reference 
 Four children used the father figure as a reference to explain the concept of the non-
biological mother. They justified the comparison by pointing out similar traits between 
both actors, which were often common characteristics of what fathers are and do in 
their opinion. Kenny, for instance, explained that he sometimes labelled his non-
biological mother with ‘daddy’ because ‘she’s also really funny, making jokes all the time. Like 
most dads.’ He added that he did not say this out loud, which could indicate that he did 
not want his parents to hear it because he expected it to be hurtful or inappropriate. 
Ben also mentioned humour as a basis for comparison between the non-biological 
mother and a father. Apart from that, he considered his non-biological mother as 
someone like a daddy on the grounds of caretaking.  
BEN: Uhm, a mom is like, uhm, not really a replacement, but she, instead of a dad, 
- and together with the mummy – raises you. And she of course is also really nice 
and, uhm, looks after you, like a dad really.  
Travis described his non-biological mother as similar to a daddy on the basis of drinking 
beer and being equally stern. Two children raised the gender difference and clarified 
that the non-biological mother and a daddy were therefore not completely the same.  
BEN: But a mom is something else still, because she’s a girl too, and a dad is a boy, 
so that’s actually different. 
9.3.4 The meaning and role of the donor: a complex issue 
Five children were aware of the man ‘behind the seeds’. The other child, Travis, did not 
include the donor in his conception story. Consequently, no questions about the donor 
concept were asked in this interview. Only Walter mentioned the donor spontaneously 
from the beginning, during the exercise with the apple tree. All other children were 
offered an apple for the donor later on in the interview after they had mentioned him 
during their explanation of the conception story. 
 For the five children who were aware of the involvement of a donor, the donor 
concept appeared to be complex. Offering an apple for the donor created a possibility to 
talk about who the donor was and what his position in the family structure was. The 
place of this apple differed among the children: some children placed the apple next to 
the apple of the parents, other children made a clear distinction between the top of the 
tree (where well-known family members were placed) and the trunk (where the donor 
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was placed). However, they had one thing in common in their explanation: they all 
made a comparison with daddies. Most of the children also used the term ‘daddy’ to 
refer to the donor. Nonetheless, it was clear that the children were searching for the 
right terminology. One child talked about ‘that mister’, indicating a distant relationship 
in combination with a polite way of putting it. All other children used the term ‘daddy’, 
but showed discomfort in using this specific term. Tom, for instance, initially named the 
donor ‘daddy’, but immediately corrected himself and explained that the donor was not 
a real daddy. The donor was differentiated from those men who met the conditions to 
receive the label of daddy in society. 
INTERVIEWER: Do you know where, from whom the seed came, where it came 
from? 
TOM: Yes, from my daddy. I mean, not my real dad. Somebody gives his little seed 
to the doctor. And then, uhm, yes, that’s with a syringe. I think. And that’s a bit 
the same then. 
Two elements were indicated by the children which explained their difficulties with the 
terminology, and by extension, the position of the donor in the family structure. On the 
one hand, donors and daddies have a kind of causal or biological relationship with the 
child in common. On the other hand, donors do not have a social relationship with the 
child while fathers have. For most children, the combination of these two elements 
made it difficult not only to label the donor, but also to understand the donor concept 
and to point out where in the family structure the donor should be positioned. This 
became particularly clear when the children were asked to place an apple for the donor. 
TOM: Hm, he belongs a bit out of the tree. 
INTERVIEWER: […] Okay, so the mister should be more here, next to the sheet of 
the paper. And why is that? 
TOM: Well, I don’t know him. It is a kind of family, I guess, but yeah, I never see 
him, I don’t know him. 
INTERVIEWER: So, what do you mean when you say ‘a kind of family’? 
TOM: Well, it’s a kind of, uhm, well, we don’t know him, but he is a small part. 
Without him, my sister and I wouldn’t be here.  
On the one hand, the donor was thought of as some sort of family member, but on the 
other hand, the lack of a social relationship excluded him from the family structure. 
However, not including him at all was impossible, because without the donor, Tom 
would not exist. This idea of the donor as a progenitor was also mentioned by Ben. For 
him, the donor was not the same as a daddy because he was unknown. Nonetheless, the 
donor deserved a special place in the apple tree.  
BEN: Yeah, the ground is hard and colder. The mister really doesn’t belong there. 
And in the crest it’s nice and warm. And to me, life has the same meaning, that’s 
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life, from, our trunk. And, he could also have a place near the roots, […] it is 
because of the roots that the tree can live and, it is because of him that I live, and 
my sister too, and our family.  
Timothy too placed the donor in the trunk of the tree. Both children created the same 
metaphor to show that the donor was a necessary condition for them and their family to 
exist, but that this did not make him a member of the family.  
For Timothy and Kenny, the social relationship predominated in attributing a role to 
the donor and therefore, he was not considered part of the family. For both children, if 
there were to be a social relationship with the donor, that would change his status. They 
explained that, if the donor were known and present in their lives, he would be a daddy. 
The combination of the two elements would make the donor a father. For Kenny, the 
donor would then be positioned next to his biological and non-biological mother. He 
said that if the donor were present, then ‘that would be a daddy. Then I would have a 
mummy, daddy and mom.’ Timothy added an extra condition. He said: ‘If my mom wasn’t 
here, then of course I would call him daddy. But now I would just name him by his first name.’ 
For Walter, the lack of a social relationship did not matter. For him, although the 
donor lived in another country and was not known, he was his daddy. First of all, he 
introduced him spontaneously in the interview as his daddy. While he was explaining 
having a biological and non-biological mother, he added ‘And, then there’s my daddy. But I 
don’t know his name. Because we never knew him, he lives in Denmark.’ In talking about the 
donor further on in the interview, Walter repeatedly referred to him as his daddy. When 
Walter was asked to place the apple for the donor, he put it next to the apples for his 
mothers. He explained this action simply by saying that the donor was his father. Two 
reasons for this comparison could be found. First, it appeared that for Walter, the fact 
that the donor had a biological relationship with him, was reason enough to consider 
the donor as a daddy. A second explanation can be found in the birth story that his 
mothers had told him. For his mothers, it was a conscious choice to introduce (and 
label) the donor as a daddy. It is likely that this contributed to Walter’s reasoning and 
word use. 
9.4 Discussion 
Defining family-specific concepts through hetero-normative references 
As part of a heterosexual society, these children had been confronted with the 
exceptionality of their particular family structure. Especially peers tend to ask questions 
about the two mothers and the conception method (Vanfraussen et al., 2002). The 
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children were urged to think about the meaning and role of the three actors who were 
involved in the creation of their family, and particularly about who the non-biological 
mother and donor was, and how these actors related to other family members. The first 
striking element in the definition of these two concepts was that all children referred to 
the hetero-normative mother and father concept. One interpretation is that the 
children looked at society (particularly at their peers) and found no immediate model 
for their non-biological mother or donor. In contrast to the concepts typical for their 
family structure, the concepts ‘mummy’ and ‘daddy’ were clear: everywhere they 
looked, they found examples of mothers and fathers. To explain their own family 
concepts, they fell back on these two more familiar concepts. The non-biological mother 
was defined by referring to either what is known as a ‘mother’ in society, or by referring 
to the father concept. Malmquist et al. (2014) found that children from lesbian families 
defined fathers as similar to mothers. One of the explanations the authors gave to these 
particular descriptions was that such children’s images of daddies were vague. 
Therefore, they used “a more familiar maternity discourse” (p.130) in order to define a 
‘daddy’. This could also be the case for the non-biological mother: the more familiar 
mother-father discourse was used to define their non-biological mother.  
 In a similar way to the non-biological mother concept, the donor was defined 
through a comparison with the more familiar concept of ‘daddy’. For defining, naming 
and positioning the donor in the family structure, the father concept appeared to be the 
closest concept to make a comparison with. The donor namely gave seeds to one of the 
mothers, and the child himself was the result. In this regard, a donor is very similar to a 
father. However, in this comparison, difficulties arise. The lack of a social relationship is 
a major difference with the father concept, a difference that is not present in the 
definition for the non-biological mother. The findings show that the children have 
difficulties with defining the concept exactly because of this opposition between 
‘progenitor’ and ‘unknown’. This difficulty is also reflected in the search for a correct 
label for the donor: the term ‘daddy’ was frequently used, but most children were 
clearly uncomfortable using this word because it did not cover the subject. Some of 
them alternated this term with ‘that mister’ or ‘that man’. Also Malmquist et al. (2014) 
found a complex balance between the use of the word ‘daddy’ and other names such as 
‘seed daddy’ or ‘that man’. The authors concluded that the labelling by the parents 
probably has a huge influence on the image the children create of the donor. However, 
most children’s parents in our study did not label the donor as ‘daddy’. They used terms 
such as ‘that friendly man’, or ‘the man who gave seeds’. The children themselves 
labelled the donor as ‘daddy’, which indicates again that ‘daddy’ for them seems the best 
available term to describe what a donor is.  
Another striking element in the definition of the donor was mentioned by two 
children. The donor was differentiated from a father because of the current lack of a 
social relationship. However, if the donor were to be known or present, his status would 
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change from ‘unknown man’ to ‘daddy’. This confirms the fear of lesbian parents about 
using a known or identifiable donor. The parents’ fear is that a known donor would 
become the second parent, and that the non-biological mother would come only third in 
line (Nordqvist, 2012). Two children mentioned that the position of the donor would 
change when he would be known. This finding indicates that there might be some 
ground for this fear. 
Equality and difference between the two mothers 
Most children saw both mothers as equal parents, without considering the difference in 
biological ties. They all made this initially clear by mentioning both parents together 
during the exercise with the apple tree. Some children confirmed this equality during 
their descriptions of the non-biological mother by describing her role in terms of what a 
biological mother was. In emphasizing similar characteristics and activities, equality 
was installed. Also the definitions of the non-biological mother in terms of a daddy can 
be indicative of considering the two parents as equal. A father is generally seen as a 
parent equal to a mother. Another explanation could be that children from lesbian 
families do not gender differentiate between parents (Malmquist et al., 2014). The 
distinction between a father, a biological mother and a non-biological mother might not 
be as strict in their experience. In this regard, it should be kept in mind that all findings 
are the result of specific questions that were asked during the interview. The 
distinctions between the mothers might be artificial, because they were asked about the 
concepts separately and in a specific order. The concept of a biological mother was 
discussed first, and the concept of the non-biological mother was explored afterwards. 
Nonetheless, by focusing on the concepts separately, valuable information was shared 
that would not have been discussed without this specific focus. These findings show that 
aside of similarities (which were presented as self-evident), differences between the 
mothers were also mentioned. Two children mentioned their mothers together in the 
exercise with the apple tree, and presented them as ‘my parents’. During the discussion 
of the individual concepts, however, distinctions arose. For Kenny, equality and 
difference in parenting status went hand in hand. The parents were equal, although the 
biological link made the mother special. Walter made a clear distinction during his 
discussion of the individual concepts. He described the mother with a biological link as 
the real mother, and the non-biological mother as the mother’s wife who promised to 
take care of him. The biological link was therefore seen as an unconditional right to 
parenthood, and as intrinsically more valuable than adoption. His story might be 
interpreted as contradictory and confusing. However, it is not uncommon for children 
to say one thing at a certain point and something else at a later moment. People’s 
reasoning about blood ties are complex and rarely follow watertight logical reasoning 
(Bestard, 2009). In this regard, it is perfectly possible that Walter and Kenny believe that 
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their parents are equal as well as different, and that the biological link is simultaneously 
special and irrelevant.  
Limitations and clinical implications 
Similar to the remark about the structure and sequence of the questions about the 
mothers, it should be noted that the information gained about the donor in relation to 
the exercise with the apple tree resulted from offering an apple for the donor. The 
findings are also based on the opinions of boys only. Gender differences may translate 
into differences in understanding kinships roles with girls generally having a more 
sophisticated view on relationships (Borduin et al., 1990). Lastly, although rich 
information was found in these data, we should keep in mind that this study involved 
six children. 
Apart from these limitations, valuable findings that contribute to the literature about 
family structure and the children’s view on concepts as biological mother, non-
biological mother and donor are presented. First of all, we found that the mothers were 
seen as equal parents and biological links are not taken in consideration. Secondly, the 
two family structure-specific concepts ‘non-biological mother’ and ‘donor’ were defined 
by looking at the hetero-normative concepts of ‘mummy’ and ‘daddy’. For the concept 
of the non-biological mother, this worked well. For the donor, more difficulties were 
described. This comparison turned out to be complex and confusing due to the conflict 
between the role as a progenitor and the lack of a social relationship. Considering the 
clinical implications, this study shows that children in this specific family context might 
find it difficult to define their donor and to situate him in or outside their family 
structure. Confusion may arise about the difference between the donor and a father, and 
explaining or comparing the donor in terms of a daddy adds to this difficulty. It might 
be relevant for counsellors to adopt this insight in their counselling session with the 
parents about disclosure to the child.  
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10.1 Integrating normative and descriptive research 
The aim of the project was to add new insights to the literature on social and genetic 
parenthood through an empirical bioethics approach. This approach aims at 
contextualizing normative theory by combining moral theory and empirical data 
(Musschenga, 2005). Real-life experiences are used to inform ethical theories. In the 
normative section of this dissertation, normative analysis and empirical data available 
in the literature were combined in the sense that empirical data were used to support 
and clarify the normative analyses. The existing data helped us to come to a normative 
analysis on the right of donors to information and on the justifiability of a directive 
counselling approach on sharing the donor conception. In the empirical section of this 
dissertation, we analysed the empirical data we collected ourselves. We gathered insight 
into families’ experiences with a one-sided genetic link (the lesbian parents), the 
positioning and meaning of the donor (the children) and couples’ moral grounds for 
parenthood (couples’ views on the hypothetical scenario). The value of these studies lies 
in that they offer an insight into the real-life moral reasoning of the people who deal 
with social and genetic parenthood every day. These data can be used as background 
information to inform normative theory. 
The ethicists’ task 
When we want to integrate our empirical findings into a normative framework (via for 
instance, the WRE), the question arises of how we can move from the empirical data to 
normative conclusions. One of the steps in that process involves the evaluation of 
people’s views. We should keep in mind that the opinions and moral judgements of the 
actors might contain contradictions or might be biased. It is the task of an ethicist to 
review these judgements and select what is described as ‘well-considered’ judgements in 
order to confront these with already existing rules and background theories. Exactly 
this process improves the credibility of the integration of empirical data. According to 
De Vries and Van Leeuwen (2010), it all has to do with identifying non-biased moral 
judgements. To successfully select such judgements, ethicists should be open to a large 
variety of moral experiences, they should gain a relevant moral sensitivity to the 
subject and gather moral experiences of people in the field until saturation is reached. 
An example of such a biased moral judgement can be found in the analysis of the 
couples’ views on the hypothetical case. An inconsistency appeared when an argument 
was used for protagonist C (he was not granted parenthood), but this same argument 
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was not used for the other protagonists A and B, while the argument also applied to 
them. The inconsistency might be explained by a bias: the couple might identify with A 
and B, therefore protecting those protagonists from anything that would block them 
from obtaining parenthood. This is not the only example of a biased moral judgement. 
In a sense, all judgements made by the participants can be expected to be biased. They 
all are part of a specific situation which influences their judgements: participants used 
an anonymous or known donor, are (non-)biological mothers or fathers, are part of a 
lesbian or heterosexual family,… A critical stance towards empirical data when used as 
background information for normative theories is thus appropriate.  
A valuable contribution 
Empirical data can contribute in several ways to normative theories (Musschenga, 2005). 
One such valuable contribution is that empirical data offer an insight into the actual 
moral opinions and reasoning patterns of the people involved in the practice. One of the 
things that became clear through the interviews with the lesbian parents was the value 
of having an anonymous donation system in Belgium. This was described via moral 
judgements on the rights of the donor (he had none), their view that contact with the 
donor should not be possible and that the child should only receive non-identifying 
information about the donor. One of the functions that can be linked to these moral 
judgements is the protection of the non-biological mother as a parent. These findings 
should be treated cautiously since we recruited parents who opted for anonymous 
treatment (assuming that they knew that known donation was possible). We miss out on 
the people who sought treatment elsewhere because they did not accept anonymity. In 
that sense, our data are biased. Nonetheless, in light of a rising trend towards open-
identity donors, it is interesting to look into the moral reasoning of the people who 
choose for an anonymous system.  
A second contribution of empirical data is the identification of relevant issues that 
were not present (or largely underestimated) in the purely normative analysis. 
Examples of this can be found in the analysis of people’s views on the grounds for 
parenthood and parental rights and responsibilities. The empirical data we gathered 
showed that the moral grounds that were considered relevant by the couples were 
much more complex than the grounds described in current normative literature. 
Moreover, a new moral ground was introduced by the couples: the commonality in 
intention or social bond is not present in the normative literature as a ground for 
parenthood.  
Exactly in these ‘encounters with experience’ lies the value of integrating empirical 
data into normative work: data confronts the ethicist with real life situations and the 
impact that certain ethical frameworks can have on the lives of people (Ives and Draper, 
  183 
2009). Integrating the views of actors in the field can result in the inclusion of voices 
that might otherwise be left out.  
10.2 Sharing information: the unanswered question 
The discussion on information sharing is complex, but this should not be surprising. In 
this particular context, the interests of parents, children, donors and professionals are 
involved, leading to two major discussions: the secrecy and disclosure debate on the one 
hand, and the anonymity and identifiability debate on the other hand. In the literature, 
there seems to be a one-sided focus on the rights and interests of the child, and an 
accompanying one-sided focus on the importance of openness and open-identity 
systems. A child born via gamete donation never had a choice in the decision to 
participate in this practice, while donors and parents did. In addition, a child is a 
vulnerable human being that is not able to speak for itself. A child cannot protect his or 
her own autonomy. Due to this diminished autonomy, they are entitled to protection 
(Klitzman, 2012). In the UK’s Children’s Act (1989, section 1) it was noted that the child’s 
welfare should always be of paramount consideration. Hereby, the child was elevated to 
a higher moral status than other human beings. Today, this allows interventions on 
parental decision making, such as fines for taking children out of school in term-time 
for a holiday. While in general parents still autonomously make the decisions with 
regard to the child, a shift can be noticed towards an emphasis on the child’s welfare. 
Even though serious consideration to the interests of the child is understandable, it 
should not lead to a neglect of the other parties. As already discussed in the 
introduction of this dissertation, the interests of all parties should be heard in order to 
reach a balance. This balance might not lead to an equal distribution of rights for all 
parties in the end, but all parties should at least be considered equally. 
Balanced criteria for all parties 
In chapter five, we argued that a right (to information) should only be granted when a 
need exists for what the right offers, a mere desire is not sufficient. For instance, 
empirical data showed that donors were curious about or had a desire for certain 
information about their donor children, such as medical information, an extended 
profile or information about the donor children’s wellbeing. We argued that some of the 
information that was desired, was not a need (for instance, an extended profile). 
Therefore donors should not be granted a right to that information. 
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If we use this criterion of ‘need’ to grant a right in the donors’ case, it would only be 
fair to apply the same criterion to donor conceived children. Similarly as in the donors’ 
case, we should differentiate the children’s desires and needs. Of course, it is possible 
that based on this criterion, children are justified to receive more information from 
their donor than their donor from them. While the outcome of the analysis should be no 
means be the same for all parties, the criterion to grant rights should. 
An example of information that is increasingly being claimed to be a right for donor 
conceived offspring is identifying information. Nonetheless, we know from studies that 
children are interested in such information mainly out of curiosity (Jadva et al., 2010; 
Vanfraussen et al., 2003). This suggests that some information that is described as the 
child’s right at this moment, is not based on a need. Further research on the needs and 
desires of all parties should be conducted in order to grant the information each party is 
justified to receive. An analysis of the current arguments in favour of granting 
information to donor conceived children should be made in order to determine which 
criterion is used and whether or not this criterion should be revised.  
No preferred option 
Due to the lack of sufficient empirical evidence, directive advice to parents to either 
disclose or to keep it secret to the child cannot be justified. Nonetheless, counsellors do 
have a responsibility to advise parents in what they should consider. That way parents 
can make an informed decision. Following Appleby et al. (2012), three types of 
considerations should be communicated to be taken into account by the parents: 
medical welfare, family welfare and rights. The medical welfare involves considerations 
about the child’s interests in its genetic make-up in relation to medical risks. The family 
welfare involves considerations concerning the welfare of the biological and non-
biological parents, and the siblings in relation to disclosure. With regard to the rights, 
parents should be encouraged to reflect upon their views on their child’s rights (for 
instance to be informed) and their own rights (for instance to keep the information 
private). More specific considerations such as timing of disclosure or the impact of 
disclosure on the extended social environment should also be discussed. Overall, we 
should accept that at this moment, no conclusive advice about disclosure can be given. 
The preferable option is the option that is chosen by the parents. 
This is not the only question we have no answer to at the moment. Also with regard 
to anonymity we should be careful about which systems we implement. The future has 
yet to show the effects of an open-identity system on the donor children and their 
families, and on the donors and their families. In the UK for instance, the entitlement of 
donor conceived offspring to receive identifying information about their donor will not 
come into effect until 2023 since the open-identity system was installed in 2005 
(Freeman et al., 2012). Caution should thus be maintained when anonymity is abolished 
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and an open-identity system becomes the only option for parents. It could be argued 
that parents should be respected in their autonomy and be able to choose for 
themselves. In a double track system, both parents and donors can choose to opt into an 
anonymous or identifying system. 
One could argue that policy should wait for the scientific evidence before applying a 
certain system. However, the precautionary principle cannot be applied in this context 
(Pennings, 2012). Policy cannot wait for the scientific evidence. A ‘catch-22’ would arise: 
we can only decide upon questions following from the donation practice (e.g. disclosure, 
open-identity) when we have scientific evidence about what the best option is, but we 
cannot obtain this evidence because we cannot implement certain decisions as long as 
we have no evidence. Scientific research should thus be conducted in order to be able 
(1) to make decisions about future consequences rising from the practice and (2) to 
evaluate the existing policy and review it if needed.  
One interesting question then is whether parents should be forced into one system 
even when sufficient data become available on for instance the impact on the wellbeing 
of the child. Imagine that conclusive data are found which show that psychological 
harm is done to children conceived with an anonymous donor. If as a consequence of 
this finding, anonymity is abolished, only the interests of the children are taken into 
account. However, moderate harm to the child might not outweigh a strong violation of 
the autonomy of the parents. A balance would be more appropriate with parents being 
able to make the deliberation themselves, even if this means that the decision is not 
completely in the interests of the child. This happens all the time; divorce is a good 
illustration.  
10.3 Building a family through gamete donation: dealing with 
the unfamiliar. 
An unfamiliar third building block 
Building a family via gamete donation means dealing with the donor, not only at the 
start of the treatment, but also years after treatment when for instance the conception 
story is explained and children start asking questions, or when physical characteristics 
appear in children that do not match family members. The donor is an essential element 
in the building process. Without the donor, these families would not exist. An 
interesting dynamic occurs when the donor is deemed a fundamental building block, 
but is considered irrelevant when it comes to parenting the child. Both studies on the 
lesbian families (parents and children) show such a dynamic. For the children, this 
 186 
became clear through their struggle with terminology. The donor was seen as a party 
that made their family possible. In that sense, a special status was granted. However, 
this special status conflicted with the unimportance of the donor during the children’s 
life. The donor as a necessary building block seemed to lead them to the term ‘dad’, but 
this word conflicted with the actual status. For the parents, an opposite duality became 
clear through the struggle of the non-biological mother with the position of the donor 
in relation to her own position as a parent. While the children pictured the donor as an 
important person for the creation of their family and as an irrelevant person in their 
family at the same time, the non-biological mothers saw the donor as an insignificant 
(but necessary) building part who could claim parental rights if he would turn up. They 
described the donor as if he could be the second parent, and they would become third in 
line. Interestingly, this idea was also found in the experiences of some children. Two 
children positioned the donor as a mere creator, not as a father. However, if this man 
would turn up, he would be given the position of a father. An important difference 
between the children and the parents was that the children would see him as an equal 
parent to both mothers, while the non-biological mothers would see him as better 
positioned than themselves.  
Often the parents are treated as a unity in discussions and research. In this 
dissertation, I also considered the parents as one party. However, our findings show that 
differences in experiences of biological and non-biological parents can be present and 
that it might produce richer findings when the parents are seen as separate parties. The 
experiences of the non-biological mothers seemed to differ greatly at certain points 
from the biological mothers with regard to the donor. The distinction applied to the 
status of the parent, with non-biological mothers as the ‘weaker’ party in the sense that 
they experienced a threat, while biological parents did not. Although not relevant in all 
discussions, in psychological research this distinction might lead to new insights into 
the dynamics that occur in families using gamete donation.  
An ambiguous position towards the genetic link 
The studies on the lesbian families (parents and children) showed an ambiguous 
position towards the importance of a genetic link. Even though the social ties were 
described as much more important than genetic ties, at times, it became clear that the 
genetic link was considered essential. For the parents, experiences of the donor as a 
hypothetical threat seemed to show that the genetic link was seen as an irreversible, 
powerful bond that put the donor in a special position towards the child. The genetic 
link was not only valued in relation to the donor. Some non-biological mothers also 
explained experiences of a difference due to a one-sided genetic link. Some children 
explained a similar idea with regard to the one-sided biological bond. They described 
that bond as more valuable than the social bond. The struggle with the importance of 
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the genetic link also became clear from the analysis of the hypothetical scenario. That 
study showed that for most couples, the genetic link was highly valued for protagonists 
A and C as a basis for either parenthood or parental rights. At the same time, the genetic 
link was considered irrelevant for protagonists A and B.  
The ambiguous status of the genetic link was a recurrent theme throughout the 
studies. It illustrates the contradiction in the practice of gamete donation. The genetic 
link is downgraded and social bonds are presented as the sole relevant ties, but at the 
same time, the genetic link seems to be of the highest importance. For some people, 
even though they opt for gamete donation, genes and genetic bonds are still granted a 
special status. In a sense, this is actually not surprising. In most cases, people who 
choose gamete donation consider a biological link with their child important (Murray 
and Kaebnick, 2003). Often, people start medical treatment with their own gametes to 
evolve into treatment with donated gametes when a partner’s gametes turn out not to 
be eligible for conception. Gamete donation is after all a practice that offers the closest 
solution to having a genetically related child when natural conception fails. In that 
sense, it is ‘logical’ that a duality exists. Trying to convince people that genes are ‘just’ 
genes and that a child is raised by its residential parents seems to fail to recognize the 
parents’ concerns. Acknowledging that a genetic bond might have a special meaning 
does not need to endanger the practice of gamete donation. Not only parents might be 
ambiguous about the importance of the genetic link, also for donor conceived children 
such a duality might exist. The genetic link might be downgraded to recognize the non-
biological parent, but at the same time, children might have physical, personal or 
medical characteristics of the donor which highlights the importance of the genetic 
link. A clinical implication is that counselling sessions should integrate this discussion 
and point out this duality to aspiring parents in order to prepare them for possible 
conflicting feelings and experiences for their own and their children. This also has 
implications for policy. The ambiguity in couples’ views on the genetic link shows that 
the trend towards an open-identity system where the donor and child have the 
possibility to keep in touch, might not be the best system for everyone. The anonymity 
creates a distance between the donor and the family and protects them from the 
possible threat the donor might pose. By minimising the information about the person 
that is genetically related to the child but is unwanted in the family, parents and 
children are able to deal with the situation. 
An unfamiliar future: long-term impact 
Gamete donation is a long-lasting process that starts with the decision to use gametes 
and evolves over time. Some people, such as lesbian couples, know in advance that they 
will need to appeal to gamete donation if they want to have genetically related children. 
Other people need to get used to the idea. Either way, people most likely accept the 
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consequences (e.g. one-sided genetic link) before starting treatment. Counselling before 
and during the treatment helps people to consider those consequences and points out 
possible difficulties they will be confronted with later in life, such as the disclosure 
decision.  
However, while couples might initially come to terms with the consequences, this is 
challenged when the child enters their lives and grows up. Parents are confronted with 
the consequences in real life. This may change the way they perceive the donation or 
the experience of living in a donor family. Our studies showed for instance experiences 
of a difference due to the one-sided genetic link, or due to children’s behaviour towards 
the biological mother. While the genetic link was seen as irrelevant for parenting and 
one’s parental status, children challenged this view with their behaviour. Another 
example is the changing disclosure attitude. The disclosure decision is discussed during 
the counselling session(s) that take place before or during the treatment. However, 
attitudes can change and new questions and uncertainties might rise as the child grows 
up. Discussing disclosure options without already having the child and without 
knowledge about how the child would react to certain types of information, is rather 
difficult. It is not surprising that attitudes change years after the initial counselling 
session due to the development of the child and other environmental influences.  
The long-term impact of the treatment should not be overlooked. Questions and 
issues that were dealt with at the start of the treatment during counselling might come 
up again. The emphasis of the current counselling practice seems to be on pre-
treatment and during treatment sessions. However, we should be aware of the possible 
need of counselling many years after the treatment.  
10.4 Social acceptance 
In Western society, medical help to fulfil a child wish is no longer a secret practice. In 
the scientific field, a lot of medical and psychological research is being conducted and a 
rich ethical debate accompanies the developments. Also outside the scientific world, 
more popularising debates are often held concerning the social, psychological and 
ethical aspects of gamete donation. This seemingly has created a more open climate 
about the practice. However, we have no idea about the acceptance of donor families in 
social practices, for instance at school or with friends and family. We should not forget 
that only medical doctors and other specialists in the field take part in public 
discussions and conduct research in the field, meaning that the image of acceptance 
that is created is biased.  
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There are some indications that families built via gamete donation are increasingly 
being accepted by their environment. One example is the growth in the number of 
families who decide to tell their child about its donor conception. Compared to for 
instance 30 years ago, the openness about the use of donated gametes clearly has 
increased. A second dynamic is the possibility for alternative families such as same sex 
couples, singles or older couples to make use of the practice. These couples have no 
other option than telling their child due to the lack of a father figure or due to age-
related natural restrictions. The fact that these couples are allowed to use the practice 
indicates a social acceptance. However, we should be careful not to generalize. While 
lesbian couples are open about the donor conception, several studies show that the 
majority of heterosexual couples did not and still do not disclose the donor conception 
(Nachtigall et al. 1998; Golombok et al. 2002; Owen & Golombok 2009, MacCallum & 
Golombok, 2007). The rising number of lesbian families might create the wrong 
impression about the number of people who decide to disclose. Another example is the 
rising number of donor offspring and donors who register themselves on websites such 
as Donor Sibling Registry (UK) to get in touch with donors, offspring or half-siblings. 
Particularly the communication about the search is relevant in this case. Jadva et al. 
(2010) showed that approximately 60% of the participants had told their friends about 
their search for the donor or their siblings, and 79% had told their mother. Only 29% of 
offspring from heterosexual families had told their father about their search for the 
donor. The data indicate a social taboo to talk about the donor conception. In addition, 
the openness varies largely among cultures (Inhorn & Van Balen, 2002), with Australia 
and New Zealand as strong advocates of openness. Many countries such as Belgium or 
France apply an anonymous system. An open climate is much less present in those 
countries. Moreover, caution should be maintained when talking about the open climate 
in countries such as Australia. While on an institutional level openness is promoted and 
highly valued, empirical data showed that this open climate does not seem to be 
embraced by the people themselves (Kovacs et al., 2012; Durna et al., 1997). 
While we have a clear view on the evolution in policy and on the ethical debate 
concerning this topic, we have no idea about local evolutions in stigmatization and 
social acceptance. Only Nachtigall et al. (1997) provide data which suggest that the 
social stigma about male infertility is one of the reasons the donor conception is not 
disclosed in heterosexual families. Hudson et al. (2009) concluded that we have limited 
information on the current ‘public’ perceptions of the practice of gamete donation, with 
‘public’ meaning the people who do not need to appeal to medically assisted 
reproduction via donated gametes. Stigmatization might occur on different levels, such 
as within families (for instance grandparents who make a difference between ‘own’ 
grandchildren and the grandchildren conceived via gamete donation) or in the wider 
social environment (at work, at school, neighbours,…). In this regard, the study of the 
children revealed interesting findings. These children experienced problems in 
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explaining their family constitution (having a donor and not having a father) to peers. 
Reactions of peers showed a difficulty to understand the situation. An explanation 
might be that our society still imposes hetero-normative family concepts and that 
children are not familiar with alternative families. This lack of understanding creates a 
difference between ‘us’ (those having a father) and ‘them’ (those having something else 
than a father or nothing). In that sense, it would be interesting to investigate children 
from heterosexual couples who used gamete donation with regard to their experiences 
with peers. The children in our study had to explain two anomalies. Apart from the 
donor, also the presence of two mothers needed to be explained.  
The gamete donation practice increases the number of alternative families. People 
should be sensitized about new family formations. Such families should be integrated in 
policy in order to raise public acceptance. An example of acceptance of alternative 
families was the recent change in legislation in Belgium with regard to the legal 
parental status of the non-biological mother in lesbian families. Giving these mothers 
the same rights as the fathers in heterosexual couples is a step forward in the social 
acceptance of alternative families. Research should be conducted on the social 
acceptability of families using gamete donation in order to be able to anticipate 
properly on trends and evolutions at the level of the actors themselves. 
In conclusion, the practice of gamete donation involves several moral debates, many 
of which have not yet reached a conclusion, and some of them might never reach a 
conclusion. It is necessary to closely monitor further evolutions in the field, especially 
as donor children grow up in different contexts. There are many complex ethical issues 
surrounding gamete donation, but it has the potential to fulfil a profound lifelong 
dream for many people. 
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Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
Achtergrond 
Het ouderschap wordt universeel als één van de belangrijkste doelen in het leven 
gezien. Voor veel mensen kan de kinderwens niet worden vervuld zonder medische 
hulp. Infertiliteit wordt gedefinieerd als een ziekte gekenmerkt door het uitblijven van 
een klinische zwangerschap na 12 maanden of meer van onbeschermde 
geslachtsgemeenschap. Tien tot vijftien procent van de koppels op reproductieve 
leeftijd wordt geconfronteerd met deze ziekte. Voor een grote groep van deze mensen 
volstaat een medische behandeling zoals IVF of ICSI met eigen materiaal om een kind te 
verwekken. Voor anderen zal dit geen soelaas brengen. In deze gevallen kan er worden 
overgegaan op het gebruik van donormateriaal (sperma-, eicel-, of embryodonatie). Het 
is net deze groep waarop wordt ingezoomd in deze verhandeling.  
Wanneer gedoneerde gameten worden gebruikt om de kinderwens te vervullen, zijn 
er meestal twee partijen extra betrokken bij het proces: de medici en de donor. De 
betrokkenheid van 4 partijen (naast eerstgenoemden ook de ouders en het kind) creëert 
een complexe verhouding van wensen, verwachtingen, rechten, belangen en plichten 
van alle partijen. Het hoeft dan ook niet gezegd dat de praktijk een bron van veel 
ethische discussies is. De verhandeling poogt bij te dragen aan deze ethische en 
empirisch bio-ethische literatuur over gametendonatie. Elke partij wordt belicht, ofwel 
vanuit een normatief standpunt, ofwel vanuit een empirisch standpunt. 
Uitdaging voor de morele basis voor ouderschap 
De splitsing van genetische en sociale banden tussen ouders en kind zorgt ervoor dat 
een nieuwe invulling nodig is voor de morele grond voor ouderschap. Wat maakt van 
iemand een ouder, of op welke basis kan iemand ouderlijke rechten en plichten 
claimen? Er werden verschillende visies en argumenten gegeven in de literatuur als 
antwoord op deze vraag. Monistische visies stellen dat er één grond is voor ouderschap. 
Zo verdedigt het geneticisme dat de genetische link tussen ouder en kind de enige grond 
is voor ouderschap. Het intentionalisme stelt dan weer dat de intentie om een kind te 
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verwekken en op te voeden de grond is voor ouderschap. Als antwoord op deze 
monistische visies, kwam de pluralistische visie. Deze visie stelt dat er meerdere 
gronden zijn voor ouderschap en bijhorende rechten en plichten.  
Uitwisselen van informatie 
De betrokkenheid van vier partijen en de aard van de praktijk doet de vraag rijzen wie 
over wat moet geïnformeerd worden. De ethische discussies focussen zich op de 
informatie-uitwisseling tussen de ouders en het kind enerzijds en de informatie-
uitwisseling tussen het gezin en de donor anderzijds. Het eerste debat richt zich op de 
vraag over onthulling of geheimhouding naar het kind toe. Het tweede debat gaat over 
de anonimiteit of identificeerbaarheid van de donor. In beide debatten hebben alle 
betrokken partijen een belang. In het onthullingsdebat staat het recht van de ouders op 
privacy tegenover het recht van het kind om geïnformeerd te worden over informatie 
die zijn/haar leven aanbelangt. In het anonimiteitsdebat staan de belangen van 
donoren, kinderen en ouders eveneens tegenover elkaar. Om tot een oplossing te komen 
moeten al deze belangen tegenover elkaar worden afgewogen. Om tot een goed 
evenwicht te komen, kunnen we beroep doen op empirische gegevens over bijvoorbeeld 
de impact van het al dan niet vertellen of de impact van contact met de donor in het 
gezin. 
Informatie-uitwisseling van het kind naar de donor 
Lange tijd was de praktijk van gametendonatie anoniem. Donoren doneerden anoniem 
om in de toekomst niet geconfronteerd te kunnen worden met de kinderen resulterend 
uit hun donatie. Sinds een paar decennia wordt deze anonimiteit in vraag gesteld door 
een focus op de rechten en belangen van de kinderen. Een aantal landen hebben reeds 
de overstap gemaakt naar een open-identiteitssysteem waarbij de donor 
identificeerbaar wordt voor het kind vanaf een zekere leeftijd (meestal 18 jaar) indien 
het kind dit wenst. Opvallend aan deze beweging is dat er bijna uitsluitend aandacht is 
voor de belangen van het kind. De belangen van andere partijen worden niet in 
rekening gebracht. In dit hoofdstuk focussen we ons net daarom op de belangen van de 
donor. Als het kind recht heeft op bepaalde informatie van de donor, dan heeft de donor 
wellicht ook recht op informatie over de kinderen resulterend uit zijn/haar donatie. In 
dit hoofdstuk gaan we op zoek naar argumenten die donoren zouden kunnen gebruiken 
om bepaalde informatie te claimen.  
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Counselen over al dan niet onthullen aan het kind 
Eén van de grote ethische discussies draait rond de vraag of het kind al dan niet moet op 
de hoogte worden gesteld van de conceptiemethode. Voor een lange tijd werd 
geheimhouding aangeraden aan het koppel. Op dit moment is er een verschuiving aan 
de gang waarbij meer en meer geadviseerd wordt om net wel te onthullen. Een eerste 
vraag die hierbij moet gesteld worden is of een dergelijke directieve aanpak, waarbij een 
actie wordt aangeraden aan de ouders, wel gejustifieerd is. In dit hoofdstuk maken we 
een analyse van twee principes die elk onderliggend zijn aan een specifieke counseling 
aanpak: het principe van autonomie (onderliggend aan een niet-directieve aanpak) en 
het principe van weldoen (onderliggend aan een directieve aanpak). We maken een 
analyse van de empirische data die op dit moment voorhanden zijn die het principe van 
weldoen, en dus een directieve aanpak, ondersteunen. De analyse toont dat er op dit 
moment niet voldoende empirisch bewijs is om een directieve aanpak te 
verantwoorden. De autonomie van de ouders mag niet geschaad worden en bovendien is 
er geen bewijs dat onthulling het welzijn van het kind bevordert. 
De morele grond voor ouderschap volgens koppels die gebruik maakten 
van gametendonatie 
In dit en volgende hoofdstukken wordt er een analyse van empirische data die 
ingezameld werden voor het onderzoek waarvan deze verhandeling deel uitmaakt. In 
dit eerste empirische hoofdstuk dat handelt over de ouders houden we een ruime focus 
aan naar zowel heteroseksuele als lesbische ouders na de behandeling, alsook lesbische 
koppels tijdens hun behandeling. Zoals reeds aangehaald daagt de praktijk van 
gametendonatie de traditionele gronden van ouderschap uit door de opsplitsing van 
genetische en sociale banden. Om deze normatieve theorieën te verrijken, maken we in 
dit hoofdstuk een analyse van de gronden die deze ouders aangeven voor ouderschap. 
Genetische en intentionele gronden worden vaak vermeld, maar ook nieuwe gronden, 
zoals de relatie tussen de partners, werden aangehaald. De koppels nemen een 
pluralistische houding in ten aanzien van ouderschap en tonen dat zeer veel criteria 
recht kunnen geven op ouderschap.  
De invloed van een eenzijdige genetische link op ervaringen van 
ouderschap 
In het tweede empirische hoofdstuk over de ouders zoomen we in op de lesbische 
ouders met een studie naar hun ervaringen met de eenzijdige genetische link. We weten 
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uit voorgaand onderzoek dat deze ouders het verschil in genetische link opvangen door 
te concentreren op het belang van sociale banden en de impact hiervan op kinderen. Uit 
onze data bleek dat de genetische link vaak als irrelevant werd beschouwd. Toch bleken 
er, voornamelijk bij de niet-genetische moeders, af en toe ervaringen van verschil op te 
duiken. Zo beschouwden sommige niet-genetische moeders de genetische link als 
waardevol of speciaal, of werd er voorkeursgedrag naar genetische moeder opgemerkt, 
wat dan werd verklaard door de aanwezigheid van de genetische link. Ook externe 
factoren initieerden ervaringen van verschil, zoals de adoptieprocedure om de 
wettelijke ouder te kunnen worden van het kind.  
Familieconcepten bij kinderen van lesbische koppels 
In het laatste empirische hoofdstuk ligt de focus op de kinderen van de lesbische 
koppels en op hoe zij omgaan met hun gezinsstructuur. We maken een analyse van hoe 
zij de concepten ‘genetische mama’, ‘niet-genetische mama’ en ‘donor’ definiëren. Twee 
opvallende bevindingen kwamen naar voren. Ten eerste werden beide moeders als 
gelijkwaardig beschouwd. De kinderen maakten geen onderscheid tussen een genetische 
moeder en een niet-genetische moeder. In hun beleving was een dergelijke opsplitsing 
niet relevant. Ten tweede, om de concepten ‘niet-genetische moeder’ en ‘donor’ te 
definiëren, grepen de kinderen terug naar de hetero-normatieve concepten ‘mama’ en 
‘papa’. In het geval van het concept ‘donor’ bleek dit vrij complex. Er ontstond een 
conflict tussen de donor als verwekker (zoals een papa) en de donor als een afwezig en 
onbekend persoon (niet zoals een papa).  
Conclusies 
In de huidige literatuur is er een trend naar een eenzijdige focus op de rechten en 
belangen van het kind. Hoewel het kind een kwetsbare partij is en dus speciale aandacht 
verdient, mogen we de andere partijen niet uit het oog verliezen. De donor blijkt, net 
zoals het kind, belang te hebben bij bepaalde informatie van zijn/haar donorkinderen. 
Het is onduidelijk waarom deze belangen zomaar aan de kant zouden mogen worden 
geschoven. Bovendien verdienen alle partijen dezelfde behandeling; de criteria voor het 
al dan niet toekennen van recht op informatie moeten voor alle partijen dezelfde zijn.  
 Verder onderzoek is nodig naar de effecten van het al dan niet onthullen van de 
conceptiemethode aan het kind en de effecten van identificeerbare donoren op de 
gezinnen. Er is op dit moment te weinig informatie om een algemeen geldend antwoord 
te geven op de vragen resulterend uit beide debatten. De beste optie (onthullen of niet; 
anonieme donor of niet) is de optie die de ouders zelf kiezen na een informerende 
counseling sessie.  
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 Gametendonatie is meer dan een behandeling alleen. De impact op het gezin op 
lange termijn mag niet worden onderschat. Een kind verwekt via gametendonatie groeit 
op en confronteert de ouders op allerlei manieren met de praktijk. Fysieke gelijkenissen 
met de donor, interesses die ouders niet bij zichzelf terugvinden, maar ook 
rechtstreekse vragen over de donor (als het kind is ingelicht), brengen de donor jaren 
na de donatie terug op het toneel. Onze data toonden eveneens dat de eenzijdige 
genetische link voor ervaringen van verschil kan zorgen jaren na de donatie. Eén van de 
moeilijkste vraagstukken waarmee ouders worden geconfronteerd is de onthulling naar 
het kind. Aan het begin van de behandeling worden koppels gecounseld over deze 
vraag. Toch is het niet onlogisch dat gedurende de jaren de mening van de ouders 
verandert, of dat het karakter van het kind een andere aanpak vraagt dan de initieel 
overeengekomen aanpak. De evolutie van ervaringen en visies op de praktijk en de 
gevolgen van ouders mag niet vergeten worden. Counseling mag niet stoppen bij een 
succesvolle behandeling. 
De gametendonatiepraktijk omvat meerdere ethische discussies waarvan vele nog 
geen conclusie hebben bereikt. Toch is het belangrijk evoluties verder op te volgen. De 
praktijk heeft het potentieel om de levensdroom van zeer veel mensen waar te maken. 
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English summary 
Background 
Universally, parenthood is undeniably regarded as one of the most important goals in 
life. However, not all couples who intend to have children will also achieve this goal 
spontaneously. An estimated 10-15 % of couples is affected by infertility, which makes 
this one of the most common diseases for people at their reproductive age (between 20 
and 45 years old). A considerable part of the infertile couples is not able to use their own 
genetic material. In such cases, material of a third party can be used. Sperm, oocyte or 
embryo donation can help a couple to conceive a child that is partly genetically or 
biologically related to them. 
The involvement of four parties (parents, child, donor, medical team) creates a 
complex web of wishes, expectations, rights, responsibilities and interests of all parties. 
It is not surprising that the practice is a source of ethical discussions. This dissertation 
aims at contributing to this ethical and empirical bio-ethical literature. Each party 
involved will be investigated, either from a normative or an empirical point of view.  
A challenge to the moral grounds of parenthood 
With the development of ARTs, the - for a long time self-evident - link between genetics 
and parenthood was severed. What exactly makes someone a parent then? Several 
moral grounds and argument were presented in the literature. Monistic theories argue 
that there is one moral ground for parenthood. A geneticist account of parenthood 
states for instance that parental rights and obligations arise solely from the genetic 
relationship between the parents and the child. The intentional account of parenthood 
defends the position that the parents of the child are those people who intended to 
create the child, regardless of any biological connection. In answer to the monistic 
theories, a pluralistic account was developed. This theory argues that there can be more 
than one moral ground for parenthood. None of the grounds is necessary, all grounds 
are sufficient.  
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Exchanging information 
Because of the involvement of four parties, the question rises about who needs to be 
informed about what. The ethical debates centre around the information exchange 
between the parents and the child (disclosure debate), and the information exchange 
between the family and the donor (anonymity debate). In both debates, all parties have 
their own interests. In the disclosure debate, the parents’ right to privacy conflicts with 
the child’s right to information about his/her own life. In the anonymity debate, the 
interests of the donor, the parents and the child are in conflict with each other. To 
reach a solution, the interests of all parties should be balanced. To reach such a balance, 
empirical data on for instance the impact of (non-) disclosure or the impact of contact 
with the donor should be taken into account.  
Information exchange from the child to the donor 
Anonymous gamete donation was long the preferred practice. Since a few decades, a 
new focus on the rights and interests of donor-conceived children has led a number of 
countries to shift towards an open-identity system. However, this evolution appears to 
overlook whether an information exchange could also be of interest to other parties, in 
particular the gamete donors. In this chapter, the question is analysed whether donors 
should be granted a right to some information about the offspring conceived by their 
donations. Five arguments are offered - along the same lines as the arguments given in 
favour of granting information to the donor conceived children - which donors could 
use in support of such a claim. 
Giving advice in the secrecy and disclosure debate 
Much discussion exist on whether the conception method should be disclosed to the 
child or not. For a long time, secrecy was advised. Nowadays, a shift towards openness 
seems to be developing. The question is, however, whether such a directive counselling 
approach is ethically justified. In this chapter, an analysis is made by balancing the two 
underlying principles of autonomy for the parents (non-directive approach) and 
beneficence for the child (directive approach). We analyse the arguments and evidence 
available at this point that support the beneficence principle. This analysis shows that 
no sufficient arguments can be given in favour of the beneficence principle and we 
concluded that the parents’ autonomy should not be overridden.  
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The grounds for parenthood 
A large variety of normative theories exists on what should be the basis of parenthood. 
In this chapter, a study about the moral reasoning of the parents involved in the field on 
the basis of parenthood and parental rights and responsibilities is presented. Via a 
hypothetical scenario, we investigated their arguments and views with regard to the 
grounds of parenthood. For this study, we aimed at including a large variety of parents. 
We focused on lesbian couples post and during treatment, and on heterosexual couples 
post treatment who had a child either via anonymous sperm donation or via (known-) 
anonymous oocyte donation. The aim was to add new insights from the stakeholders to 
the normative debates concerning parenthood. Looking into the moral experiences of 
the people involved can enrich current moral frameworks with views that were 
overlooked by ethicists. The study shows that the people use traditional grounds such as 
intentionalism and geneticism, as well as new grounds such as the relationship between 
the partners. 
The influence of the genetic link on the experience of parenthood 
One of the central topics in the literature on parenthood after treatment via gamete 
donation, is the relevance of genetic ties for parenthood. To enrich normative analyses 
and descriptive background theories, a qualitative analysis is presented on how lesbian 
couples experience and deal with the difference in genetic relatedness in their family 
and to what extend parenthood and being a parent depends on a genetic link. Previous 
research showed that lesbian couples handle the difference with regard to genetic 
relatedness, for instance, by creating a narrative about physical resemblances or by 
focusing on the social bond and its influence on children. The difference with regard to 
the genetic link brought up complex and context-specific experiences for these parents. 
Generally, the genetic link was described as irrelevant: equality between both parents 
was presented as a given. However, some experiences of difference due to the presence 
of one genetic link were found.  
The influence of the genetic link on the definition of family concepts 
In the last chapter, a qualitative study is presented that explores how children (9 to 10 
years old) from lesbian families define the three actors involved in the building of their 
family: the biological mother, the non-biological mother and the donor. The aim of this 
research is to outline how a child conceived via third party reproduction (sperm 
donation) makes sense of his or her family relationships, and to what extend this is 
influenced by the (non-)existence of a genetic link. Two findings stand out. First, the 
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biological and non-biological mother were described as equal parents. Second, the 
concepts ‘non-biological mother’ and ‘donor’ were defined by looking at the hetero-
normative concepts of ‘mummy’ and ‘daddy’. With regard to the donor, the comparison 
with a ‘daddy’ turned out to be complex due to the conflict between the role as a 
progenitor and the lack of a social relationship. 
Conclusions 
In the current literature, there seems to be a one-sided focus on the rights and interests 
of the child, and an accompanying one-sided focus on the importance of openness and 
open-identity systems. Even though serious consideration to the interests of the child is 
understandable, it should not lead to a neglect of the other parties. We argued that the 
donor was justified to receive certain types of information about his/her donor 
conceived children. Moreover, all parties should be considered equally: the criteria to 
grant a right to information should be equal for all parties. More research should be 
conducted on the effects of (non-)disclosure and identifiable donors on the families and 
donors. At this moment, we lack sufficient information to come to a general solution in 
both debates. The preferable option is the option that is chosen by the parents (and 
donors).  
Gamete donation is a long-lasting process that starts with the decision to use gametes 
and evolves over time. While couples might initially come to terms with the 
consequences, this is challenged when the child enters their lives and grows up. Parents 
are confronted with the consequences in real life. One of the most difficult questions 
parents are confronted with is the disclosure decision. While this is discussed during the 
counselling session(s) that take place before or during the treatment, attitudes can 
change and new questions and uncertainties might rise as the child grows up. The long-
term impact of the treatment should not be overlooked. Questions and issues that were 
dealt with at the start of the treatment during counselling might come up again. We 
should be aware of the possible need for counselling many years after the treatment.  
In conclusion, the practice of gamete donation involves several moral debates, many 
of which have not yet reached a conclusion, and some of them might never reach a 
conclusion. There are many complex ethical issues surrounding gamete donation but it 
has nevertheless the potential to fulfil a profound lifelong dream for many people. 
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Appendices 
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Appendix 1  Interview guide lesbian couples – retrospective study 
 
The order of the questions depends on what the participants bring up during the interview. The participants guide the interview partially.  
 
Symbol Ѻ: Questions are in first instance asked to the couple to invite them to talk about both (and shared) experiences. Then, the differences within the 
couple are investigated by asking the question to each participant separately. These differences are then fully explored.  
Symbol *: The specific term used by the participants is copied by the interviewer. When the concept still needs to be introduced, neutral terms are used. 
 
Aim/technique Questions/themes 
Introduction Suggestion: You were invited for an interview because you have a child conceived via medically assisted reproduction. Not much research has 
been done to the experiences of these families themselves so far. That is why we invited you; during this interview we would like to get to know 
your experiences and opinions as parents.  
[Informed consent ] 
[Point out the possibility of taking a break, skipping questions, thinking about questions,…] 
[Point out that no answer is right or wrong] 
Experiences (Origins of) the 
child wish 
 
How did your 
child wish 
start? 
 
Which options 
did you 
consider to 
fulfil your 
child wish?  
 
Can you tell 
me a bit more 
about this 
decision 
process? 
 
Experiences 
with the 
treatment  
 
How did you 
experience 
the 
treatments?  
 
What meaning 
do they have 
for you now?  
 
What role did 
the 
professionals 
have for you? 
 
Meaning couple 
 
What about the 
relationship 
between you 
two?  
 
What meaning 
did the treatment 
have for you, as a 
couple?  
Environment/ family 
narratives 
 
What did you tell to 
your social 
environment (or didn’t 
you tell anything?)  
 
How come that things 
went like that?   
What reaction or 
responses did you 
receive from your 
environment? 
  
Well-being child 
 
Did you tell your child about its 
conception? How come you did 
(not)?  
How did you tell?  
What was his/her response? How 
was this for you?   
 
Are you aware of whether your 
child* has ever spoken about this 
with other people/children?  
 
What do you think the donor* 
means to your child*?  
Similarities 
 
Do you experience any 
similarities or 
differences between 
you and your child* or 
not really? 
Do you recognize 
yourself in your 
child*in some way or 
not? Ѻ  
 
Do others sometimes 
speak about this?  
 
What meaning does 
the absence/presence 
of similarities has for 
you? 
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When themes are mentioned by the participants that were not included in this guide, these are further explored. 
[summarizing and feedback.] 
Moral 
reasoning 
Now, we will go in to some things in more detail. When you’d rather not talk about certain things, you can always say so. 
Experiences of 
parenthood 
 
How do you 
‘do’ that, in 
practice, being 
a parent?  
 
How do you 
experience 
your 
role/position 
as a parent? 
 
At which 
moment you 
had the 
feeling ‘now, 
I’m a parent’? 
‘Mattering’ 
 
How do you 
know that 
you, as 
parents, 
matter to your 
child*? 
 
 
Genetic versus 
social 
 
You are both 
parent to your 
child. You (to 
the genetic 
mother) have 
a genetic link 
with your 
children, you 
(to the non-
biol mother) 
do not. How is 
that for you 
(to the 
couple)? Ѻ  
 
Do you notice 
a difference in 
daily life? Or 
in specific 
contexts? How 
do other 
Meaning donor 
 
How do you see 
the donor* 
(evolution)? 
What does this 
donor* mean to 
you?  
 
[Semantic 
differential scale] 
 
Do you 
sometimes talk 
about the donor* 
in your family or 
not really?  
 
How do you see 
the role of the 
donor* towards 
your child? What 
duties, rights or 
responsibilities 
does he have for 
you?  
 
Information-anonymity 
 
You used an anonymous 
donor. How was that for 
you? 
 
Did you consider using a 
known donor, a friend 
for instance? 
 
The following three 
questions are 
hypothetical and it is 
possible you have never 
thought about them 
before. This is no 
problem.  
 
Imagine that you could 
have received more 
information on the 
donor*, what 
information would you 
like to have received? Ѻ 
How come you would 
have liked more 
information?  
 
Imagine that your child* 
wants certain 
information about the 
donor* in the future, 
what information 
should your child* be 
Perception of the donor 
 
If it were possible, would you have 
liked to choose your donor* or not?  
 
If you could choose your donor*, 
which characteristics would be 
relevant to make a choice?  
 
What do you expect from the 
reproductive centre with regard to 
the donor selection?  
 
If you would be informed about the 
number of offspring of your donor*, 
and this number would be high, 
what would this mean to you?  
 
 What do you think about the 
financial reimbursement for 
donors? 
 
Hypothetical scenario 
 
To further elaborate 
your personal opinions 
in more detail, I 
brought a story with 
me that we made up. I 
would like to ask some 
questions about the 
story (see below). 
The aim is to get a 
better insight into 
your opinions, so you 
should answer what 
you think, not what 
can be done legally. I 
will read the story out 
loud, and you can read 
with me on this sheet.  
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people deal 
with it?  
offered according to 
you? 
 
Imagine that the donor* 
was able to let you know 
that he would like to be 
in contact with you 
(now, this is not 
possible). What would 
your reaction be? 
 
Ending [Thank participants for participating] 
[Offer information about the possibility for medical and psychological help] 
[Explain the interview study towards children and give informed consent when interested. ] 
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Semantic differential scale 
 
A “semantic differential scale” is offered to the participants. They are invited to situate their answer on the scale. The range of possibilities between the two 
extremes are not named, so the participants are free to fill these in themselves. No scores are used to prevent a feeling of right and wrong answers. This scale 
is used to ask about attitudes and opinions, and as a tool to open up a certain subject for discussion. 
 
 
 
 
1) How do you see the donor*? 
 
 
 
Someone         
offering                        Father 
cells 
 
 
 
2) What exactly did you receive of the donor*? 
 
 
                   
A child with 
personality  
traits 
 
 
 
 
 
Some 
cells  
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Hypothetical scenario 
 
 
The participants are offered following story to investigate their ideas about parenthood and the importance of genetic ties. This story is used for several 
groups. The sexes of the individuals in the story are not defined. When the participants ask about this, their question is reversed (they are asked to fill in the 
sex) or they are asked whether this would influence their answer.  
 
When the story is read out loud by the interviewer (participants can read with the interviewer on a separate sheet), the participants are invited to think 
about a solution for all individuals in the story. Cards are offered to help them with ‘full parenthood’, ‘co-parenthood’, ‘no parenthood, but sporadic contact’ 
and ‘no parenthood, no contact’. Each option can be put with each individual. They are asked to discuss out loud their decisions and the reasons for their 
decisions. 
 
 
 
Baby Jeff was born late 2011 to A and B following an IVF-treatment at an American clinic. A and B were overjoyed but their 
relationship broke down a year later. They parted in friendship and agreed on a week-on/week-off co-parenting arrangement. In 2012 
it was clear that a mistake had been made in the lab of the American clinic. A was genetically linked to Jeff, B was not. Instead of the 
material of B, the lab used the material of another person (C) who underwent an IVF-treatment in the same clinic. All three parties 
were notified by the hospital and all three now make a claim the child/parenthood 
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Appendix 2  Interview guide children from lesbian families 
Aim/technique Questions/themes 
Introduction The interviewer introduces herself as a researcher. Suggestion: “I am a researcher and I conduct research on how all sorts of families 
can look like – with mummies, daddies and children – and how the children in all those families were created. I wonder how this 
is in your family, how your family was created. I don’t know much about those things, but I would like to learn a lot about it. And 
that is why I wanted to come and talk with you.” 
 
If you have any questions, you can always ask them to me. When you want to take a break, or when you don’t want to talk about 
something, or when you want to think about something first, that is all possible. There are no right or wrong answers. I am very 
curious about what you think.  
 
Apple tree (see below) [Child is offered a sheet with a drawing of a tree, cards in the shape of apples and a pencil] 
 
I would like to know who belongs to your family – who really belongs to you – and that is why I brought some kind of apple tree. 
You can write your name on an apple and put it somewhere on the drawing or the sheet, where ever you want. Now, you can add 
other apples for all the people who belong to your family. You can choose where you put the apples. So, who belongs to you? To 
your family?  
 
Probe: should anyone else be in the tree? 
Probe: why can x be in the tree?  
 
[! The donor is only discussed when the child mentions him spontaneously, he is not introduced here] 
[Questions about the meaning of ‘belonging to me’: reversing the question and asking to the child ‘does he/she belongs to you? If he/she belongs 
to you, he/she can be in the tree’] 
 
Experiences Concept family/ parenthood (and feelings) 
 
You have an apple for your mummy* 
Similarities 
 
Some children look like their mummy*, 
Birth story 
 
Formerly, your mummy* and mom* 
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(biological mother). But, what exactly is that, 
a mummy*? What do mummies* do? (little 
alien1) 
And a mom* (non-biol mother), what is that 
exactly? What do moms* do?  
You have a mummy* and a mom*, some 
children have a daddy. Can you tell me what a 
daddy is? What do daddies do, you think?  
 
How do you know, or how can you tell that 
you are the child of your mummy* and 
mom*?  
How could other people know that you are 
the child of your mummy* and your mom*?  
How can you know you matter to your 
mummy* and mom*  
some children look like their mom*, 
some children look like both of them and 
some children do not look like either of 
them. How is that with you? What do you 
think of that? You like it, or not? Why is 
that?  
Are there other people you look like, or 
not? (siblings?)  
were alone (pointing at apple tree). 
Back then, they had no children. 
And then, you came. Do you know 
how you came, were created? Can 
you tell me a bit about that?  
Probe: Who told you about how you 
were created?  
Probe: Do you talk about this at 
home sometimes?  
Do you know how other children are 
created?  
In whose tummy have you been? 
And how did that work? (Probe: from 
who was the egg? Where did the 
seed come from?) How did that 
work with your brother(s)/sister(s)?  
 
What do you think about that? Do 
you talk about this sometimes? Of 
not yet? Or how does it work with 
you? How is that for you, (not) 
talking about that?  
 
(discussion is open for feelings 
surrounding the donor and feelings 
surrounding two mothers)  
 
                                                     
1 Imagine that a little alien would come to the Earth to investigate this world and at the alien’s planet, no mummies* and moms* and daddies* exist. How would you 
explain what mummies* and moms* are tot his little alien? And how could this little alien know, “Ah, those are X’s mummy* and mom*”.   
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When themes are mentioned by the child that were not included in this guide, these are further explored.  
[Summarizing and feedback] 
Resuming Apple tree 
(see below) 
Let’s turn back to the apple tree [resume what we did in part 1]. We also talk with other children and then we give them also an 
apple for the donor* and we ask them where this apple should be placed. If you would have an apple for the donor*, what would 
you do with it? Where would you place it? Why can the donor* be there?  
 
What do you know about the donor*? 
 
What does the donor* mean to you?  
 
Do you think about the donor* sometimes, or not? Some children think a lot about the donor*, other children think about him 
sometimes, others never think about the donor*. How is that for you? Probe: what do you then?  
 
I find this all very interesting. I am learing a lot from you. I didn’t know much about all this.  
If you could know something about the donor*, would you like to know something and what would this be? Imagine you had a 
crystall ball or a magical box, what would you like to know?  
  
[! Underline that interviewer has no information about the donor] 
 
Environment Have you ever told about all this to one of your friends, or not? Or in class? What did you tell?  
(discussion is open for feelings surrounding the donor and feelings surrounding two mothers) 
What did the children think about it? Did they say anything, ask something, or not? And your teacher?  
 
Did another adult talk about this with you already, or not?  
Probe: did you talk about it with your grannie or grandpa? What do you think then? Have you spoke about it with your 
brother/sister? How is that for you? 
 
Summarizing and 
feedback 
[Summarize] Is that correct? Did I forget something?  
Are there any questions you want to ask me? Or things you would like to know?  
[!Underline that interviewer has no information about the donor] 
 
Ending [Thank child for participation.] 
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Appendix 3  Interview guide heterosexual couples – anonymous sperm donation – 
retrospective study 
 
Aim/technique Questions/themes 
Introduction Suggestion: You were invited for an interview because you have a child conceived via medically assisted reproduction. Not much research has 
been done to the experiences of these families themselves so far. That is why we invited you; we would like to get to know your experiences and 
opinions as parents.  
[Informed consent ] 
[Point out the possibility of taking a break, skipping questions, thinking about questions,…] 
[Point out that no answer is right or wrong] 
Experiences (Origins of) the 
child wish 
 
How did your 
child wish start? 
 
Which options 
did you consider 
to fulfil your 
child wish?  
 
Can you tell me 
a bit more about 
this decision 
process? 
 
Experiences with the 
treatment  
 
How did you 
experience the 
treatments?  
 
What meaning do 
they have for you 
now?  
 
What role did the 
professionals have 
for you? 
 
How did you 
experience the 
meeting with the 
counsellor?  
Meaning couple 
 
What meaning did 
the treatment 
have for you, as a 
couple? 
Environment/ family 
narratives 
 
What did you tell to 
your social 
environment (or 
didn’t you tell 
anything?)  
 
How come that things 
went like that?   
What reaction or 
responses did you 
receive from your 
environment? 
Well-being child 
 
Did you tell your child 
about its conception? 
How come you did (not)?  
 
Are you aware of 
whether your child* has 
ever spoken about this 
with other 
people/children?  
 
What do you think the 
donor* means to your 
child*? 
Similarities 
 
Do you experience any 
similarities or differences 
between you and your 
child* or not really? 
Do you recognize yourself 
in your child*in some way 
or not? Ѻ  
 
Do others sometimes 
speak about this?  
 
What meaning does the 
absence/presence of 
similarities has for you? 
 
When themes are mentioned by the participants that were not included in this guide, these are further explored. 
[summarizing and feedback.] 
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Moral 
reasoning 
Now, we will go in to some things in more detail. When you’d rather not talk about certain things, you can always say so. 
Experiences of 
parenthood 
 
Parenthood is 
a concept with 
a lot of 
definitions. 
However, not 
one decisive 
definition has 
been given so 
far. That’s why 
we wanted to 
ask you.  
Parenthood in 
general, what 
does this mean 
for you? 
 
At which 
moment you 
had the feeling 
‘now, I’m a 
parent’? 
‘Mattering’ 
 
How do you know 
that you, as 
parents, matter 
to your child*? 
 
 
Genetic versus 
social 
 
You are both 
parent to your 
child. You (to the 
mother) have a 
genetic link with 
your children, 
you (to the 
father) do not. 
How is that for 
you (to the 
couple)? Ѻ  
 
 
Do you notice a 
difference in 
daily life? Or in 
specific contexts? 
How do other 
people deal with 
it? 
 
What does the 
genetic link mean 
to you? 
Meaning donor 
 
How do you see the 
donor*? Has there been 
an evolution in how you 
see the donor*? What 
does this donor* mean 
to you?  
 
[Semantic differential 
scale, see appendix 1] 
 
Do you sometimes talk 
about the donor* in 
your family or not 
really? Do you 
sometimes think about 
the donor*? 
 
What duties, rights or 
responsibilities does he 
have towards your child 
for you?  
 
 
 
 
 
Information-anonymity 
 
You used an anonymous 
donor. How was that for you? 
 
Did you consider using a 
known donor, a friend for 
instance? 
 
The following three questions 
are hypothetical and it is 
possible you have never 
thought about them before. 
This is no problem.  
 
Imagine that you could have 
received more information on 
the donor*, what information 
would you like to have 
received? Ѻ How come you 
would have liked more 
information?  
 
Imagine that your child* 
wants certain information 
about the donor* in the 
future, what information 
should your child* be offered 
according to you? 
 
Imagine that the donor* was 
able to let you know that he 
would like to be in contact 
with you (now, this is not 
possible). What would your 
reaction be? 
Perception of the donor 
 
If you would have been 
allowed to choose 
certain characteristics 
of the donor* at the 
time of your treatment, 
would you have liked 
that? Why (not)? What 
characteristics would 
you consider 
important?  
 
What do you expect 
from the reproductive 
centre with regard to 
the donor selection?  
 
If you would be 
informed about the 
number of offspring of 
your donor*, and this 
number would be high, 
what would this mean 
to you?  
 
What do you think 
about the financial 
reimbursement for 
donors? 
 
 
 
 
Hypothetical scenario 
 
To further elaborate 
your personal opinions 
in more detail, I brought 
a story with me that we 
made up. I would like to 
ask some questions 
about the story (see 
below). 
The aim is to get a 
better insight into your 
opinions, so you should 
answer what you think, 
not what can be done 
legally. I will read the 
story out loud, and you 
can read with me on 
this sheet [see appendix 
1].  
 
At this point, we didn’t 
determine the gender. 
What if A would be male 
and B would be female? 
In other words, B has no 
genetic link, but has 
carried the child? Would 
it make a difference or 
not? 
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Ending [Thank participants for participating] 
[Offer information about the possibility for medical and psychological help] 
[Explain the interview study towards children and give informed consent when interested. ] 
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Appendix 4  Interview guide heterosexual couples – anonymous or known-anonymous egg 
donation – retrospective study 
 
Note to this guide: 
 
In this study, two groups of participants were included. Some participants opted for anonymous donation, and others for known-anonymous 
donation. To include the experiences and reasoning about both donors (the anonymous donor from whom they received and the known 
donor they brought with them ‘in return’) for the participants who used known-anonymous donation, we added specific questions to the 
guide. These questions are underlined. The abbreviations “K-A donation” and “K-A donor” is used to refer to the known-anonymous 
donation. 
 
 
 
Aim/technique Questions/themes 
Introduction Suggestion: You were invited for an interview because you have a child conceived via medically assisted reproduction. Not much research has been 
done to the experiences of these families themselves so far. That is why we invited you; we would like to get to know your experiences and 
opinions as parents.  
[Informed consent ] 
[Point out the possibility of taking a break, skipping questions, thinking about questions,…] 
[Point out that no answer is right or wrong] 
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Experiences (Origins of) the child 
wish 
 
How did your child 
wish start? 
 
Which options did you 
consider to fulfil your 
child wish?  
 
Can you tell me a bit 
more about this 
decision process 
(decision K-A 
donation)? 
 
How was it for you to 
consult a fertility 
centre? (Probe: Some 
couples can have 
children on their own, 
while others can’t. 
They need to consult a 
fertility centre. How 
was that for you?) 
Experiences with 
the treatment  
 
How did you 
experience the 
treatments?  
 
How did you 
experience the 
meeting with the 
counsellor?  
Meaning couple 
 
What meaning did 
the treatment 
have for you, as a 
couple? 
Environment/ family 
narratives 
 
What did you tell to 
your social 
environment (or didn’t 
you tell anything?)  
 
How come that things 
went like that?   
What reaction or 
responses did you 
receive from your 
environment?? 
  
Family communication 
 
Have you told your 
child about his or her 
conception (or…)?  
 
Are you aware of 
whether your child* 
has ever spoken about 
this with other 
people/children?  
Similarities 
 
Do you experience 
any similarities or 
differences between 
you and your child* 
or not really? 
 
Do others sometimes 
speak about this?  
 
What meaning does 
the absence/presence 
of similarities has for 
you? 
 
When themes are mentioned by the participants that were not included in this guide, these are further explored. 
[summarizing and feedback.] 
 
Moral 
reasoning 
Now, we will go in to some things in more detail. When you’d rather not talk about certain things, you can always say so. 
Experiences of 
parenthood 
 
Parenthood is 
a concept 
with a lot of 
definitions. 
However, not 
Genetic versus 
social 
 
You are both 
parent to your 
child. You (to 
the mother) 
have a genetic 
Meaning 
anonymous egg 
donor 
 
(questions about 
the donor from 
whom they 
received) 
Information-
anonymity 
 
Both anonymous and 
known egg donation 
are offered (ever 
considered this?). You 
used an anonymous 
Perception of the 
anonymous egg donor 
 
If you would have 
been allowed to 
choose certain 
characteristics of the 
donor* at the time of 
Negotiations, 
relationship, 
engagements with the 
K-A donor 
 
How did you 
experience the search 
towards your K-A 
Hypothetical 
scenario 
 
To further 
elaborate your 
personal opinions 
in more detail, I 
brought a story 
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one decisive 
definition has 
been given so 
far. That’s 
why we 
wanted to ask 
you.  
Parenthood in 
general, what 
does this 
mean for you? 
 
At which 
moment you 
had the 
feeling ‘now, 
I’m a parent’? 
link with your 
children, you 
(to the father) 
do not. How is 
that for you (to 
the couple)? Ѻ  
 
 
Do you notice a 
difference in 
daily life? Or in 
specific 
contexts? How 
do other people 
deal with it? 
 
What does the 
genetic link 
mean to you? 
 
What does the 
anonymous egg 
donor* mean to 
you? Has there 
been an evolution 
in how you see the 
donor*?  
 
[Semantic 
differential scale] 
 
What do you think 
the anonymous 
egg donor* means 
to your child*? 
 
Do you sometimes 
talk about the 
donor* in your 
family or not 
really? Do you 
sometimes think 
about the donor*? 
 
What duties, rights 
or responsibilities 
does he have 
towards your child 
for you?  
 
 
 
 
 
donor. What does this 
anonymity mean to 
you? 
 
The following three 
questions are 
hypothetical and it is 
possible you have 
never thought about 
them before. This is no 
problem.  
 
Imagine that you could 
have received more 
information on the 
donor*, what 
information would you 
like to have received? 
Ѻ How come you would 
have liked more 
information?  
 
Imagine that your 
child* wants certain 
information about the 
donor* in the future, 
what information 
should your child* be 
offered according to 
you? 
 
Imagine that the 
donor* was able to let 
you know that he 
would like to be in 
contact with you (now, 
this is not possible). 
your treatment, 
would you have liked 
that? Why (not)? 
What characteristics 
would you consider 
important?  
 
What do you expect 
from the 
reproductive centre 
with regard to the 
donor selection?  
 
What do you think 
about the financial 
reimbursement for 
donors? 
 
 
 
 
donor*? Ѻ 
 
What does the K-A 
donor* mean to you 
(contact, 
engagements,…)? 
 
Did you share the K-A 
donation with your 
environment? Do you 
know whether your K-
A donor* has ever 
mentioned this her 
environment?  
 
How do you see the 
role of your K-A donor* 
towards your child 
(contact)? 
with me that we 
made up. I would 
like to ask some 
questions about 
the story (see 
appendix 1). 
The aim is to get 
a better insight 
into your 
opinions, so you 
should answer 
what you think, 
not what can be 
done legally. I 
will read the 
story out loud, 
and you can read 
with me on this 
sheet.  
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What would your 
reaction be? 
Ending  [Thank participants for participating] 
[Offer information about the possibility for medical and psychological help] 
[Explain the interview study towards children and give informed consent when interested. ] 
 
 
Semantic differential scale 
 
 
1) How do you see the donor*? 
 
 
 
Someone         
offering                       Mother 
cells 
 
 
 
2) What exactly did you receive of the donor*? 
 
 
                   
A child with 
personality  
traits 
 
Some 
cells  
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Appendix 5  Interview guide lesbian couples – prospective study 
 
 
Aim/technique Questions/themes 
Introduction Suggestion: You were invited for this interview because you currently are in treatment at the fertility centre of the Ghent University Hospital. 
Not much research has been done to the experiences of the families in treatment so far. That is why we invited you; during this interview we 
would like to get to know your experiences and opinions as parents.  
[Informed consent ] 
[Point out the possibility of taking a break, skipping questions, thinking about questions,…] 
[Point out that no answer is right or wrong] 
Experiences (Origins of) the 
child wish 
 
How did your child 
wish start? 
 
How do you 
experience the 
treatment process? 
Ѻ 
 
How do you 
experience this as 
a couple? 
 
 
Decisions 
 
Who will carry the child? 
What does this mean for 
you? 
 
Did you consider other 
options (adoption?)? 
 
You opted for an 
anonymous donor. How is 
that for you?  
 
Did you ever consider 
using a known donor?  
Environment 
 
Have you told your 
environment about your 
current treatment or not 
really? How come you chose 
(not) to tell? 
 
What reaction or responses 
do you receive from your 
environment?? 
  
Thinking about the future 
 
How do you picture your 
future family? 
 
For instance, do you think 
about having more than one 
child, what are your ideas 
about who will carry the child, 
do you have any ideas about 
the donor,…? 
Disclosure 
 
Do you think you will 
disclose the conception 
method to your child or 
not? What are your views 
on that now? 
When themes are mentioned by the participants that were not included in this guide, these are further explored. 
[summarizing and feedback.] 
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Moral 
reasoning 
Now, we will go in to some things in more detail. When you’d rather not talk about certain things, you can always say so. 
Parenthood 
 
Parenthood is a 
concept with a lot of 
definitions. 
However, not one 
decisive definition 
has been given so 
far. That’s why we 
wanted to ask you.  
Parenthood in 
general, what does 
this mean for you? 
 
What exactly is ‘a 
parent’? 
Selection/views on 
heritability 
 
Did you record certain 
preferences for the donor 
selection?  
 
You already mentioned 
that X* will carry the 
child. One of you will 
have a genetic link with 
the child, the other will 
not. How do you see that?  
 
What does ‘a genetic link’ 
entail for you exactly? 
Information-anonymity 
 
The following three 
questions are hypothetical 
and it is possible you have 
never thought about them 
before. This is no problem.  
 
Imagine that your child* 
wants certain information 
about the donor* in the 
future, what would your 
reaction be? What 
information should be 
available to your child? 
 
Imagine that the donor* will 
be able to let you know, in 
the future, that he would 
like to be in contact with 
you (this is not possible at 
this moment). What would 
your reaction be? 
 
Donor: role and meaning 
 
How do you see the donor* 
(image and meaning)?  
 
[Semantic differential scale] 
 
What duties, rights or 
responsibilities does the 
donor* have towards your 
child according to you?  
 
What do you think about the 
financial reimbursement for 
donors? 
 
What do you expect from the 
reproductive centre with 
regard to the donor selection?  
 
Imagine that you were able to 
choose more characteristics of 
the donor*, would you like to 
do that? What characteristics 
would you consider 
important?  
 
Hypothetical scenario 
 
To further elaborate your 
personal opinions in more 
detail, I brought a story 
with me that we made up. I 
would like to ask some 
questions about the story 
(see below). 
The aim is to get a better 
insight into your opinions, 
so you should answer what 
you think, not what can be 
done legally. I will read the 
story out loud, and you can 
read with me on this sheet.  
 
Imagine A would die, how 
would you deal with the 
situation then? 
Ending [Thank participants for participating] 
[Offer information about the possibility for medical and psychological help] 
[Explain the interview study towards children and give informed consent when interested. ] 
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Semantic differential scale 
 
 
 
What exactly will you receive from the donor*? 
            
 
 
 
                   
Some cells                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a child 
with 
personality 
traits  
